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Post deregulation, many U.S. airlines created hubs with banked schedules, however, in 
the past decade these same airlines began to experiment with depeaking their schedules to 
reduce costs and improve operational performance. To date there has been little research 
that has investigated revenue and operational shifts associated with depeaked schedules; 
yet understanding the trade-offs among revenue, costs, and operational performance at a 
network level is critical before airlines will consider future depeaking and related 
congestion-management strategies. This study develops data cleaning and analysis 
methodologies based on publicly available data that are used to quantify airport-level and 
network-level revenue and operational changes associated with schedule depeaking. 
These methodologies are applied to six case studies of airline depeaking over the past 
decade. Results show that depeaking is associated with revenue per available seat mile 
(RASM) increasing slower than the rest of the network and the industry as a whole. 
Depeaking is associated with improved operations for both the depeaking airlines and 
competitors. Airports benefit from increases in non-aeronautical sales associated with 
connecting passengers spending more time in the terminal. The underlying reasons 
driving airlines’ scheduling decisions during depeaking vary greatly by case. Results 
from the study provide insights for airlines that are considering depeaking and the 
airports which are affected. The results suggest that losses in RASM and no improvement 
in operations could potentially lead an airline to repeak, and that RASM is prone to fall 








A “depeaked” schedule goes by many names in the airline industry. Some describe it as a 
rolling hub, because the banks are removed and there are no lulls in activity. It also is 
described as a continuous schedule, because of the consistent level of operations which 
occurs throughout the day at the airport. Regardless of name, the depeaking of an airline 
schedule is a cost-cutting strategy that removes the inefficiencies of a banked, or peaked, 
schedule. Since the early 2000s, it has been a technique that several major airlines have 
tried at least once at one of their hubs. The depeaking concept during the early 2000s 
became one of the biggest experiments in the industry (Mecham, 2004). 
 In a peaked schedule, aircraft arrive in banks at an airline hub so that short 
connections are available for passengers. This helps the airline compete against 
competitors offering non-stop service or service through other hubs. Between the peaks 
of activity, however, staff and equipment sit idle. In addition, the large number of gates 
needed to service all the aircraft simultaneously sit empty. Banking, for all the benefits it 
provides, is an inefficient use of airline resources. Depeaking solves this issue and allows 
the airline to be more efficient, reducing the cost to operate the schedule.  
 The benefits of depeaking have been explored in terms of cost savings, 
operational improvements, and resource usage. These positive effects though come at the 
expense of a reduction in revenue, as connections are presumed to be broken as the banks 
are dropped. This study fills this gap in the literature through an exploration into the 
2 
 
revenue effects of depeaking. By combining publicly available data, the supply and 
demand before and after a depeaking event are compared to explore the role these play in 
airlines’ depeaking decision-making processes. In addition, the revenue effect of 
depeaking a schedule is analyzed so that the change in revenue can be better forecasted. 
 This dissertation contains five chapters. The first is an introduction to the topic 
and the motivation behind doing the study. The second chapter describes the literature on 
topics relevant to depeaking so that the issue can be more fully understood. Chapter three 
describes the methods used to analyzed depeaking, and chapter four contains the results 
from this analysis. Chapter five discusses what can be learned from the results, 
summarizes the conclusions and recommendations, and points out how this study 
contributes to the industry. 
 
1.2 Context 
Many airports are congested, have reached their physical capacity, and cannot expand to 
meet near-term and long-term demand. Increased traffic is constrained by the level of 
activity an airport’s runways and gates can process. Increased congestion and demand for 
infrastructure access cause aircraft to experience delays. Airport delays due to congestion 
can be exacerbated due to a common airline business model: banking flights at hub 
airports.  
 The banked schedule, soon after deregulation, became the most common traffic 
pattern at large airports, with systematic, distinct peaks that resulted from the hub-and-
spoke operations of the dominant hub airline (Daniel & Harback, 2008). These banks 
consist of flights that arrive and depart within a short period of time, allowing airlines to 
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create more connection opportunities and minimize connection times for passengers. 
Both of these factors are intended to increase airlines’ revenue. The more connections an 
airline can offer in a reasonable time for passengers, the greater the likelihood of a trip on 
that airline occurring, due to the increased probability that an inbound flight can reach a 
given outbound flight (Franke, 2004). Some hubs have up to twelve daily banks to allow 
passengers as many chances to use them to complete their travel at the times they desire 
(Hirschman, 2004).  
 Banking flights, however, may result in increased passenger delays because the 
number of takeoff and landing requests exceeds the available airspace capacity. The 
massive peaks lead to reduced airside productivity because of the temporary congestion. 
This is particularly problematic if multiple carriers have banked flight operations at the 
same hub. Banked flights also constrain the hub airline’s ability to recover from irregular 
operations caused by adverse weather conditions or other events. 
 Banked schedules are also a challenge for airports, particularly with respect to 
manpower planning. Banked flights create peak periods of activity for customer service 
representatives, baggage handlers, and gate and ground personnel. These large 
fluctuations come at a time when there is already a high-risk for missed flights due to 
time critical connections (Franke, 2004), causing high stress to airport staff. Ultimately, 
this leads to poor punctuality performance. Servicing these peak periods requires hiring 
more staff and purchasing additional equipment that is not fully utilized when the peaks 
are over (Kemppainen et al., 2007). This underutilization during the off-peak periods 
increases the cost per aircraft because more staff is needed than would be necessary if 
flights were more evenly distributed. Although many airlines have maintained their 
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banked schedules because they believe these banks maximize their revenue opportunities, 
and fuel the possibility for business growth (McDonald, 2002), other airlines have 
experimented with depeaked schedules as a way to minimize costs. 
 Depeaking schedules was one way airlines responded to the high costs they faced 
throughout the 2000s. By reducing the maximum number of aircraft that depart and arrive 
at an airport within a period of time, gates, equipment, and personnel can be used more 
efficiently. Inactivity is reduced as aircraft are constantly being serviced. American 
Airlines was the first U.S. airline to implement depeaking across parts of its system in 
order to control for costs. In 2002, American depeaked its hubs in Chicago O’Hare 
(ORD) and Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW), responding to the economic downturn post-9/11 
(Reed, 2006). 
Depeaking is not an easy decision for an airline because a more continuous 
schedule of operations means there are likely fewer connection opportunities, and the 
average minimum connection time increases. Decreased revenue is thus likely, and an 
airline needs to assess whether the cost savings associated with depeaking outweigh any 
revenue losses. Although cost savings are relatively straightforward for an airline to 
quantify, it is difficult to measure revenue changes. An airline that depeaks its schedule 
may unintentionally improve operational performance for all carriers at the airport; thus 
the airline may lose revenue and increase the profitability of its competitors. 
 
1.3 Research Problem 
As noted by Stephan Nagel in 2004, Director of Star Alliance’s route network operations, 
“there’s no clear answer as to whether the rolling hub is a good hub” (Mecham, 2004). 
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This gap in knowledge makes it ever more critical to study this topic. The research 
problem is a lack of understanding about how depeaking affects revenue and operations. 
Airlines have been implementing depeaking without fully knowing what the effects on 
revenue the schedule change will have. This problem could put the airline at risk to lose 
on routes to spoke airports where it once was dominant, as the competition takes 
advantage of dropped connections at the depeaked hub. It also could cause unforeseen 
impacts to operations. 
The research problem at its core is a lack of information. There has been no 
formal study to determine how airline revenue is affected by depeaking. Without an 
analysis performed on what can potentially change when a schedule is depeaked, it is 
difficult to make an informed decision on the consequences. From the revenue 
perspective, benefits are often measured indirectly in terms of aircraft utilization and 
percent of time spent in the air.  The operational effect has seen more attention, likely 
because it is easier to study, but there has yet to be a cross-case comparison on operations 
due to airline schedule depeaking. 
 Involved with the problem of a lack of understanding is a lack of measurement for 
depeaking. Being able to assess depeaking requires a means to say how much of a change 
occurred and how that relates to the effects. It is an issue that there is not a way to 
quantify the changes that occur to a schedule during depeaking, or to assess how banked 
a schedule is compared to a depeaked schedule. 
 Another part of the problem which has not been studied is with regards to 
potential connections. There has yet to be a look into how depeaking breaks connections 
in the schedule. This is important because for a hubbing airline, connections are the key 
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to profitability. By understanding if connections get broken provides either a reason or a 
factor into revenue potentially decreasing due to depeaking. In addition, even a loss in 
connections can still be good for revenue, if the decision is made correctly. Figure 1.1 




Figure 1.1  Connection opportunities with banked and continuous schedule design. 
 
 
Under peaked scheduling, flights 1-5 are scheduled to provide connections to flights a-d 
and flights 6-9 are scheduled to provide connections to flights e-i. Under continuous 
scheduling, some of these connections (e.g., 3-a and 3-b) are broken, yet additional 
connections (e.g., 5-e and 5-f) are created. It has been noted that the average passenger 
volume of the markets which lost connections in depeaking and were removed from the 
schedule were less than a third than those markets which were maintained (Goedeking & 
Sala, 2003). The problem is that no mention though was made of the connections that 
were created in the process. Connections 5-e and 5-f could be much more profitable than 
the broken connections. 
 In addition to the lack of information on depeaking, there is no objective 
determination as to whether depeaking is good or bad for the airport. As described before, 
there is some information available on depeaking’s effects on airlines, especially from the 
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cost side. For airports, however, no statement has been made or studied. The airport may 
not have a role in the decision, but as an important stakeholder, it is a problem that there 
is no information for the airport as to how depeaking can affect it. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
In order to address the research problem, several research questions were developed to 
guide the research project. These questions are the ones that will be attempted to be 
answered through the work of this study, and are purposefully asked to motivate finding 
solutions to the previously described research problem statements. Each question would 
build on the body of knowledge for depeaking. The research questions are: 
 
• What are the differences between different airlines’ depeaking implementation? 
• How did depeaking affect airline revenue? 
• How did operations change at the depeaked hub? 
• What was the effect on the competition at the depeaked hub? 
• How did airlines decide which changes to make in their network when depeaking? 
• What is the effect on airport revenue? 
 
1.5 Purpose Statement 
Taking a banked schedule and depeaking it certainly comes with risks. The need to, at the 
least, balance saved cost and lost revenue is important. It is plausible that depeaking 
negatively affects revenue to such an extent that the saved cost leaves the airline in a 
worse situation than when it started.  
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The purpose of this study is to quantitatively and qualitatively examine how 
depeaking can be used to control cost at an airport hub without hurting revenue and 
operations to the point where the change does more harm than good. The intent is to help 
airlines and airports prepare for depeaking, and to be made aware of the risks. Part of this 
is the objective to compare and contrast depeaking examples to provide a reference for 
what depeaking is and what it can be reasonably expected to do for an airline. By 
quantitatively analyzing the network decisions airline’s made in depeaking the airline and 
airport can be better prepared for deciding to depeak in the future. 
To accomplish these overall goals and answer the research questions, the 
following objectives were developed: 
 
• Identify how past studies have evaluated depeaking and what additional steps can 
be taken to further their conclusions. 
• Understand the background of what gave rise to banked schedules, why 
depeaking occurred, and what the benefits were discussed as being at the time. 
• Develop a methodology to examine revenue and operational impacts of depeaking 
based on publicly available data. The methodology includes determining how to 
attribute affiliate airline traffic to parent airlines and developing a heuristic 
method to identify banks in a schedule. 
• Determine if public data sources can be used to identify which airlines depeaked 
and when they depeaked. 
• Develop measures to describe the effectiveness of depeaking. 
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• Evaluate supply, revenue, and operations changes using a difference-in-difference 
technique. 
• Use multivariate regression model to investigate the decision-making process of 
airlines depeaking their schedule. 




This paper contributes to the field of aviation through practical knowledge, 
methodologies, and relevant conclusions that can be put into practice. 
 Practically, this paper contributes to the literature by identifying those airlines and 
airports that depeaked from 2000-2010, a list which is not found elsewhere. It also 
contributes by determining the context under which each airline depeaked. 
 Methodologically, this study develops data cleaning and analysis methodologies 
based on publicly available data that are used to assess revenue impacts associated with 
schedule depeaking. A new methodology is developed to heuristically identify banks 
within a peaked schedule, and specifically to determine the number of peaks in the 
banked schedule, as well as the number of adjacent time periods to define as part of a 
bank. This study is also unique in that it develops a methodology for recreating historic 
schedules flown by parent and their affiliate carriers based on combining the On-Time 
and DB1B ticketing databases available from the Office of Airline Information of the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS).  
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 Lastly, this study contributes to the industry by quantitatively and qualitatively 
evaluating depeaking. It is the first study to evaluate the revenue impacts of depeaking. In 
addition, both the revenue and operational impacts are assessed across cases for a broader 
understanding of depeaking’s effects. The study contributes an understanding of the 
depeaking decision-making process so that in the future airlines can compare their current 
situation to past cases and assess their best course of action. For airports, this 
understanding allows them to assess potential future changes in service to other cities that 
may be cut or added due to depeaking. Lastly, the study formalizes relationships between 
passenger connection times and airport revenue, which could assist airlines in discussions 
with airports about the positive benefits of depeaking. 
 
1.7 Note on Naming Conventions 
Throughout this dissertation, the official names of airlines, their common-use names, and 
operating codes are used interchangeably (e.g. Delta Airlines, Delta, and DL). A list of 
airline operating codes used in this report can be found in Appendix A. Similarly, a list of 








Depeaking has received increased interest in the literature since American Airlines 
depeaked its hub at Chicago O’Hare airport in 2002. As other airlines attempted the 
strategy at their hubs, research efforts focused on the reasons airlines decided to depeak, 
defining performance measures to evaluate the effects of depeaking, and evaluating the 
results of implementing continuous schedules. The following chapter describes how 
peaked schedules developed during the post-deregulation period, and discusses the 
history of depeaking and why it arose as a strategy used by legacy airlines a decade and a 
half later. American Airlines is described in further detail to explain some of the typical 
results of depeaking. 
 This chapter also includes background on other areas of significance related to 
this project. Included in the discussion are sections on how competition is affected by 
depeaking, peak scheduling in other industries, background on affiliate airlines and how 
their contracts are structured, and the revenue effects for airports due to the longer 
transfer times of depeaked schedules. 
 In the following few sections, the effects of hub-and-spoke networks, flight banks, 
and depeaked schedules are discussed on how they affected passenger fares and revenue 
for the airline. The reader will notice that depending on the source, the different network 
and schedule changes are perceived as increasing or decreasing fares. To make sense of 
the differing opinions, section 2.4 summarizes the different beliefs, and provides some 
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insight into the different conclusions. One of the goals of this research is to examine 
depeaking through a more rigorous analysis to gain perspective on these uncertain 
answers. 
 
2.2 Rise of Banked Schedules 
After deregulation, hub-and-spoke networks and banked flight schedules developed 
around the same time. The shift in 1978 from a highly regulated aviation market to one 
where airlines could make decisions and operate without government intervention set off 
a period of innovative practices in the industry. The U.S. aviation business redefined 
itself in a very short period. 
 
2.2.1 Development of Hub-and-Spoke System 
On October 24, 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) was signed into law, a 
decision which was the culmination of nearly three years of congressional hearings. Prior 
to the enactment of the ADA, experts described what they envisioned the post-
deregulation aviation industry to look like. There was very little discussion, however, on 
the potential for a new route structure under deregulation (Evans & Kessides, 1993), and 
none of the predictions foresaw the emergence of the hub-and-spoke system (Levine, 
1987). Instead, it was expected that airlines would continue to use linear route structures, 
just as the intrastate airlines, which were never federally regulated, had been using all 
along.  
 Prior to deregulation, only Delta and Frontier Airlines operated a hub-and-spoke 
system, the former out of Atlanta and the latter out of Denver. After deregulation, the 
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hub-and-spoke model was widely adopted by airlines and became the route structure of 
choice. Many airlines were reluctant to develop such a system under regulation because it 
required permission to exit a market. In addition, the barriers to entry of a market made it 
difficult to achieve demand-side benefits associated with networks (Gillen, 2005). Thus 
the reconfiguration of networks after deregulation got driven by the underlying 
economics of the industry that were just waiting to be in the driver’s seat. 
 The economics that drove the development of the hub-and-spoke system in the 
industry are described by Gillen (2005) to be two primary network effects: (1) the 
compatibility of flights in each market and (2) the internalization of externalities in using 
spokes as feeder traffic for trunk routes. Gillen describes that in a linear connected 
network, direct flights achieve direct density economies, such that the presence of a non-
stop flight in a market attracts more demand than having a connection in between. Thus, 
a non-stop flight is preferable to a connection for the airline, all other variables aside, 
because it attracts passengers. 
 The linear network with many direct flights, however, is not cost effective and 
does not optimize profit. The combination of high frequencies and larger aircraft are 
simply not possible in a system served by non-stop flights (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985). 
A hub-and-spoke network allows more flights for a given traffic density on the spokes, 
and cost levels can be reduced by ensuring a compatibility of flights to these markets 
(Gillen, 2005). By matching smaller aircraft to smaller markets, these aircraft can work as 
feeder services to larger trunk routes through the hub connection. Large trunk routes can 
fly large intercontinental aircraft long distances, at the same frequency of the small 
market. This internalizes the externalities of the system by pricing tickets so that the 
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feeder spokes can offer higher frequencies and be more cost efficient, while pricing trunk 
routes to have heavier traffic with demand created throughout the system. Airlines thus 
consolidate flights to a few hub airports to take advantage of the higher volumes which 
are a result of the change (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985), using large aircraft to service 
those demands and taking advantage of the economies of large aircraft size. It is then also 
possible to increase service frequency as well, a benefit to passengers which slightly 
offsets the increase in travel time due to transferring. 
 The hub-and-spoke model was preferred by deregulated airlines for a number of 
reasons. First, by developing a network focused on a hub the airlines were able to keep 
costs down and reduce fares (Button, 2002; Evans & Kessides, 1993; Levine, 1987). 
These goals in some part were achieved through increased load factors. This increase 
reduced the cost per passenger mile on traffic to the spokes in the network and also 
helped reduce fares in the hub-spoke markets (Evans & Kessides, 1993; Siegmund, 
1990). In addition, the hub-and-spoke model allowed for airlines to keep aircraft in the air 
longer than a linear network and enabled airlines to coordinate aircraft maintenance, both 
aiding in the reduction of cost relative to revenue (Button, 2002). 
 The second reason for the shift by deregulated airlines to a hub-and-spoke 
network was it allowed an overall increase in the scope of their operations (Evans & 
Kessides, 1993), both in breadth of markets and service frequency. By reducing the 
number of direct flights offered in the overall network, the airline repurposed aircraft to 
serve hub-spoke routes continuously. By aggregating their traffic from a variety of 
origins and making passengers connect through a hub, the airlines increased their number 
of city-pair routes (Evans & Kessides, 1993; Levine, 1987). This aggregation of 
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passengers at the hub allowed for medium and small markets to get service to 
destinations across the system, when typically no service would be available at all 
because the traffic density would not support it. As described by Levine (1987), each 
additional spoke adds to the system such that there is a geometric expansion in the 
number of markets being served. As described by Franke (2004), the system 
accomplished a disproportional increase in connections at just an incremental cost. 
 To the surprise of those who thought service frequency would decrease after 
deregulation, service frequency among markets increased because of the rise of the hub-
and-spoke network. The increase occurred because each additional aircraft departure to 
an additional spoke provides many alternatives for connecting flights (Winston, 1998). 
Increased service frequency also was beneficial for the airline because it satisfied the 
needs of the high yield business customer (Gillen, 2005). Airlines preferred this network 
type because it positioned them to capture higher fares from customers desiring a broad 
range of destinations at high frequencies. A final advantage of the increase in schedule 
frequency is that it gave the airline a prominent share of the market (Kanafani & 
Ghobrial, 1985), which in turn provided increased returns on market share. 
 The final reason airlines turned to hub-and-spoke networks was the market power 
it provided and the savings generated from economies of scale. The hub-and-spoke model 
kept concerned airlines reassured that they could survive deregulation because it provided 
protection from new airlines entering their hub (Levine, 1987). With one airline having 
strong market power at a hub, other airlines did not enter that hub unless providing 
service to and from their own strong hubs. A hub’s market power also extended to 
reservation systems. The hubbing airline dominated the Computer Reservation System 
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(CRS) at the hub, and with their large volumes and variety of flights, it could create more 
effective CRS override programs, such as incentives for travel agents to encourage them 
to sell seats on the hubbing airline (Levine, 1987). Agents were exposed to more 
information from the dominant hub airline, and thus sold more tickets for it than 
competitors (Siegmund, 1990). Even the distribution of information to consumers gave 
the hub airline an advantage. A dominant hub airline could afford the costs of developing 
and communicating information about schedules, seat availability, service features, and 
prices to consumers (Levine, 1987). These consumers, exposed to a greater concentration 
of information about one airline than others in a market, would choose the same hub 
airline continuously for future travel.  
 Being in control of an airport also gives the airline an advantage in setting fares in 
markets. Through operating a large percentage of the available gates, the airline has the 
ability to increase fares in markets since they likely have greater frequency of service and 
exposure to the customers (Siegmund, 1990). Hanlon (1996) describes how the average 
fare to and from hubs are much greater than the average fares on other routes provided by 
the airline; a premium for traveling to and from the hub. This fare increase becomes 
accentuated when competition is reduced on these hub routes, and the hub airline can 
increase fares further. The hub airline’s control of an airport also garners it cost savings 
from economies of scale due to the centralizing of maintenance, reservations, sales, and 
general traffic services. Lastly, even though the average cost per passenger does not 
decrease as passenger volume increases (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985), with a hub, the 
incremental cost of adding a passenger is much lower than the incremental revenue that 
passenger brings to the system (Levine, 1987).  
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2.2.2 Banked Schedules at the New Hubs 
Once a hub-and-spoke system was implemented, the preferred scheduling design post-
deregulation was a banked schedule. Coordinating the arrival and departure of aircraft 
became ever more important as competition increased at major airports (Hanlon, 1996). 
Flight banks occurring repeatedly throughout the day gave passengers many options for 
service, reasonable travel times, and lower fares. Airlines claimed that a banked wave 
structure was designed to meet passenger expectations, particularly convenient access to 
many destinations, based on responses they received from travelers over time (Button, 
2002; Kemppainen et al., 2007). Airlines felt safe to assume that passengers desired to 
minimize their total elapsed time, creating banks to achieve this goal (Theis et al., 2006). 
 The key aspect of a banked schedule was that all aircraft would arrive and depart 
in a short period of time. In this system, it was necessary to schedule all arriving flights 
ahead of any departing flights. This allowed passengers to make transfers between all 
aircraft, and maximize the number of origins and destinations pairs they could travel 
between (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985; Daniel, 1995). Maximizing the amplitude of each 
bank only further increased the potential benefits (Hanlon, 1996). The time for these 
transfers needed be long enough to permit passengers to get between any aircraft in the 
arrival and departure banks. The quick turnarounds also kept aircraft in the air longer 
than in a linear network, keeping fares low and attracting more passengers to the system 
(Button, 2002). More importantly, though, is that banked schedules provided more 
choices of service for passengers (Button, 2002; Gillen, 2005; Siegmund, 1990). Airlines 
accomplished this by providing many gates close together in a single terminal to handle 
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the peak flow of passengers. More options opened up to the passenger because of the 
simultaneous arrival of many flights going to dozens of destinations. 
 Banked schedules were favorable for airlines because they retained a reasonable 
travel time as compared to a direct flight. A fast connection kept the airline’s offering for 
a given market competitive. By having flights arrive in a bank, passengers were able to 
connect quickly and not be burdened by dwelling in a terminal for a longer period 
(Button, 2002; Dennis, 2001; Siegmund, 1990). Passengers value both their time in the 
air and on the ground. Reducing overall elapsed time in the schedule made it more 
convenient for a connecting traveler (Levine, 1987). Although a nonstop flight was 
superior in total elapsed travel time, a connecting flight could be cheaper at the expense 
of time, but not too much longer to not be competitive.  
 Having flights arrive at the airport and requiring servicing simultaneously is the 
major drawback of banked schedules. It is acknowledged that when complex hubs 
coordinate all arrivals into banks, it poorly utilizes labor and equipment which sit idle in 
between banks (Button, 2002; Gillen, 2005). This drawback, however, can often be 
minimized with careful staff scheduling.  
 Hub-and-spoke networks are a successful innovation in their own right, but 
banked scheduling amplified their success. At a given airport, banked schedules 
increased the dominance of the airline hubbing there (Dennis, 2001), further amplifying 






2.2.3 Adding to Banked Schedules 
The growth of passenger traffic in the aviation industry has resulted in airlines having to 
prepare for additional travelers in their schedules. Simultaneously, airlines in periods of 
good growth aim to add new destinations from their hub to reap the geometric effects on 
revenue each connection contributes to the network. Dennis (2001) discusses how airlines 
have two options for these new flights: (1) add new banks to the schedule, or (2) add to 
the edges of existing banks. Both of these have their share of complexities. The first 
requires moving flights from other banks to create a new bank of flights, or adding 
additional daily flights to a destination to fill the new bank. The second option has the 
potential to add to a passenger’s waiting time, which risks pushing the passenger to a 
competitor or to not fly at all. The second option though has the potential to be favorable 
over the first option, because adding to the periphery of the banks could have 
multiplicative benefits. 
 In order to explore the multiplicative effect of adding to a bank, Dennis (2001) 
examines the relationship between the number of flights in a bank, the necessary 
connection time, and the amount of potential connections that can occur. Using as an 
assumption an airport that has the runway capacity to handle 60 arrivals and departures 
per hour and a minimum connection time of 30 minutes, Dennis finds the optimal size of 
a bank is 50 aircraft, as seen in Figure 2.1. As banks become too long, due to a limited 
capacity for runways to process arrivals and departures, the waiting times for passengers 
become extended. Any additional connections created by placing a flight at the outskirts 
of the bank act to only increase average waiting times, thus marginal waiting time 





Figure 2.1  Increase in connections with respect to bank (wave) size (based on 60 arrivals/departures 
per hour and 30 minute minimum connection time). Source: Dennis (2001) 
 
 
Because adding to a bank can have negative effects after a certain point, airlines have 
historically gone in the direction of adding more banks throughout the day. This had the 
added benefit of increased flight frequency which was attractive to travelers. Airlines at 
busy airports, like American at DFW and Delta at ATL, had as many as 11 and 10 banks 
a day, respectively. They maintained a disciplined series of arrivals and departures that 
squeezed as much revenue out of the airports’ runway capacities (Dennis, 2001). 
 Whether adding banks or to the periphery of banks, airlines must consider a 
number of variables (Hanlon, 1996). First, the airport and the airspace have limited 
capacity, perhaps the most important factor when determining changes to a schedule. If 
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the infrastructure and travel patterns cannot handle an increase, it cannot be forced 
through. Second, flight safety needs to be considered, so that passengers and crew are not 
put at risk due to the intensity of operations. Lastly, rostering for crew and aircraft 
allocation has to be considered carefully so that work limits are not exceeded and 
maintenance schedules are still met. 
 
2.2.4 Looking for Another Option 
The results from the 2001 study by Dennis showed that there is an upper bound for the 
potential of banks in a schedule. Banks can only get so large before more banks need to 
be added and the bank size reduced. The probability of capacity getting increased, such as 
adding additional runways, is low in the short time-frames airlines have to adjust their 
schedules. When airports are congested and nearly a dozen banks are operating daily for 
an airline, there are few options left. 
 As just mentioned, an expensive capacity increase is likely not plausible to solve 
an airline’s connection time issue within its banks. One option has been for airports to 
make investments to reduce the minimum connection time for passengers by rearranging 
terminal and gate assignments (Dennis, 2001). This is not always possible, however, as 
the airport has contracts with many airlines, and it could involve coordinating with 
competitors, with the hubbing airline likely being the only one to reap the benefits.  
 Searching for an option that is within an airline’s own power to control, airlines 
looked toward depeaking their schedules. Depeaking, however, is a major challenge in 
itself, and similar to the rise of hub-and-spoke systems, a strong stimulus was needed to 
convince airlines it was a good path to explore.  
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 As described earlier, the rise of hub-and-spoke airline systems and thus the 
emergence of banked schedules occurred during a volatile period in U.S. aviation history. 
These characteristics developed just as the industry was suddenly expanding due to 
deregulation, and subsequently contracting domestically as airlines merged and went 
bankrupt in the free market environment where fares were not set by the government 
(Evans & Kessides, 1993). During this time of change, innovative practices flourished. 
Over two decades later, the events of 9/11 changed the airline industry, and from this 
volatile change, the innovative practice of depeaking emerged. 
 
2.3 The Switch to Depeaked Schedules 
The airline industry is always changing and adapting, keeping itself at the frontlines of 
operations research and developing new concepts. Depeaking, a term to describe an 
airline implementing a continuous or rolling schedule at a hub, arose in the early 2000s as 
a viable option to solve rising costs in the system. The central premise is that one can 
save more cost from being efficient with labor, equipment, and real estate than from lost 
revenue by connections becoming too long or too short. 
 Taking a banked schedule and depeaking it certainly comes with risks. The need 
to, at the least, balance saved cost and lost revenue is important. It is plausible that 
depeaking negatively affects revenue to such an extent that the saved cost leaves the 
airline in a worse situation than when it started. In addition, the belief held by Button 
(2002) is still applicable in many situations: that the loss due to spreading out of services 
to better make use of landside staff and facilities is more than offset by the additional 
passenger benefits which come from convenient connections amassed in a bank.  
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 The following subsections describe the problems with banked schedules and how 
these problems results in a need for depeaking, what the business climate was like in the 
early 2000s that led to the depeaking trend, and the decision points airlines have to 
consider before depeaking. 
 
2.3.1 Depeaking’s Need - Problems with Banked Schedules 
Banked schedules, as described previously, had many benefits that led to their rise post-
deregulation. As both airport airside and landside congestion increased over the decades, 
having aircraft from the majority of spokes arriving in a short time period became a 
problem (Gillen, 2005). With large numbers of aircraft and passengers congregating at 
the hub during each bank, problems arose simply from the facilities being used near or at 
their capacity (Button, 2002). Banks simply required more capacity per unit of traffic 
served than a non-banked schedule (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985). The temporary 
congestion caused by the massive peaks reduced airside productivity such that large 
queues formed for the runways (Franke, 2004), and became an issue for aircraft that 
needed to turn around and meet schedules. Overall, punctuality for the aircraft decreased 
in an environment where there were time critical connections. Passengers also had to deal 
with transferring in a crowded terminal, under a very short time window.  
 The congestion issues decreased the quality of service for a connecting passenger. 
It has also been seen that passengers were not willing to pay the premiums that once 
supported a wide array of opportunities for having convenient connections. Customers 
were willing to give up time in their schedule in order to fly on lower priced tickets 
(Mecham, 2004). Ultimately, passengers never preferred unconditionally the shortest 
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possible connection, but rather the shortest connection which they know they can 
successfully make (Theis et al., 2006). Passengers are both risk averse and rush averse. If 
passengers have this flexibility in their travel time, and are glad to have a connection 
which does not require high stress, legacy carriers do not have to focus on maximizing 
scheduling connections and minimizing connection times. The presence of a large of 
group of customers who are non-time-sensitive encourages major airlines to depeak. 
 A second issue with banked schedules is the inefficient usage of airport 
infrastructure and airline resources. The airline needed to have its aircraft arrive 
simultaneously to provide a multitude of short connection opportunities, setting the upper 
limit for resources during this time period. The airport must have enough gates for all 
arriving aircraft, and the airline must have enough staff, crew, and equipment. Having 
enough of all of these resources on hand to serve the peak is inefficient (Dennis, 2001; 
Theis et al., 2006), because during the periods between banks, the staff, gates, and 
equipment sat idle. These inefficiencies cost the airline because they needed excess 
resources to handle only the maximum activity, and be ready to serve the sharp surges in 
activity (Hanlon, 1996). By reducing the peak labor needs, there is an increase in 
productivity in the workforce and cost is reduced as services are spread through the day 
(Abeyratne, 2000; Gillen, 2005; Mecham, 2004). The minimizing of connection time, 
however, should only put into place if the anticipated revenue that would be gained 
would be larger than the additional operating costs that would result (Theis et al., 2006). 
It is the hope of the airline that a peaked schedule would be more attractive to the 
connecting passenger, so that revenues increase to a great enough degree. 
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 A final issue with banking is the effect it has on aircraft operations. The traffic 
pattern during the banks is dominated by the hub airline’s aircraft, and these peaks every 
few hours exceed the airport service rate (Daniel & Harback, 2008). As a result, queuing 
delays increase and add cost to the airline. Runway congestion from the bank of flights, 
along with the potential to have to wait for passengers who are running to make their 
connection, increase the delay for aircraft movements (Hanlon, 1996; Theis et al., 2006), 
even when the individual aircraft and its crew are performing at their best. The arrival 
rates peak less severely than departure rates, because arrival queues are more costly than 
departure queues (Daniel, 1995), but both are at risk for added cost. Banked schedules are 
also at greater risk to weather events, as a single weather delay can affect all of an 
airline’s flights and cause disruptions throughout the airline’s network (Hanlon, 1996). 
The banked schedule also incurs a high cost because aircraft dwell at the hub for a long 
period of time waiting for feeder flights to arrive into the bank (Daniel, 1995). The 
earliest arriving aircraft and latest departing aircraft have the greatest layover costs as 
these aircraft sit and wait for all other aircraft to arrive and/or depart. By reducing aircraft 
delay through depeaking, Daniel reports in 1995 that Minneapolis-St. Paul, as an 
example, could accommodate 30% more traffic per day. 
 The peaked schedule is great at maximizing the number of connections between 
airports in the system. Not all connections, however, are profitable ones (Hanlon, 1996). 
Often times flights into and out of the hub are only there to ensure there is an aircraft 
waiting at the spoke for passengers (Theis et al., 2006). Aircraft are kept at the hub with 
lengthy and expensive waits for connections to all be made. Hanlon discusses that instead 
of maximizing connections, airlines should aim to maximize profitable connections. With 
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careful network planning, airlines can reduce redundant connections and ensure that 
useful connections are prioritized in scheduling. Connectivity can still be emphasized, but 
not at the expense of profitable connections between critical cities. 
 Switching from the hub-and-spoke banked model to a hub-and-spoke model that 
still emphasizes connectivity can solve many of the issues hub airlines have with banked 
schedules. Many airlines have experienced these changes post-9/11 by experimenting 
with a more continuous flow of flights (Gillen, 2005). By depeaking schedules, airlines 
expect to accomplish the following (Kemppainen et al., 2007):  
• Reduce the congestion at the gates and overall number of gates 
• Reduce congestion at the runway during peak periods 
• Decrease the number of aircraft needed to fly on specific routes 
• Decrease their airside and landside airport staff size 
• Improve the reliability of their schedule 
These positive benefits are the key aspects of depeaking which allow cost to be saved. 
The benefits are achieved by tackling the biggest issues with banked schedules: airport 
congestion and inefficient usage of infrastructure. In the next subsection, however, the 
opposite argument, to stay peaked, is discussed. 
 
2.3.2 Why Not Depeak? 
Despite the cost benefits of depeaking, there are risks involved with depeaking that could 
dissuade an airline not to depeak. First and foremost, there is a large risk to an airline’s 
revenue. Depeaking is expected to reduce ticket revenue because of extended connection 
times that become undesirable for passengers (Luethi, Kisseleff, & Nash, 2009; Mecham, 
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2004). In addition, some connections become so long that they are no longer marketed. 
The longer elapsed time is associated with a reduction in service quality (Gillen, 2005); 
passengers are then willing to pay less for this lower service level. Overall, there would 
be loss of traffic in many local markets, putting some at risk for service because the 
number of passengers needed to maintain a link is reduced too much. 
 Dissent towards depeaking has also been brought up in reference to its effect on 
operations. Although many studies tout depeaking’s positive effect on on-time operations 
and reduced congestion risk (Flint, 2002; Goedeking & Sala, 2003; Jiang, 2006; 
Kemppainen et al., 2007), a recent study contends that depeaking contributes to delays 
when they  hurt the most (Jenkins, Marks, & Miller, 2012). A depeaked airport is more 
susceptible to bad weather because the valleys between the banks are no longer present to 
allow for recovery in the system. The authors do not dispute that depeaking is an 
effective cost fix, and note that in normal weather depeaking is more efficient at using the 
gate areas, ramps, equipment, and staff. Their concern arises during irregular operations 
when a depeaked schedule has the potential to contribute to flight delays. The authors 
find that airports with the most peaked schedules have the lowest observed aggregate 
delay rates, although no statistical correlation exists. They also point to an increase in 
aircraft turn times since the depeaking trend began.  
 
2.3.3 Difference from Low Cost Carrier Scheduling 
Continuous scheduling has been used for a longer period of time than the short period in 
which full-service carriers have been operating with depeaked schedules. Low cost 
carriers, particularly Southwest, have been using continuous schedules at the airlines’ 
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focus cities. It is not uncommon for legacy airlines to look towards Southwest to gain 
perspective on how to increase market capitalization (Bogusch, 2003). American Airlines 
used Southwest as a model in looking at how the airline operated such a schedule, 
particularly in how turnaround times can be reduced with the effective use of manpower 
(Ott, 2002, 2003). Bogusch (2003) examines the American Airlines schedule from after 
its depeaking, and describes it to be emulating the Southwest schedule. 
 Southwest does not particularly schedule connection opportunities at its focus 
cities, but allows them to occur naturally if two flights are within a certain time window 
in the schedule. By having a sufficient number of services available, they are able to 
combine flows necessary to operate into new markets (Dennis, 2001). Although flights 
are not scheduled into banks, passengers are still willing to put up with a longer wait time 
in order to save money on their fare. The low cost carriers (LCCs) also use the 
continuous schedule to spread out their staffing, ground handling, maintenance, and gate 
needs to achieve savings (Gillen, 2005), a model some of the full-service carriers have 
looked to follow. 
 The flexibility on the passenger’s part to have longer connections, the ability to 
still have connections in a continuous schedule, and the savings associated with staff and 
other services, provides a motivation for a legacy carrier to depeak. The difference is that 
connections with the hubbed legacy airline are purposeful and planned. Although banks 
no longer exist, the hub-and-spoke system still does, and connections are critical to 
survival of the airline. A balance must be struck between preserving connections with 
high revenue potential, and smoothing the schedule so resources can be used more 
efficiently. Gillen (2005) believes though that the depeaked hub-and-spoke model will 
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soon be the dominant network structure and represents a convergence of the legacy 
carrier and LCC network types. 
 
2.3.4 Climate for Depeaking 
Although the hub-and-spoke model has been described “on its face to be the natural 
method of structuring airline networks” (Evans & Kessides, 1993), the past decade has 
seen a wide array of changes in the airline industry. Depeaked schedules arose from the 
challenges airlines faced, and several airlines saw an opportunity to respond to changing 
markets. Thus what once was thought as the natural way of the airline industry has been 
reinvented to respond to changing conditions. 
 The events of 9/11 caused an economic downturn that particularly affected the 
airline industry due to the terrorist attack’s connection to aviation. Many airlines spent 
the final quarter of 2001 and the beginning of 2002 evaluating their business practices, 
and struggling to make it through low passenger volumes (Bogusch, 2003). In order to 
survive, United Airlines and US Airways filed for bankruptcy. These challenges, 
however, were seen by American as an opportunity to reform its business processes, and 
American began to experiment with introducing more continuous arrival flows at some 
hub airports. 
 The rise of the Internet ticket booking era also aided in the ability for airlines to 
depeak schedules because the Internet changed how customers identified and compared 
flight options. Previously, travel agents played a large role in what flights customers were 
made aware of. Travel agents relied on terminals linked to a CRS for flight information. 
Travel agents tended to sell passengers tickets from the first page of results in the CRS 
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for a given origin and destination (O&D) search (Flint, 2002). The CRS page results were 
ordered by shortest travel time, and thus a short connection at a hub airport was more 
likely to be booked by a potential passenger because these connections appeared at the 
top of the screen (Theis et al., 2006). Travel agents booked 80 percent of tickets from the 
first display page, and 50 percent from the first line of the display (House of Lords, 
1998). It was critical for an airline to have its flight make it onto the first page in order to 
get travel agents to book passengers on the flight. As a result, airlines focused their flight 
planning on short connections. A banked system was the strategy that best met this goal. 
Today, most airlines’ online booking displays prioritize flights by fare, and it is no longer 
critical for airlines to offer the shortest connection in the market in order to garner 
bookings (Jiang, 2006). There is no regulation on display order for Internet sites (Theis et 
al., 2006). The Internet has made banked schedules less important because it has reduced 
the importance of short connection times for booking purposes. 
 The combination of an era of tight finances and the rise of the Internet made the 
climate ripe for airlines to choose to depeak their hubs. American was the first to 
recognize and act upon this change, but others would soon test the waters as well. 
 
2.3.5 Choosing to Depeak a Specific Airport 
Part of the decision to depeak an airline is beyond a motivation to cut cost, and lies with 
the airline’s scale of operations at the hub and geographic realities of connecting flights. 
Large hubs are the best candidates for depeaking because the high number of connections 
on profitable main routes can still be maintained, due to high flight frequencies, and aid 
in minimizing any revenue loss that depeaking will cause (Luethi et al., 2009; Mecham, 
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2004). Even midsize airline hubs are difficult to depeak because there are not enough 
flights to allow depeaking while maintaining a profitable level of connections. In 
addition, hubs are typically the connection point for larger international aircraft. Large 
hubs that serve a large number of smaller spoke cities are best suited for filling seats on 
these larger aircraft, because they are able to combine many passengers from a variety of 
origins (Franke, 2004). Another important factor is for there to be a high level of 
domestic traffic, such that the level of international flights is small relative to shorter 
domestic flights (Goedeking & Sala, 2003). The economies of scale thus give large hubs 
the greatest likelihood for depeaking success. 
 The geographical location of an airline hub plays a role in determining the success 
of a depeaked hub. A continuous schedule works best if there is directionality in the 
connecting traffic (Goedeking & Sala, 2003). DFW and ORD are great targets for 
depeaking because there traffic is primarily heading east-west, with very little traffic 
north-south. Goedeking and Sala describe how American chose to maintain banks of 
flights coming in from one half of the country, but arrivals from the other half were 
spread out in a constant flow pattern irrespective of connection opportunities. A hub 
which has omnidirectionality, with flights coming in from all around, has a reduced 
ability to create a pattern for its operations. In fact, a major reason that high levels of 
international traffic are bad for a depeaked hub is because of its need for an 
omnidirectional source of connections. For these reasons, MIA is not a suitable airport to 
depeak. It is a good example of a hub that is geographically challenged and has little 
directionality to its traffic (Zhang et al., 2004); still American depeaked it in 2004. A 
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summary table on the factors that could play into a decision to depeak an airport is listed 
in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1  Depeak or Don’t Depeak? Factors for Consideration Source: Goedeking & Sala, 2003 
 
De-peaking Traditional Hub System 
High directionality High multi-directionality 
Little long-haul High number of long-haul flights 
High volumes High dependence on connectivity 




2.4 Uncertainty in Effects of Depeaking 
Revenue implications of different schedules have been unclear as far back as 
deregulation. Hub-and-spoke systems and peaked schedules have been described by 
researchers at different times to either increase or decrease passenger fares, and affect 
revenue accordingly. As revenue implications of depeaking are a major focus of this 
study, it seemed prudent to discuss the differing views on how fares and revenue change 
due to these structural schedule changes. All sources mentioned here were previously 
mentioned in the last three subsections. 
 
2.4.1 Hubbing and Price 
Hub-and-spoke networks are described as being able to reduce fares because the network 
structure reduces cost for the airline, and thus reduce the cost per passenger (Button, 
2002; Evans & Kessides, 1993; Levine, 1987; Siegmund, 1990). The cost per passenger 
is reduced because higher load factors are achieved through the consolidation of flights at 
the hub, keeping planes in the air longer than in a linear network, and coordinating 
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maintenance. These authors perceive the airlines as passing the cost savings on to the 
passengers’ fares.  
 Experience in the hub-and-spoke network, however, has shown that hubbing 
increases fares for flights traveling to and from the hub. Siegmund (1990) provides 
evidence that fares increased greatly, faster than elsewhere in the system, when a hub was 
developed at an airport. The author describes the reason for this being that the airline 
operates a large percentage of the gates, and can control the fares in markets because of 
higher frequencies of flights and greater exposure to passengers. Hanlon (1996) finds this 
also to be true, noting how flights connected to hubs have greater average fares than other 
routes served by the airline. 
 In the case of hubbing, it seems that in theory, hub airlines would reduce fares 
because of their savings on cost. What occurs, however, is airlines make use of their 
market power to turn a greater profit. By controlling the hub and the majority of markets 
that connect to the hub city, airlines can raise fares higher than if they did not control the 
hub. 
 
2.4.2 Peaking and Price 
The effect of banked flight schedules on fares is also split in opinion. It is perceived by 
Button (2002) that the short connections of banks reduce fares at hub airports greater than 
they would have been with long connections. Button argues that the narrow time window 
for changing aircraft actually lowers fares because traffic is concentrated into a short 
period. Button does appear to contradict himself, however, by stating that passengers 
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have a high willingness to pay for the concentration of connecting services, which would 
imply that fares should be higher. 
Button’s contradiction is backed up by authors describing banked schedules to 
have higher fares. Mecham (2004) implies that there is a premium paid by the passenger 
to have such a convenient connection. Describing that passengers are certainly willing to 
give up time in their travel to fly on a lower priced ticket implies that the airlines’ 
maximizing of connections came at a cost to the passengers. Luethi et al. (2009) agree 
with Mecham that a short connection is something of value and worth paying for by the 
passenger, noting that passengers will travel on the extended connections of depeaking 
only if fares are reduced.  
The information presented on peaked schedules’ effects on fares seems to lean 
towards causing fares to increase. 
 
2.5 History of Airline Depeaking 
Airlines have continuously adjusted schedules and experimented with ideas to better 
increase profits and reduce costs. As discussed in previous sections, there are trade-offs 
between peaking and depeaking. Thus, airlines have seen the benefits of depeaking at 
different periods over the past decade, and sometimes have repeaked a schedule after 
depeaking it. The following subsections describe the history of depeaking, to help add 






2.5.1 Major Airline Events of the Early 2000s 
Depeaking was just one of the major events for airlines over the first part of the 2000s. 
This period, was marked by many of the legacy carriers experiencing bankruptcy for the 
first time. Dehubbing occurred and mergers took place. Figure 2.2 shows the major 
airline events that occurred during this time period, to provide context for discussion later 
on when depeaking took place. 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Timeline of major airline events in the first part of the 2000s. 
 
 
The effects of the 9/11 terrorist attack and the SARS outbreak in the Asian-Pacific region 
caused a drop in traffic for the U.S. airlines. This unexpected loss of revenue pushed 
many of the airlines into bankruptcy, to merge, and to remove hubs from their network.  
 Depeaking was another effect of this period, and the following subsection 




2.5.2 Airline Depeaking Timeline 
The combination of an era of tight finances and the rise of the Internet made the climate 
ripe for airlines to choose continuous scheduling at their hubs. Prior to 9/11, Continental 
Airlines reportedly depeaked its Newark hub (EWR) in either 1997 (Ott, 2002) or the 
summer of 2000 (McCartney, 2000). It subsequently saw a 20% reduction in delays 
(World Airline News, 2001). American depeaked ORD in early 2002, and DFW at the 
end of 2002. American reported many system-level benefits and decided to depeak MIA 
in 2004 (American’s experience with depeaking is discussed further in the next section). 
 American’s positive experience with continuous schedules influenced other 
airlines to do the same in the middle of the decade. United depeaked ORD in February 
2004, Los Angeles (LAX) in June 2005, and San Francisco (SFO) in 2006 (United 
Airlines, 2006). United is of particular interest because initially it gained market share at 
ORD due to American’s depeaking, but no analysis has been performed since United 
depeaked. United described the reasons for depeaking its hub as a means of cost 
reduction and as a way to increase efficiency. Depeaking at LAX, for example, enabled 
the airline to remove its United Express terminal and consolidate operations.  
In 2005, Delta depeaked its Atlanta (ATL) hub in order to make its schedule less 
chaotic and more predictable (Hirschman, 2004). At the time, ATL handled twelve Delta 
banks of flights every day, each upwards of 90 flights arriving and departing. Through 
continuous scheduling, Delta was able to have employees work more steadily, and 
accomplish more during their shifts. The result was an increase in daily departures and 
destinations served from ATL. The company’s jets increased their daily flying time by 
8%, which meant they spent less time on the ground using valuable gate space. As a 
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result, gates at ATL saw 8.5% more aircraft turns after depeaking. It is noted that later in 
2005 Delta repeaked its ATL schedule. It is reported that Salt Lake City (SLC) and 
Cincinnati (CVG) also were depeaked in 2005 (Hirschman, 2004). 
US Airways is reported to have depeaked their schedule in Philadelphia (PHL) in 
February 2005, and repeaked later that autumn. As described by Kirby (2004), US 
Airways depeaked in order to better position itself during bankruptcy as low cost rival 
competition increased out of PHL. According to the airline, it enabled them to operate 
230 more daily flights system wide, and specifically a 7% increase in flights out of PHL. 
Simultaneously, they created two additional banks at Charlotte (CLT), their other east 
coast hub. The depeaking would aid in reducing aircraft turn times, relieving airfield 
delays, and increasing operation efficiency. 
Alaska Airlines implemented a depeaked strategy at its Seattle (SEA) hub, 
although no year is mentioned for its implementation (Williams & Weiss, 2005). It is 
reported that the increase in aircraft utilization which resulted for Alaska due to its 
depeaking effectively added three additional aircraft to its fleet. Williams and Weiss also 
mention that Continental depeaked its hub in Houston (IAH), as well does Ott (2002), but 
no year is mentioned for this event.  
Due to congestion on the airfield, John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) 
depeaked all operations in 2008 (Ferguson et al., 2010) a rare example of an airport 
instigating the decision to depeak. The motivation behind the scheduling change was the 
need for capacity controls. Simultaneously, the two other airports in the New York 
region, EWR and LaGuardia (LGA), reduced their overall schedule volumes. JFK, 
however, chose a different approach to maintain its daily flight volume by spreading out 
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its banks of flights. The change enabled the airport to have fewer flight delays and fewer 
cancelled flights. 
This airport-wide depeaking, such as what occurred at JFK, is argued by Jenkins, 
Marks, and Miller (2012) to have occurred at numerous airports nationwide over the 
second half of the 2000s. The authors note that many airports in the U.S. have 
progressively reduced the peaked nature of the combined airlines’ schedules as they 
reached their FAA operational benchmark capacity. The airports depeak to avoid 
overscheduling throughout the day; they thinned down the peaks and boosted up the off-
peak departures.  
Internationally, several airports have started to depeak operations. Lufthansa 
depeaked its Frankfurt (FRA) hub in 2004 to decrease scheduled block times, in an effort 
to better handle demand variation (Frank et al., 2005). The airline saw an overall travel 
time reduction for 35 of its 50 most profitable flights. Even during a period where the 
airport saw a 6% increase in traffic, ground delays for the airline went down 50%. 
Scandinavian Airlines also depeaked its Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Oslo hubs to 
reduce costs (Hansen & Warburg, 2006). 
 
2.5.3 American Airlines’ Depeaking 
American Airlines’ experience with depeaking is the most documented in the industry. 
American was the first airline to create continuous schedules at several of their hubs, and 
the event made many headlines, particularly because it came at a time when its 
counterparts were filing for bankruptcy. Two studies review what occurred at American’s 
hubs and came to different conclusions. One study found that depeaked schedules were 
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overall a neutral or slightly positive move for an airline (Bogusch, 2003) and a second 
study was slightly skeptical of the benefits of depeaked schedules (Zhang et al., 2004). 
Neither study explicitly examined the revenue implications of depeaked schedules, these 
early studies focused on operational and cost measures, as described below. 
 One of the key effects of a continuous schedule is a more consistent experience 
for ground operations throughout the day. The number of flights arriving and departing 
has less variation across the time of day. The peak number of scheduled departures within 
a 15-minute period at ORD was reduced from 15 to nine. This resulted in more efficient 
staff utilization and the removal of four gates at both ORD and DFW. At DFW, 
American was able to consolidate its operations into two terminals and cease all flights at 
Terminal B. Aircraft utilization also improved, but so too did the on-time arrival rate. At 
ORD, five aircraft were freed up from use, and at DFW nine aircraft were freed up. The 
mean aircraft turn time decreased on average by five minutes at the hub airports, despite a 
system wide increase in minimum aircraft turn times to govern the depeaking. The airline 
realized approximately $100 million dollars in cost savings combined at ORD and DFW 
by switching to the continuous schedule (Reed, 2006). Overall, many benefits were seen 
in measures that indicated less variability in scheduling and greater resilience to delays. 
 Perceived decreases in passenger revenue associated from depeaking discourage 
some airlines from attempting the scheduling change. The risk in losing customers due to 
a reduction in potential connections is likely to reduce an airline’s market share. 
American lost 4% of its market share at ORD compared to United Airlines, and lost 1% 
to other airlines at DFW. This is partly due to the increase in connection times, in the 
range of between 7-10 minutes per passenger, such that the average connection time was 
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longer than United’s. The degree of connectivity decreased, and ORD lost market share 
to the other American hubs, DFW (still banked initially) and St. Louis (STL). In addition, 
United actively sought to counter American’s strategy, and made their schedule more 
connected and peaked than before, taking advantage of open runway time (Goedeking & 
Sala, 2003). In all, the on-time performance on both airlines improved at the hub. 
 Bogusch (2003) concludes that the decision to depeak “was neutral from a market 
share perspective, neutral or favorable from an operations perspective, and likely 
favorable from a cost perspective.” The author makes the final point, however, without 
any rigorous analysis. Zhang et al. (2004) opine that that the airline’s widely touted costs 
savings generated by depeaking are balanced out by losses in market share. These losses, 
due to layover times, challenge the “widely held view that service does not matter in the 
era of internet flight booking and declining business travel.” The loss of market share, the 
authors state, should be more explicitly considered in the evaluation of depeaking 
operations. 
 
2.6 Competition’s Reaction to Depeaking 
A depeaking airline’s competitors have an opportunity to capitalize on the depeaking 
airline’s schedule changes. The depeaked schedule of the hub airline frees up runway 
capacity and terminal space. Thus, there is potential for competitors to snag runway slots 
and expand their operations. In addition, broken connections by the depeaking airline can 
be recreated by competing airlines. At a network level, competitors can also adjust their 
own hub schedules to adjust for broken connections at the depeaked hub to gather traffic 
that would have traditionally gone through the depeaked hub. 
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 A hub airline’s competitors often avoid the time periods in which the flight banks 
are occurring. As shown in Figure 2.3, from Daniel and Harback (2008), the non-hub 
airlines (in grey) cluster their operations to the sides of Delta’s banks where runway 
capacity is not restricted. This helps the competing airlines avoid congestion and delays 
caused by the rush of activity caused by the hub airline. During the banks, the competing 
airlines reduce their operations to near zero, preferring to cluster on either side. This 
diversion to the edges of peaks is caused by airlines choosing to structure schedules in 
order to minimize the cost to operate them (Daniel, 1995). By summing up all aircraft 
operating costs, the non-hub airlines see the fringe of the banks as the optimal point to 
keep costs down. 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Arrival rates of hub and competing airlines in hub operations. Hub airline (black) has a 
peaked schedule and the competing airlines (gray) operate mostly between the banks. Source: Daniel 
and Harback (2008)  
 
  
In some cases, there are two hub airlines operating out of an airport (e.g. ATL, ORD, and 
DFW). In this situation, when one of the hub airlines depeaks its banked schedule, the 
other airline is able to restructure their schedule to take advantage of the available 
capacity and broken connections. As previously mentioned, United did precisely this at 
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ORD when American depeaked in 2002 (Goedeking & Sala, 2003). After American’s 
depeaking, United created a schedule which was even more peaked, and provided shorter 
and more connections. United was able to implement such a schedule because of the 
improvement in operating conditions caused by American’s depeaking. In this case, the 
punctuality of both aircraft’s flights improved. Delta underwent a similar change after 
American depeaked their schedule at DFW. Seeing an opportunity to capture American’s 
passenger base that no longer could be served by American’s schedule due to broken 
connections, Delta increased their number of flight banks from six to eight (Delta Air 
Lines, 2003; Ott, 2003). This change added an additional bank in the late morning and 
early evening periods, with the airline citing the schedule modification’s goal as making 
the hub more productive. 
 
2.7 Hubbing in Other Sectors 
The airline industry is not alone in its use of the hub-and-spoke model for its networks. 
The freight airlines also make use of hub-and-spoke networks, while both freight and 
passenger rail have also exhibited this network structure. Of these three, only the 
passenger rail industry has felt an adaptation to the hub-and-spoke model needed to be 
made due to its inefficient use of resources.  
 In the past decade as passenger airlines explored the depeaking concept, air cargo 
carriers have gone the opposite direction (Gupta, 2010). Air cargo carriers have worked 
to achieve faster hub connectivity for packages and freight. In addition, they have 




 Hub-and-spoke networks exist in a different sort of form for freight railroads, but 
the essential aspect of them still exists. Train engines travel to a freight rail hub where 
rail cars are transferred between train engines going to different destinations. These 
systems have synchronized arrivals and departures so cars do not dwell in train yards for 
extended periods of time, and connection times are reduced (Wiegmans et al., 2007). This 
hub-and-spoke system benefits small markets as trains can be compiled at the hub for 
these destinations, when normally they would receive sporadic point-to-point service. 
Lastly, just like airlines can use larger aircraft from hubs and gain benefits from 
economies of scale, so can freight railroads use longer trains from their hubs instead of 
increasing frequency which can get costly. 
 Passenger railroads also make use of hub-and-spoke systems to create a wide 
range of markets for their passengers. Through the use of a hub and connections, 
passenger railroads can reduce point-to-point service, use economies of scale to use 
longer trains, and provide more frequent service to smaller markets. Like a peaked airport 
hub, train station hubs make use of short connections for passengers to move between 
two trains, operating in Europe under integrated timed transfer systems (Clever, 1997). In 
the integrated timed transfer systems, vehicles arrive at depart from a station at 
approximately the same time so passenger waiting times are minimized. 
 The similarities between passenger rail and passenger airlines, in terms of peaks 
at hub airports, also extend to the inefficiencies inherent in such a system. Like airport 
hubs, rail hubs must be very large in order to hold the large number of trains that must be 
present simultaneously for transfers to take place. The integrated timed transfer system 
does not make use of the facilities and staff efficiently (Clever, 1997), with trains only 
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staying for a short time and then departing. The train station remains empty for long 
periods of time.  
 To make more efficient use of the station, and to allow for small stations, Clever 
describes a spreading out of services, similar to depeaking. Like depeaking, arrivals and 
departures get spread out but in a way that still preserves important connections. The 
train hub would be operated in waves. In the first wave, all trains terminating at the hub 
drop off passengers and then wait in a holding area. The second wave is for trains passing 
through the station, and stop to exchange passengers. A final wave is for the terminating 
trains to come back to the terminal and pick up passengers to make outbound trips. By 
reducing the peak activity of a bank of trains, the train operator can still maintain good 
connections for passengers and make more efficient use of platforms, staff, and 
equipment.  
 
2.8 Affiliate Airlines 
The role of affiliate airlines in the depeaking process is an important consideration for a 
depeaking airline. Affiliate airlines often make up a large portion of the operations at hub 
airports, and the contracts that are drawn up between major carriers and their affiliates 
must be managed appropriately for a major carrier to depeak its hub. 
 Affiliate airlines developed in response to the creation of the hub-and-spoke 
network. Major carriers did not own enough aircraft to serve all the spokes they desired 
to have in their network, and thus feed arrangements with airlines composed of smaller 
regional aircraft were needed to connect to the spokes (Gillen, 2005). Today, all major 
U.S. carriers subcontract portions of their network to affiliate airlines (Forbes & 
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Lederman, 2011); these affiliates carry over 25% of domestic passengers. Over the past 
decade, enplanements on affiliates doubled and ASMs tripled. In some cases, the major 
airline wholly owns the affiliate, while in other cases the affiliate is an independent 
airline that is governed by a contract with the major airline. 
 
2.8.1 Affiliate Airline Basics and Benefits 
Affiliate airlines complement a major airline’s mainline flights in order to bolster the 
offerings the major airline can provide to passengers. Major network carriers do not 
operate any small aircraft (Forbes & Lederman, 2011). By assigning an affiliate airline’s 
smaller jets to spokes with lower demand, the major airline can benefit from the 
passenger base without using their larger aircraft. The major airline’s decision to use an 
affiliate aircraft on a route is based solely on the type of plane needed for a route. 
Affiliate airlines also are beneficial for their cost advantage in operating smaller planes, 
including lower compensation for affiliate airline employees in relation to the major 
airline’s own employees. This cost efficiency allows them to be used to offer greater 
frequency to enhance the service provided by the airline (Gillen, 2005). 
 The affiliate operates these routes under a codeshare agreement, with flights 
ticketed by the major airline under its own airline code. Affiliate aircraft have the paint 
and branding of the major airline. Through this, the major and affiliate airlines are 
integrated into a common network (Forbes & Lederman, 2011). Having the affiliate 
ensures for the major airline that a greater proportion of all traffic is kept online with a 
single carrier (Gillen, 2005). This provides a large benefit to the major airline, because 
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the flights operated by the affiliate carrier generate positive externalities elsewhere in the 
major’s network due to hub connections. 
 
2.8.2 Types of Affiliate Airline Contracts 
Up until the late 1990s, the primary form of contract that affiliate airlines had with major 
airlines were revenue sharing contracts (Forbes & Lederman, 2011). In the late 1990s, 
revenue sharing contracts began to be replaced with a new contract type known as 
capacity purchase agreements. This change was drastic: in 1996, 15% of all affiliate 
airline flights operated under a capacity purchase agreement; by 2003 this fraction had 
grown to 87%. 
 Revenue sharing contracts are structured such that the affiliate airline and the 
major airline shared ticket revenue from passengers who fly on both carriers (Forbes & 
Lederman, 2011). The passenger’s fare revenue was split between the two carriers, 
typically in proportion to the distance traveled on each airline. The affiliate airline 
received all of the revenue for passengers who flew solely on the affiliate carrier’s 
aircraft. 
 Capacity purchase agreements differ in that the affiliate airline receives a fixed 
payment from the major airline for each flight which the affiliate airline flies (Forbes & 
Lederman, 2011). The amount which the affiliate airline is paid is independent of the 
number of passengers on board the aircraft. The payment is based on estimates of the 
affiliate airline’s cost, and agreed upon in the contract by the major and affiliate carriers. 
The payment includes enough to cover the estimated costs, and still provide a profit 
margin for the affiliate. Often, the agreement includes incentives for operational 
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performance measures. Capacity purchase agreements give the major airline complete 
control over the affiliate airline’s scheduling and inventory management. 
 The two contract types’ effect on the relationship between the involved airlines’ 
relationship and the affiliate airline’s incentive to provide good service are markedly 
different (Forbes & Lederman, 2011). Revenue service contracts involve significant 
haggling between the two airlines when drawing up the agreement. Under these contracts, 
affiliate airlines desire to serve the most profitable routes because their revenue is directly 
related to traffic. The positive externalities that exist for the major airline due to the 
affiliate airline’s additions to the network do little to benefit the affiliate. There is no 
incentive to serve routes that are solely beneficial to the major airline on a network level, 
but not attractive on a stand-alone basis. Route selection and scheduling decisions thus 
become very important in developing this agreement. The affiliate’s risk exposure is 
high, but it incentivizes the affiliate airline to exert effort towards increasing demand on 
their routes.  
 Capacity purchase agreements reduce an affiliate’s risk exposure, because the 
revenue is a predetermined amount based on the number of flights flown (Forbes & 
Lederman, 2011). Thus, haggling is reduced when writing the contract because there is 
no worry for the affiliate on scheduling or routing decisions. Affiliates are indifferent to 
where and when they operate. The primary issue for haggling for affiliate airlines in 
capacity purchase agreements is routes that have low on-time rates. Certain spoke 
airports have a higher potential for delays, and thus the affiliate airline haggles to avoid 
these routes – although the affiliate airline can still be protected by the major carrier 
building in considerable buffer time in the schedule. 
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 Because the depeaking events occurred in the early 2000s, the affiliate airline 
contracts involved with depeaking are for the most part capacity purchase agreements. 
Depeaking airlines would thus still be contracted to reserve a set amount of capacity for 
their affiliate airlines to operate from the depeaked hub. 
 
2.9 The Hub Airport and Its Revenue 
The airports which serve as hubs have a different perspective on operations and revenue 
than a non-hub airport. Hub airports, like all airports, have a relationship with the city and 
the residents that live there, and build a relationship with the originating passenger base. 
An airport is the departure and arrival point for the residents and workers of a city, 
serving as a transportation facility for large regions. 
 A hub airport also has a relationship, though, with the hub airline, which it must 
work closely with to be profitable and successful. This relationship is more likely to 
control the airport’s general planning than its relationship with the city.  Due to the hub 
airline, the airport also effectively has a relationship with many of the passengers in the 
hub airline’s system. To the rest of the country and world, it is simply a place to connect 
to their next aircraft. For example, think of all the people across the U.S. who have 
opinions about ATL’s terminal layout, simply because they connected there a couple of 
times. This collection-distribution role the airport serves for the hub airline and its 
passengers has implications for the airport’s economic policy (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 
1985). The higher levels of connecting traffic at a hub airport, which is very different 
from originating traffic in its revenue-producing abilities, changes the airport’s economic 
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impact. The airport becomes less tied to the local economy as compared to one that 
serves primarily originating traffic. 
 The variety of relationships in which an airport is engaged affect how an airport 
operates and plans for the future. Their revenue stream is connected to the city, airline, 
and passenger base. Whether or not the airline has a peaked or depeaked schedule can 
greatly affect the money the airport generates. The following subsections describe how 
these different schedules play a role in an airport’s earnings. 
 
2.9.1 Issues with Being a Hub 
There are great economic benefits to being a hub airport, and much can be gained by the 
city and airport authority. High levels of employment, connections to many destinations 
around the world, and indirect benefits of companies locating in the city are just many 
reasons why attracting an airline to an airport is desirable (Button & Lall, 1999).  
 There are also issues for a hub, many of which are unique to being a hub. The 
biggest issue, and which is more prone to affect airports serving as hubs, is a strain on 
capacity. The added volume created by the hub’s presence creates problems from the 
nature of the traffic (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985). The hub airline contributes peak-load 
capacity issues on the aprons, runways, and terminals for the aircraft, and also strains the 
baggage handling system (Hanlon, 1996). Capacity-constrained hubs are common, and 
there are high risks for delays to both the hub airline’s aircraft and other airlines’ flights. 
These delays reflect negatively on the airport, and can give the airport a reputation 
amongst passengers and businesses of being a poor-performing facility. Such a reputation 
could lead to traffic choosing other airports over the congested hub airport. 
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 In order to meet the operational demands of the hub airline, and reduce delay, 
airports must look to expand facilities and increase capacity. The airport must meet the 
activity demands of the hub airline or the airline will look to expand its business at 
another hub. Due to the hub airline, the airport must adapt to faster growth than a non-
hub airport, and invest in additional capacity for runways and terminals frequently 
(Hanlon, 1996). This is pushed to a greater extreme when flight banks are in place, as the 
airside capacity needs are greater. These banks place a greater burden on airport facility 
development (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985), and one that may be too difficult for the 
airport to meet. While the airport may have plans of their own, the airside needs take 
precedence, as the landside surface area needs are not increasing as the hub airline 
expands – leaving originating passengers to not see much improvement landside. The 
airport and the hub airline must come to agreement on how to pay for and develop such 
expansions, and if the airport is capacity-constrained for some reason, the airport may 
have to tell the airline to explore other operational options – such as voluntary depeaking 
or mandatory slot controls. 
 The strong push by the hub airline for increased capacity and development at the 
airport is always a calculated risk for the airport. The airport becomes increasingly 
dependent on the hub airlines connecting traffic and less reliant on demand from the 
airport’s local region (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985). If the airline does not perform well, 
or goes bankrupt, the airport suffers financial losses as well. Building infrastructure for 
the hub airline thus is a high-risk move, as it could go empty if the airline reduces 
operations, or even worse, pulls out of the airport entirely as a hub. Dehubbing is the 
ultimate burden for an airport, which airports such as Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and 
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Cincinnati have suffered through. Being dependent on another airline’s entry and exit 
decisions is an issue all hub airports must contend with. 
 
2.9.2 Commercial Revenue 
Commercial activities are a critical portion of an airport’s revenue. There are a wide 
variety of figures to describe how much supporting services contribute to the overall 
revenue, but it is often greater than the revenue generated through aeronautical operations 
(Doganis, 2001; Zhang & Zhang, 1997). These commercial services consist of a wide 
number of activity including parking services, banking, food and beverage, gift shops, 
newsstands, and car rental (Torres et al., 2005), and are central to the growth and 
economic stability for most airports. What must be understood in measurements of 
commercial activity is that the values can be skewed depending on an airport’s definition 
of commercial activity. As noted by Graham (2009), Salzburg airport in Austria provides 
its own ground handling services, thus reducing the percentage of revenue for which 
commercial activity contributes. Although this subsection reports percentages, Graham 
recommends that commercial activity should be reported as revenue per passenger. That 
said, below is a sampling of airports worldwide and how important commercial activity is 
to an airport’s revenue stream. 
• Non-aeronautical revenue comprises half of all operating revenue in a sample of 
75 U.S. airports (Appold & Kasarda, 2006).  
• Medium to large U.S. airports have 75-80% of revenue come from commercial 
operations (Doganis, 2001). 
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• Commercial revenue in European airports is 48% of total revenue (Graham, 
2009). 
• Commercial activity accounted for 60% of the British Airports Authority revenue 
(Jones, Viehoff, & Marks, 1993). 
• Concession revenue alone accounts for over 65% of revenue at Hong Kong 
International Airport (Zhang & Zhang, 1997). 
The key concept to grasp from these figures is that commercial revenue is very important 
to an airport’s finances. Over the early part of the 2000s, however, sales per passenger 
were decreasing at airports (Bork, 2007). Because spending money at shops is low 
priority on a passengers list when they arrive at the airport, the airport often has to make 
strong efforts to encourage passengers to shop. As discussed by Appold and Kasarda 
(2006), between 54-68% of passengers purchase food or beverages in the airport and 11-
37% purchase non-food items. Maximizing commercial revenue is critical for an airport’s 
development. 
 
2.9.3 Commercial Revenue for Hub Airports 
A hub airport has many passengers walking through its terminals, but this does not 
necessarily mean high revenue streams. Because a large portion of a hub airport’s 
passenger traffic are only transferring between aircraft, these passengers do not have the 
opportunity to park or rent cars (Van Dender, 2007). For this reason, on a per passenger 
basis, the airport is unable to generate the same amount of commercial revenue as 
airports with higher levels of originating traffic (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985). Thus, 
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transfer traffic is not as attractive to airport operators as compared to originating traffic 
(Hanlon, 1996). 
 Hub airports must adapt to the different passenger characteristics to still garner 
sales. The circulation patterns of connecting passengers are very different from 
originating passengers (LeighFisher et al., 2011). With short layover times, for example, 
and connecting passengers rushing to get to their departure gate as soon as possible, 
airports would need to locate concession directly on their circulation path or near the 
gate.  
 
2.9.3.1 Connection Times and Revenue 
The banked schedule patterns of hub airlines serve only to reduce airport commercial 
revenue. Good fast connections mean less opportunity for a passenger to spend money at 
an airport shop (Hanlon, 1996). As passengers rush between gates, they are unable to 
make purchases (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985). Airlines typically believe that longer 
connection times has a negative effect on passengers, but when considering a passenger 
who may desire to make a food or beverage purchase, a longer connection time could in 
fact be beneficial to the airline attracting a passenger (Encaoua, Moreaux, & Perrot, 
1996). Depeaking thus could increase the revenue airports and airlines receive from 
passengers by extending the amount of time connecting passengers spend in the terminal. 
 The connection time of passengers (or as airports perceive it, the dwell time) is 
related to the amount of money spent on concessions. Transfer passengers are a captive 
market for retailers (Crawford & Melewar, 2003; Hanlon, 1996), but they are also time-
sensitive, so increases in dwell time should lead to increased spending (LeighFisher et al., 
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2011; Theis et al., 2006). The enforced free time that passengers have makes them more 
likely to make purchases (Appold & Kasarda, 2006), although it is seen that by Torres et 
al. (2005) that the longer time does not increase the amount of spending, only the 
likelihood of spending. Torres et al. noted that if you exclude passengers not buying 
anything, there is no time relationship between the amounts of money passengers were 
spending at the airport. Overall, it appears that higher concession revenue can be 
achieved through an increase in connection times. 
 
2.9.3.2 Terminal Congestion and Concession Revenue 
The primary negative effect of banked schedules on commercial revenue is the 
minimizing of dwell time, and thus shopping time, for passengers. Banked schedules, 
however, can have a secondary negative effect on airport concession due to increased 
terminal congestion for passengers. Passengers in a banked schedule flood the terminal 
simultaneously, congesting the terminal halls, shops, and eateries. Appold and Kasarda 
(2006) describe that congestion can hamper commercial sales in terminals with limited 
space because it reduces the potential that a passenger can access a shop. Congestion also 
impacts a passenger’s use of dwell time (Graham, 2009), slowing them down during their 
walk between gates and reducing the likelihood that the passenger has time to shop. 
Capital spending to increase space is not always a possibility, so airports must find the 






2.9.4.3 Getting the Airline to Agree 
Leaving suitable time for passengers to purchase food, beverages, and retail items can be 
a conflict of interest between airport authorities and airlines (Hanlon, 1996). The airport 
and airline are essentially in a trade-off relationship where both are looking to maximize 
profits (Lin, 2006). Airlines with banked schedules want connections maximized and 
connection times reduced. This increases congestion and reduces potential shopping time, 
hurting the revenue of the airport. Depeaking the airline schedule benefits both parties 
because when performed well, useful connections are maintained while airline costs are 
cut, while connection times increase and benefit the airport. 
 Depeaking can be very attractive to airlines that hold shares in the airports they 
operate out of, or directly control the airport facilities. Examples of this situation include 
Lufthansa in Munich’s Terminal 2 and JetBlue in JFK’s Terminal 5. By optimizing 
terminal operations to extend connection times, while still providing good connections, 
concession revenue can increase, and the airline shares in this additional revenue 
generated (Fu, Homsombat, & Oum, 2011). If an airline chooses to depeak an airport 
where it receives revenue from the terminal, it puts itself in a very advantageous position. 
 
2.9.4 Positive Purchasing Environment 
Reducing congestion in the terminal, through depeaking or another means, is important 
psychologically for encouraging passengers to make purchases and improving an 
airport’s commercial revenue. 
 An airport is inherently a stressful place, but also is a location where people feel 
high levels of excitement. Up until passengers pass through security, anticipation and 
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excitement are building simultaneously with stress. There is stress from getting to the 
airport on time and having travel plans go smoothly, all of which typically reduces as 
soon as a passenger passes security and enters the departure hall (Crawford & Melewar, 
2003; Entwistle, 2007).  The period from when a passenger passes security and boards 
their plane is a “happy hour” of time in which they are comfortable, yet still excited, and 
are ready to make purchases. Figure 2.4 is a diagram of this period in relation to 
passengers’ feelings of stress and excitement. 
 
 





Airports can capitalize on this period by keeping the departure hall as stress-free as 
possible. Passengers must be in the proper emotional state to buy items, as it factors into 
whether they will shop and how much they want to spend (Bork, 2007; Crawford & 
Melewar, 2003). The goal is to increase impulse buying, and encourage those who want 
to purchase to feel comfortable doing so. 
 The connecting passengers in an airport hub feel high levels of stress having to 
make a transfer. Additional stress can be added if the transfer is short. The congestion 
during the transfer may also make them not relaxed enough to shop (Graham, 2009). 
Depeaked hubs, with longer connections, inherently will have connecting passengers who 
are less stressed because there is less congestion and more time to transfer. The additional 
time to shop and the lower stress have a high potential to considerably increase an 














This chapter is a description of the analysis steps of the study. It details several of the 
processes which were coded in SAS (Statistical Analysis Software), and the reasons 
particular decisions were made throughout the study. The aim is for future researchers to 
be able to reproduce the analysis and make changes for their own needs. SAS code is 
included in the Appendices of this document. 
 The chapter begins with a description of the structure of the study along with the 
goals and research questions that were developed based on the literature review. Detail is 
then given to the different types of data used in the study and why they were chosen. The 
next part describes the preparation done in order to use the datasets, particularly the 
cleaning processes. The analysis is then described including how cases were chosen, how 
schedules were reproduced, and how the retained cases were compared with one another. 
Particular attention is given to how peaks are identified and the depeaking measurement. 
Lastly, the methodology use to quantify the effect of an increase in connection time, such 
as what happens during depeaking, on revenue is presented.  
 
3.2 Study Structure 
The study is designed to compare the different instances of depeaking in the U.S. that 
occurred in the early 2000s. A case study approach is used in order to assess the different 
schedule changes made by the depeaking airlines, and how revenue was affected for the 
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airlines after choosing to depeak a hub. The supply side of the airline’s depeaking is 
analyzed first, to assess the structural changes in the schedules before and after 
depeaking. The demand analysis is then coupled to the supply results to assess how 
revenue shifts occurred in relation to the supply changes. The approach also includes a 
network-level comparison of changes in passenger itinerary choices that occurred after 
depeaking. On-time performance is also analyzed in relation to depeaking. A linear 
regression model is used to explore the spoke level decisions hub airlines make when 
depeaking. The research provides a better understanding about what conditions are best 
for an airline to achieve positive results from a depeaked schedule. 
 
3.2.1 Project Motivation and Goal 
Previous studies have lacked an understanding of how revenue is affected by depeaking, 
and how the scheduling changes affect other airlines. Bogusch (2003) examines the 
performance of American Airlines before and after depeaking to see how market share 
and on-time performance were affected, but does not examine what changed in 
American’s ticket sales and revenue. Zhang et al. (2004) discuss revenue briefly, 
comparing the revenues of flights through depeaked hubs to the total revenue of the 
airline in the same markets.  
The goal of this research project is to determine the effects of depeaking on the 
volume and cost of sold tickets, network level changes in schedules, and passenger 
traffic. One of the key aims is the linking of the supply data to the changes in demand and 
on-time performance of the airline which depeaked. The research will lead to a greater 
understanding of what aspects of a hub make it suitable to be depeaked. 
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A second goal of this study is to compare the different degrees of depeaked 
schedule implementation. American Airlines has received the bulk of attention in the 
literature, and this study examines some of the other airlines’ experiences with a 
depeaked schedule. 
A third goal is to develop a robust measure of peaking and depeaking that can be 
used for quickly assessing how much an airline depeaked its schedule. This involves 
being able to automatically identify peaks, and developing the logical reasoning behind a 
suitable depeaking measure. 
Lastly, the effect on a depeaked airline’s competition in the system will be 
studied. American Airlines was concerned greatly about how depeaking at ORD would 
affect United, and American tracked several performance measures to make sure their 
strategy did not have a negative impact or benefit competitors (Ott, 2003). 
 
3.2.2 Research Questions 
The purpose of the study is to better understand depeaking. Through the research 
endeavor, the following research questions will be investigated: 
• What were the differences across airlines’ implementation of a depeaked 
schedule? 
• What were the changes in demand due to depeaking? 
• How did depeaking affect revenue in terms of ticket sale volume, price, and mix 
of traffic? 
• What were the effects on other airlines in the system due to an airline depeaking? 
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• What were the changes in operations due to depeaking for both the airline 
implementing continuous schedules and other airlines? 
• How is airport revenue affected by a major airline depeaking? 
 
3.3 Datasets 
The supply and demand data for this study are publicly available from the Office of 
Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)1. Each dataset is 
described below in relation to this study. 
 
3.3.1 Supply Data 
Supply data provide schedule information that is needed to compare an airline’s 
operations before and after depeaking. In this study, the BTS database of Airline On-
Time Performance Data2 is used as a measure for supply. The database provides a list of 
the majority of flights flown in the U.S. Although it would be ideal to use the Official 
Airline Guide (OAG)3 to recreate schedules as it is more complete than the On-Time 
database, this was not a viable option due to the fact that historic OAG files back to 2000 
were not available from the airline that is collaborating on this study and were 
prohibitively expensive to purchase. 
 The On-Time database provides detailed records of flight-level information and 
can be used to calculate the number of flights in a given period and determine measures 
                                                 
 





of peaking and depeaking. The top domestic U.S. carriers that carry at least one percent 
of all domestic scheduled-service passenger revenue report on-time flight information. 
The database provides information on whether a flight was delayed, diverted, or 
cancelled. Information on each flight’s departure time, arrival time, carrier, and departure 
date is also provided. The scheduled CRS flight time and actual flight time are both 
included. The tail number of the aircraft (defined as a unique identification number for a 
specific aircraft) is provided. Using this dataset, it is possible to construct a representative 
schedule an airline offered at a particular airport at a particular point in time. The On-
Time database enables a comparison of delay costs before and after depeaking. 
When using the On-Time database, one must be aware that slight changes 
occurred in reporting over time. For example, the format of the flight data changed from 
MM/DD/YYYY to YYYY-MM-DD. In addition, during a period in 2001 to 2002, the 
reported tail numbers became corrupted in the database. By inspecting the datasets, 
however, it was seen that the tail numbers were corrupted consistently between different 
tail numbers. This is useful because one can still make use of the dataset using tail 
numbers, as long as knowing the precise tail number is not important (e.g. N123AA 
corrupted to N&%&8* each time). 
 
3.3.2 Demand Data 
Demand data in this study are used to determine the traffic in airline markets and the 
ticket revenue airlines gained during the study period. It is useful to be able to measure 
passenger behavior before and after a schedule becomes depeaked. The demand dataset 
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for this study is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B)4 provided by BTS. 
The DB1B is a ten percent random sample of all lifted (or used) airline tickets on 
reporting carriers.  
This database contains three datasets, namely the Coupon, Market, and Ticket 
data. The Ticket dataset is a list of all the tickets in the sample, with an itinerary 
identification number used as a key variable. The Market data is linked to the Ticket 
dataset by the itinerary ID, and it is a list of the directional market routes traveled on the 
ticket. A market is identified by a break in the traveler’s trip, such as staying for an 
extended period at the destination. Each of the markets is identified by a unique identifier 
called the market identification number. Lastly, the Coupon dataset is a list of all the 
segments flown on each ticket. The coupon level is the lowest level to break down the 
ticket, and the coupons are linked to the Market and Ticket datasets with the itinerary ID 
and the market ID. 
Fare information is available at the ticket and market level. The Ticket dataset 
includes the full fare paid by the traveler for the entire itinerary. The Market dataset 
includes fare data for each directional market, but the fare is prorated by distance. The 
Coupon dataset does not contain fare data, and how this is handled is discussed later. 
The DB1B database was chosen over two other demand datasets. CRS booking 
data is not used because it is primarily a travel agency database, and under represents 
LCCs because it does not include web bookings. The CRS dataset was still applicable 
and was used in the study by Bogusch (2003), but the rise of internet sales has caused it 
to become heavily biased towards legacy carriers. Two other BTS datasets, the T-100 





Market and Segment databases, are not used because this study requires information 
about connections and passenger fares and T-100 does not contain itinerary or revenue 
information. 
 DB1B is a suitable dataset because it does not have a bias towards particular 
airlines, and provides connection and fare information. The data are organized by quarter, 
and listed by the origin and destination airports. Information on the specific flight date, 
flight number, and time, however, are not included. 
 
3.3.3 Supplemental Datasets 
Several other datasets are used in this study to support the research. These were often 
used in preparing the two primary datasets: the On-Time database and the DB1B 
database. These include spatial data for the National Airspace System, the Standard 
Industry Fare Level (SIFL) calculation, the Marketing Information Data Transfer (MIDT) 
dataset, the Schedule B-43 inventory for tail numbers and seating capacity, and the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) traveler surveys. 
 
3.3.3.1 Spatial Airport Data 
Geographic Information System (GIS) data was gathered on airport location from the 
2011 National Transportation Atlas Database (NTAD)5. The point file Public-Use 
Airports was used to spatially locate the airports in the GIS environ. Included in this data 
is attribute data for the physical and operating characteristics of each airport as well as 
usage categories. Only airports that exist for the public’s use are included in the NTAD 





dataset. Unlike the T-100 data, the airport codes in the two spatial databases are assigned 
by the Federal Aviation Administration. These are not always the same as the IATA 
codes. 
 
3.3.3.2 Standard Industry Fare Level 
Part of the cleaning process for the DB1B database involves comparing market fares to 
the Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL)6. The SIFL was created by the ADA as a way of 
limiting the Civil Aeronautics Board discretion to prescribe fare levels (Office of 
Aviation Analysis, 2012). The SIFL is maintained by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (USDOT), and is updated on a half-year cycle. The initial SIFL was based 
on 1979 fares, and became the standard measurement for determining the reasonableness 
of fares. In practice, it has been applied to the unrestricted coach fare. 
 The USDOT SIFL calculation is described by Good (Good, 2011). The SIFL 
calculation makes use of the market distance, and not the non-stop distance between an 
origin and destination. Thus a flight with a connection at the hub should use the total 
distance flown over the two flight legs. In addition, the calculation calculates the SIFL as 
an additive function of terminal charges and mileage rates. Each flight has a base 
terminal charge, and a per mile rate based on the distance traveled. The first 500 miles 
flown are assumed to have one rate, the next 1000 miles a slightly lower rate, and any 
mileage above that at an even lower rate. Each of these mileage groups get summed on 
top of the ones prior to it, such that a flight of 600 miles would have a calculation of: 
SIFL = terminal charge + (0-500 mile rate)*500 miles + (501-1500 mile rate)*100 miles 





3.3.3.3 Marketing Information Data Transfer 
In order to create a list of potential connections in a peaked and depeaked schedule, it 
was necessary to determine minimum connection times (MCT) and maximum connection 
times (MxCT) for each case study airport. To gather this information, booking data was 
used. Booking data provides the tickets which were sold to passengers, and thus provide 
insight into the length of connections that were considered reasonable to make by the 
airline, travel agent, and/or passenger.  
 A sample of domestic U.S. itineraries was pulled from the June 2010 Marketing 
Information Data Transfer (MIDT) dataset.  The MIDT dataset includes itinerary 
information for bookings that occurred through travel agencies on every carrier in all 
markets.  Each record is a unique itinerary, and includes the origin, destination, arrival 
and departure date and times, connecting cities, carriers, flight numbers, equipment types, 
and the number of passengers who booked on each specific itinerary. Access to this 
dataset was granted from a major U.S. airline. 
 
3.3.3.4 Tail Number Database 
A standard measure of capacity in the airline industry is Available Seat Miles (ASM). 
Similarly, it is standard practice to report revenue for flights as Revenue per Available 
Seat Mile (RASM). In order to create these measures, seating capacity for aircraft must 
be gathered. The On-Time database provides tail numbers, so with a dataset of registered 




 The Schedule B-43 Inventory7 provided by BTS is used to provide a list of tail 
numbers with their respective seating capacities. Data was downloaded for the period 
from 1992 to 2009, and compiled into a single list. Because seating capacities can change 
over time as airlines add or remove seats from the airplane, only the most recent entry for 
each tail number is retained in the list. 
  
3.3.3.5 Port Authority Traveler Surveys 
Evaluating the effect of an increase in connection due to depeaking on concessions 
revenue is useful to show how depeaking affects airport revenue. The PANYNJ collects 
passenger information through traveler surveys. PANYNJ reports their data each year in 
their Annual Air Traffic Reports8. This data has been used by Seaman (2011) to examine 
the demographics of airline passengers and the link to concession sales. The data are 
summarized for each airport owned by the PANYNJ – JFK, LGA, EWR, and SWF 
(Stewart International) – and as a total for the year. The data includes the average dwell 
time for both OD and connecting passengers, the percentage of passengers connecting, 
the amount of food and retail purchased per passenger, the percentage of passengers who 
purchases food and retail, and the average income of the passenger base. 
 
3.4 Preparing the Datasets 
In order to use the BTS datasets for this study, several data cleaning and pre-processing 
steps needed to be performed. Data cleaning routines were designed to eliminate clear 






errors in the database. Data processing routes were written to (1) assign affiliate airlines 
to parent airlines’ schedules in order to fully understand the schedules the depeaking 
airlines constructed and (2) standardize time zone information in order to construct a 
consistent time measurement. The following subsection describes the time zone 
modifications. 
 
3.4.1 Time Zones 
The FAA data are reported using flight times that reflect the time zones of the specific 
airports at which the aircraft is arriving from and departing at. Thus two different time 
zones can be used when reporting on an aircraft’s flight. In order to create a consistent 
time for the purpose of tracking specific aircraft, all times were converted to Greenwich 
Mean Time (GMT). Dates were changed as needed to reflect the time zone difference if 
the time in GMT caused the flight departure or arrival to be a day earlier. To establish the 
time zones of each airport, an ArcGIS map was created with the locations of all U.S. 
airports in the National Airspace System (NAS) and the time zones of the world. Each 
airport was attributed using the map with the airport’s difference in hours from GMT so 
that it can be used in making time adjustments. 
 When changing time zones of airports, it is critical to note whether Daylight 
Savings Time (DST) was in effect at the airport’s location at the time of the flight. Until 
2006, DST took effect from the first Sunday in April to the last Sunday in October. In 
2007, the Energy Policy of Act of 2005 (109th Congress, 2005) changed DST to take 




 Several parts of the country do not follow DST or have changed their policies of 
following DST over the past decade. This list most notably includes the states of Hawaii, 
Arizona, and parts of Indiana. Many airports in Indiana switched from not observing DST 
to observing the change in 2006. Some airports, however, were in counties that were 
already observing DST prior to 2006, such as Evansville Regional Airport. Using the 
ArcGIS map of the NAS airports and time zones, the DST changes over time were 
overlaid so that each airport could be attributed with the correct time zone and DST 
information. When cleaning and pre-processing the data, this information was joined to 
the list of flights so that times could be appropriately changed to GMT. Months in which 
DST started or stopped had to be split in two, for the dates which operated under DST 
from those that did not (April and October, 2006 and earlier; March and November, 2007 
and after). 
 
3.4.2 Cleaning the On-Time Performance Database 
Cleaning the On-Time Performance data was an important step in the schedule 
reproduction process. The goal of the cleaning the data was to remove errors so that the 
flights that would compose the schedules would be valid. To provide a starting point for 
cleaning the On-Time data, recommendations were gathered from Arikan et al. (2008). 
These guidelines removed what Arikan and co-authors considered erroneous data.  
• An aircraft whose scheduled departure time from an airport is earlier than the 
same aircraft’s scheduled arrival time of its previous flight to the airport. 
• An aircraft which flies successively on the same origin and destination route on 
the same day. 
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• An aircraft which arrives at an airport and its immediate next flight is from a 
different airport in less than five hours. 
Over a three year period from 2005 to 2007, the Arikan and co-authors removed a little 
over 1 million flights from the On-Time Performance data, approximately 5% of the data. 
 In cleaning the database for this study’s purposes, the Arikan guidelines were 
used as a starting point. Through many iterations of cleaning the data and error checking 
to ensure the process worked, the following process was created: 
1. Remove all blank tail numbers and tail numbers that were three characters or less 
o It is necessary to have tail numbers to recreate the airline schedule to 
ensure flights did not have errors. A missing tail number does not allow 
this and thus is removed. It is assumed that tail numbers of three 
characters or less are errors. 
2. Remove all cancelled flights. 
o Cancelled flights are not useful for the assessment of what historically 
occurred at the airport. 
3. Remove all diverted flights. 
o The actual arrival and departure times are used to clean the schedule. It 
was found while creating the cleaning process that CRS times introduced 
more errors during schedule recreation than actual flight times. Thus, 
because diverted flights did not fly between the origin and destinations the 
flight records claim, they do not have actual arrival and/or departure times, 
and thus are removed from the data. 
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4. Remove an aircraft’s flight whose actual departure time from an airport is earlier 
than the same aircraft’s actual arrival time of its previous flight to the airport. 
o First, sort aircraft list by tail number, and each tail number by departure 
and arrival times in GMT. 
o Next, assume that the first flight of the month for each tail number is a 
valid flight, and will be kept. Only subsequent flights can be removed. 
o When an error between two flights occurs, the latter of the two flights is 
always the one removed. It is assumed that because the earlier of the two 
flights did not have an error with its own preceding flight and has been 
retained, it is a valid flight. 
o This process is done iteratively. During each of the iterations through an 
aircraft’s flights, all errors of this type are flagged. The first occurrence of 
a tail number’s flights chronologically is removed during each loop 
through the aircraft’s schedule.  
5. Remove an aircraft’s flight which arrives at an airport and its immediate next 
flight is from a different airport in less than five hours. 
o This check is based upon the origins and destinations of flights which have 
no time conflicts. Five hours is used as a default time required for an 
aircraft to deadhead to another airport. The process is performed 
iteratively.  
o When two flight records are found to not meet this requirement, they are 
assessed based on the flights which occurred before and after the pair of 
flights. The one which is out of place is removed. This is different from 
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the time check, which always removes the latter flight. In the origin-
destination check, either can be removed. 
o This check is not flawless in the logical process that was developed to 
catch errors. There are instances where an incorrect portion of a tail 
number’s itinerary is chosen over what is correct from a visual inspection. 
The differences are minor, however, and affect well less than one percent 
of flights. 
 
In performing the cleaning process, there were sometimes aircraft tail numbers that have 
an exceptionally large number of flight records with overlapping flight times, the type of 
error flag from step 4 in the process just described. Usually there was only one aircraft 
per month with which this occurred. It is postulated that these tail numbers act as 
“temporary plates” in the airline industry, as the same tail number is listed flying to 
several locations at a given time. These tail numbers were entirely removed from the 
dataset because they caused so many errors during the cleaning process. 
Through the cleaning process, between one and six percent of data were removed 
from each month of flight records, with an average of about three percent. The cleaned 
datasets were then able to be used to recreate the flight schedule at given airports, and 
analyzed statistically for depeaking measures. 
 What follows is an example of a portion of the On-Time Performance data being 
cleaned. Assume for this example, that the tail number used is not one of the tail numbers 
which is a “temporary plate”, and thus has only a handful of errors from the step 4 of the 
cleaning process. Table 3.1 displays the example through a flow chart of the On-Time 
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data cleaning process, with sample records from the On-Time Performance Database. As 
it progresses through the steps of the cleaning process, flights are deleted that do not meet 
criteria.  All of the example flights in the table are considered to have taken place on the 
same date. 
 
































































Sort data by tail number and 
departure times. 
   PHX HOU 2110 2330 
N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC PHL 1045 1151 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   PHL BOS 1330 1507 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
N745UW   CLT SAN 1805 2358 
N745UW Yes  CLT DCA 1950 2055 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N82   RDU EWR 1622 1801 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   PDX SMF 1141 1322 
N945SW   SMF PHX 1350 1537 
N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW  Yes SFO SMF 2046  
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
1. Remove all blank tail 
numbers and tail numbers of 
three characters or less 
   PHX HOU 2110 2330 
N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC PHL 1045 1151 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   PHL BOS 1330 1507 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
N745UW   CLT SAN 1805 2358 
N745UW Yes  CLT DCA 1950 2055 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N82   RDU EWR 1622 1801 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
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Table 3.1  (Continued) 
 N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   PDX SMF 1141 1322 
N945SW   SMF PHX 1350 1537 
N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW  Yes SFO SMF 2046  
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
2. Remove all cancelled flights N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC PHL 1045 1151 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   PHL BOS 1330 1507 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
N745UW   CLT SAN 1805 2358 
N745UW Yes  CLT DCA 1950 2055 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   PDX SMF 1141 1322 
N945SW   SMF PHX 1350 1537 
N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW  Yes SFO SMF 2046  
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
3. Remove all diverted flights N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC PHL 1045 1151 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   PHL BOS 1330 1507 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
N745UW   CLT SAN 1805 2358 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   PDX SMF 1141 1322 
N945SW   SMF PHX 1350 1537 
N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW  Yes SFO SMF 2046  
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
4. Remove aircraft’s flights 
whose actual departure time 
from an airport is earlier than 
the same aircraft’s actual 
arrival time of its previous 
flight to the airport 
N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC PHL 1045 1151 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   PHL BOS 1330 1507 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
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Table 3.1  (Continued) 
FIRST ITERATION 
(Only first error is removed 
for each tail number) 
N745UW   CLT SAN 1805 2358 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   PDX SMF 1141 1322 
N945SW   SMF PHX 1350 1537 
N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
 
SECOND ITERATION 
(Only first error is removed 
for each tail number) 
N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   PHL BOS 1330 1507 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
N745UW   CLT SAN 1805 2358 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   PDX SMF 1141 1322 
N945SW   SMF PHX 1350 1537 
N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
 
THIRD ITERATION 
(No more time errors) 
N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   PHL BOS 1330 1507 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   PDX SMF 1141 1322 
N945SW   SMF PHX 1350 1537 
N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
5. Aircraft’s flight which 
arrives at an airport and its 
immediate next flight is from 
a different airport in less than 
five hours. 
FIRST ITERATION 
Only first error is removed for 
each tail number. Pairs of 
errors are checked to see 
which fits in the schedule. 
N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   PHL BOS 1330 1507 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   PDX SMF 1141 1322 
N945SW   SMF PHX 1350 1537 
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Table 3.1  (Continued) 
 N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
 
SECOND ITERATION 
Only first error is removed for 
each tail number. Pairs of 
errors are checked to see 
which fits in the schedule. 
N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   SMF PHX 1350 1537 
N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
 
FINAL  CLEANED 
SCHEDULE 
N745UW   CHS CLT 721 823 
N745UW   CLT RIC 928 1059 
N745UW   RIC CLT 1112 1221 
N745UW   CLT DFW 1313 1459 
N745UW   DFW CLT 1602 1848 
N745UW   SAN DFW 2352 253 
N945SW   TUS LAX 758 936 
N945SW   LAX SMF 1012 1133 
N945SW   SMF SFO 1400 1445 
N945SW   SFO EUG 1525 1727 
N945SW   EUG SFO 1810 1959 
N945SW   SFO EUG 2359 201 
Note: The grayed out flights during step 5 of the process are the pairings that do not line up with one 
another and are analyzed during the iteration. The flight scratched out in bold is the one that the 
logical process decides does not belong. In all of the steps, the lightly scratched out flights are also 
marked as potential errors, but are not assessed during that particular iteration. It is possible in step 
4 and 5 that those flights are no longer marked as errors once the cleaning process deletes prior 
errors, as seen with the second and third iteration of step 4 above. 
 
 
One of the important parts of the cleaning process is its iterative set-up for step 4 and 5 in 
the cleaning process. Iteration in the process and deleting only one flight per tail number 
during each loop through the data makes sure one error does not have a cascading effect 
by making several other flights to be tagged as errors. It is possible that by removing one 
bad flight, many flagged errors become unflagged. For example, in Table 3.1, the last 
flight of the day for N745UW (SAN-DFW) is initially flagged as an error, but once the 
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previous flight record (CLT-SAN) is removed as an error, SAN-DFW is no longer an 
error because the flight leaves from a different airport over 5 hours than it last left 
previous airport, and thus is assumed to be deadheading during that time. 
 
3.4.3 Adding Affiliate Airlines to Schedule 
Capturing the passenger traffic served by affiliate airlines is important for recreating the 
schedule, creating depeaking measures, and analyzing airline revenue. Affiliate airlines 
fly a large portion of routes out of airline hubs, and often account for over half of the 
flight departures. The major hub airlines, however, are the ones that determine when and 
where the affiliate airlines fly, and thus it is necessary to include the affiliate airlines that 
fly for a depeaking airline in the schedule for that airline’s hub. 
 
3.4.3.1 Challenges with Affiliate Airlines 
There are several challenges associated with including affiliate airlines in reproduced 
airport schedules from the On-Time database. First, not all affiliate airlines have their 
flights reported in the On-Time database. Federal regulations require that only certain 
airlines report their on-time statistics: airlines that carry one percent or more of the total 
domestic scheduled passenger revenues. Which airlines qualify at the one percent level 
for a given year is determined by the passenger revenue of the 12-month period of 
activity ending on June 30 for the previous year. Thus in January of each year, the 
airlines which must report are subject to change (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 
2011). An example of this change is shown in Table 3.2. In 2002 only ten airlines 
reported to the On-Time database, whereas in 2003, a total of 17 airlines reported.  
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All the major airlines fly enough flights that their aircraft movements are 
consistently reported in the database, but most of the affiliate airlines do not fly enough 
passengers to be required to report their on-time data. Of the ten airlines in 2002 that 
reported to the On-Time database, only one was an affiliate airline: American Eagle 
Airlines. A year later, five affiliate airlines were reporting their performance data. In 
addition to American Eagle, the new affiliate airlines reporting in 2003 were: Atlantic 
Coast Airlines (DH), Atlantic Southeast Airlines (EV), SkyWest Airlines (OO), and 
ExpressJet Airlines (RU).  
  





















Because not all affiliate airlines report to the On-Time database, it may not be possible to 
fully reproduce a depeaking airline’s schedule. If, for example, half of the flights for a 
given depeaking airline’s schedule in 2003 were operated by an affiliate airline that did 
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not report performance data in that year, the reproduced schedule would be incomplete. 
Analysis on this schedule in the context of the objectives of this study would be fruitless. 
 The second challenge with affiliate airlines is that the affiliate may fly for 
different (or multiple) carriers over time. Some affiliate airlines are fairly simple to assign 
to a parent airline, e.g.: American Eagle has only operated flights for American Airlines 
and Comair has only operated flights for Delta. Other affiliate airlines can be much more 
complex. SkyWest Airlines has flown for many different legacy airlines over time, 
changing parent airlines and often operating for two or more airlines simultaneously. 
When reproducing schedules, it is critical to know which parent airline an affiliate airline 
in the database was flying for at a given time and where the affiliate airline was flying.  
A robust method is needed to determine which affiliate airlines flew for which 
parent airlines and to which destination during different periods of time. In order to 
accomplish this, the DB1B ticketing database was used. In a given quarter of data, for all 
of the depeaked hub airports, each unique combination of ticketing airline, operating 
airline, reporting airline, and spoke airport is pulled from the DB1B database. This 
provides a full list of which affiliate airline flew for which parent airline between the 
parent airline’s hub and a spoke airport at a given point in time. 
The third challenge with affiliate airlines is the large number of unimportant 
combinations that exist in the DB1B dataset. For the fourth quarter of 2005 at CVG there 
are 1,693 combinations of ticketing carrier, operating carrier, reporting carrier, and spoke 
airport. Of these 1,159 averaged less than five passengers per day between CVG and the 
spoke airport, as seen in Figure 3.1. It is believed that this large number of combinations 
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reflects how reporting is affected by the variety of ways that passengers get ticketed, 
codesharing, and ticket changes. 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Distribution of the number of passengers in affiliate groupings. The histogram reflects the 
number of passengers per day in the different markets served from CVG by unique combinations of 






3.4.3.2 Decision Process for Affiliate Matching 
In order to reproduce a depeaking airline’s schedule at a hub airport at a given point in 
time, the inclusion of affiliate airline operations is necessary. The problem in including 
these operations is the affiliate airlines that report their operations to be recorded in the 
On-Time database are not listed with the airline for which they flew. In addition, it is 
possible for a number of affiliate airlines to have flown for a depeaking airline from a hub 
airport, so there is no quick solution. Affiliate airlines that reported their performance to 
the On-Time database must have their operations credited to the airline they flew for to 
create the schedules for the major airlines at a given airport. In order to credit these, a list 
was created from the DB1B dataset. 
 The first step in preparing a list from DB1B to match to the On-Time database 
was to generate all unique combinations of the fields ticket_carrier, operating_carrier, 
reporting_carrier, and the spoke airports flown to from the depeaking hub.  The spoke 
airports can be either an origin or destination served from the hub airport. 
 Next, all unique combinations in which the ticket_carrier field is equal to the 
operating_carrier field were removed from the initial list. It was assumed that if these 
two fields were equal, then the ticket_carrier was the air carrier who made the schedule 
for the particular combination. Only the major carriers were assumed to make schedules, 
and these were already credited properly in the On-Time database. Thus there was no 
need for them to be changed and do not need to be in the DB1B list. 
 The next step was to remove all combinations in which less than five passenger 
operations occurred per day on average. When looking at Figure 3.1, these combinations 
are all encompassed within the first bar in the histogram. These combinations were 
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deemed immaterial and were not considered when changing affiliate airline codes to 
major carrier codes in the On-Time database. Five passengers per day on average was 
chosen because this cutoff value enabled removal of a large portion of combinations, and 
had an intuitive interpretation; further, rules such as these (eliminating thin paths from 
schedule analysis) is common to airline practice. Because the DB1B database is a 10% 
sample of tickets, and there are approximately 90 days in a quarter, the threshold for the 
count of unique combinations in the DB1B dataset was 45 (representing a 10% sample of 
90 days at 5 passengers per day). Reporting_carrier was needed up until this step because 
it helped pick out the less substantial combinations. After this step, reporting_carrier can 
be removed, and combinations that are redundant can be combined. 
 Following the removal of immaterial combinations, the next step removed all 
combinations where operating_carrier was a major scheduling airline (legacy airlines, 
JetBlue, Southwest, AirTran, etc.). It was assumed that these combinations were 
scheduled by the respective major scheduling airline. 
 The final step was to check if the various operating carriers remaining in the list 
were uniquely matched to a ticketing carrier. If they were, those combinations which had 
a unique match could be assigned to be changed in the On-Time database. If they were 
not, it had to be decided which combinations should be assigned to one another in the 
On-Time database.  
The decision-making process to determine which operating carrier/ticketing 
carrier pairs is called exception processing, and is performed manually. By the end of 
exception processing, each combination of the variables operating_carrier, 
ticket_carrier, and spoke were assigned to either be changed in the On-Time database, or 
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to be excluded altogether. This exception processing combines knowledge of which 
affiliates historically primarily flew for a certain carrier at certain airports, which 
combination has more passengers per day, and if the spoke is a hub for the ticketing 
carrier. For example, in Step 6 of Table 3.3 that follows, SkyWest (OO) is listed as an 
affiliate for both United and Delta at ATL. Because ATL is a hub for Delta, the 
combination of SkyWest/United/ATL is excluded from being changed in the On-Time 
database. Thus, whenever OO is found as the carrier in the On-Time database flying to 
or from ATL, carrier will be changed to DL. The exception process results for the cases 
studies are shown in Appendix C. 
Table 3.3 shows a flow chart of the affiliate airline matching process with sample 
combinations from the DB1B dataset. As it progresses through the steps, combinations 
are deleted that do not meet criteria. 
 
Table 3.3  Decision Process for Affiliate Matching  

























































1. Create list of all unique combinations 
from DB1B of ticket_carrier, 
operating_carrier, reporting_carrier, and 
spoke 
DL DL DL ATL 502 
DL DL DL SFO 376 
DL NW NW DTW 482 
DL EV EV SLC 207 
DL EV OO ATL 12 
DL EV OO SLC 3 
DL  OO EV  ATL 54 
DL OO MQ ATL 2 
DL OO OO ATL 106 
UA OO OO ATL 9 
UA UA OO LAX 24 
UA UA UA LAX 371 
2. Remove if 
operating_carrier=ticket_carrier 
DL DL DL ATL 502 
DL DL DL SFO 376 
DL NW NW DTW 482 
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Table 3.3  (Continued) 
 DL EV EV SLC 207 
DL EV OO ATL 12 
DL EV OO SLC 3 
DL  OO EV ATL 54 
DL OO MQ ATL 2 
DL OO OO ATL 106 
UA OO OO ATL 9 
UA OO OO LAX 24 
UA UA UA LAX 371 
3. Remove if # of passengers per day < 5 DL NW NW DTW 482 
DL EV EV SLC 207 
DL EV OO ATL 12 
DL EV OO SLC 3 
DL  OO EV  ATL 54 
DL OO MQ ATL 2 
DL OO OO ATL 106 
UA OO OO ATL 9 
UA OO OO LAX 24 
4. Remove reporting_carrier and combine 
redundant combinations 
DL NW . DTW 482 
DL EV . SLC 207 
DL EV . ATL 12 
DL OO . ATL 
54+106 
=160 
UA OO . ATL 9 
UA OO . LAX 24 
5. Remove where operating_carrier is a 
major scheduling airline 
DL NW . DTW 482 
DL EV . SLC 207 
DL EV . ATL 12 
DL OO . ATL 160 
UA OO . ATL 9 
UA OO . LAX 24 
6. Search for unique 
operating_carrier/ticket_carrier 
combinations. Perform manual exception 
processing for the remaining. 
DL EV . SLC 207 
DL EV . ATL 12 
DL OO . ATL 160 
UA OO . ATL 9 
UA OO . LAX 24 
 
 
When the final list of combinations of ticket_carrier, operating_carrier, and spoke were 
ready, these could be attributed to the On-Time database. The change was made using the 
carrier field in the On-Time database. For a give combination, the entries in the On-Time 
database were checked to see if the origin or destination is the depeaking hub, the 
corresponding destination or origin was equal to the spoke, and the carrier was equal to 
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the operating_carrier. If these three conditions are met, carrier was changed to be the 
ticket_carrier. This signifies that the ticketing carrier was the airline which created the 
schedule for that particular flight, and should receive credit for it in schedule 
reproduction. 
 
3.4.4 Adding Seating Capacity 
The seating capacities of the aircraft listed in the On-Time database are matched by tail 
number to the list from the B-43 database. Between 85 and 90 percent of the tail numbers 
in the On-Time database are able to be matched with a tail number in the B-43 database. 
This is slightly higher than Barnhart et al. (2010), which matched approximately 75 
percent of flights in the Airline Service Quality Performance database with the B-43 tail 
number list. According to Barnhart et al., 100% of the tail numbers do not match because 
tail number information is sometimes inaccurate or non-existent in the B-43 database. 
 Leftover unmatched tail numbers are assigned seating capacities through a three-
pass ordered assignment process. After each pass through the tail numbers, the tail 
numbers with newly assigned seating capacities are not included as “matched” tail 
numbers for subsequent passes. 
1. The first pass through the unmatched tail numbers checks to see if a given 
unmatched tail number has an airline and an OD pair as other matched tail 
numbers that operated for the same airline between the same OD pair. If so, the 
average seating capacity for that airline on that OD pair is assigned to the 
unmatched tail number.  
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2. The second pass through the unmatched tail numbers checks to see if a given 
unmatched tail number has an OD pair as other matched tail numbers that 
operated between the same OD pair. If so, the average seating capacity for that 
OD pair over all airlines is assigned to the unmatched tail number. 
3. If there are no non-stop flights present with tail numbers in the OD pair, an 
average capacity for all markets served in a given distance range is assigned to 
the remaining unmatched tail numbers. Distance ranges are by 500 miles 
increments, and seating capacities are averaged across all airlines.  
 
With seating capacities attributed to tail numbers in the schedule, both the actual and 
estimated capacities, it is possible to make calculations involving ASM. 
 
3.4.5 Cleaning the DB1B Database 
The DB1B cleaning process was important to creating a database of demand and revenue 
information that was usable for the purposes of this study. The goal was to have a 
consistent set of ticket coupons, attributed with fare data that could be compared in 
different markets before and after a depeaking event. 
Several studies in the literature were examined for how they cleaned the DB1B data. 
The goal was to gain perspective on what types of errors could exist in the dataset, and 
what screens could be made to create a dataset fit for our needs. It is important to have 
consistency in the types of ticket coupons analyzed.  
Borenstein in several papers makes use of DB1B data (Borenstein, 1989, 2005; 
Borenstein & Rose, 1994), and the cleaning guidelines he has developed encompasses 
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correcting keypunch errors as well as restricting the data to one-way or roundtrip travel 
ensuring there is consistency in analyzed trips. The follow tickets are eliminated under 
Borenstein’s guidelines: 
• Tickets that include a destination or change of plane at a U.S. airport not in the 
top 200 largest airports 
• Tickets that are open-jaw or circle trips 
• Interline tickets 
• Tickets that have more than two coupons between a given O&D 
• Tickets that include more than four coupons 
• Tickets with at least one segment in first-class (except on Southwest and JetBlue, 
where all coupons are called first class) 
 
Error checking for keypunch mistakes includes removing: 
• Tickets with a fare greater than five times the USDOT’s SIFL for the O&D 
distance of travel 
• Tickets with fares less than $10 
 
This study makes use of some of these guidelines, and adjusts them for what was deemed 
important for this study’s purposes. In order to capture all destinations in the U.S., no 
airports were deleted regardless of size. Because this study looks only at the coupon 
level, open-jaw, circle trips, and interline tickets are left in the dataset.  
Borenstein removes tickets that have anything that has more than two coupons in 
market, and our study also uses that restriction. This restriction removes double 
connection markets, which when prorated, often have coupons with very low fares. In 
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addition, part of the analysis looks at revenue for connecting flights, and by only allowing 
one connection per market, it reduces the complexity of analysis and creates a more 
uniform set of flights. A restriction is also put, on the number of coupons in a ticket, 
which with two coupons in a market, is capped at four coupons in an itinerary. 
The Borenstein studies and many other studies (Cristea & Hummels, 2011; Dana 
& Orlov, 2007) all remove first class fares from their analysis. The reason being is these 
fares skew any revenue analysis, and likely disproportionately to certain markets. 
Borenstein also removes fares which have fares five times greater than the SIFL level for 
a market, which is adopted in this study, instead of the flat $9999 fare cutoff used by 
Cristea & Hummels (2011). Each of the studies also have a low-end cut off for fares, 
ranging from $10 per ticket for the Borenstein studies, $25 for Dana & Orlov (2007), and 
$100 for Cristea & Hummels (2011). These low fare cutoffs exist mostly to remove 
tickets that are frequent flyer trip redemptions. This study uses $5 per market, which is 
derived from half of the $10 Borenstein ticket cutoff. 
 There is also a trend to remove trips below a distance cutoff. These short trips 
were assumed to be land segment transfers between airports in the same metropolitan 
area (such as from LGA to JFK). Authors had different distances for the exclusion. 
Thirty-five miles was suggested such that transfers between two airports in the same city 
would not be dropped (Cristea & Hummels, 2011), while another drops all trips (both 
land and air) below fifty miles without any stated reason (Dana & Orlov, 2007). This 
study is not concerned with trips within the same city, but trips between two airports that 
are close together are worth keeping. Thus, the screen used for distance in this study is 
land trips under fifty miles. 
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 In summary, the following are the set of DB1B cleaning rules used in this study, 
in the order they are performed, with short explanations of each. 
1. Remove all itineraries that have more than four coupons and all markets with 
more than two coupons. 
o Itineraries with greater than four coupons are rare, but often have odd 
routings that look to be the product of mileage running and create 
complexities in analyzing revenue for connecting passengers. In addition, 
prorated fares become very small with so many segments. 
2. Remove all itineraries that have at least one first-class ticket 
o The entire itinerary is removed because the ticket fare is prorated by 
distance over the markets. Thus, even if a market was flown entirely in 
coach, and one leg of a different market on the same itinerary was flown 
in first-class, the market fare for the market flown in coach will be higher 
due to the prorating. 
3. Remove tickets with abnormally high fares. 
o Each market is assessed to see if the market fare exceeds the SIFL level by 
five times for that particularly market. 
o For any itinerary that has at least one market which exceeds the SIFL level 
by five times, the entire itinerary is removed from the Coupon and Market 
datasets. This is because the market fares are prorated, and thus any other 
markets affiliated with this itinerary should not be included 
4. Remove tickets with low fares. 
o Each market is assessed to see if the market fare is below $5.00. 
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o For any itinerary that has at least one market which has a fare below 
$5.00, the entire itinerary is removed from the Coupon and Market 
datasets. 
5. Remove coupons that have short distances. 
o Each coupon is assessed to see if the distance of the leg is less than 50 
miles and does not have an airline for the ticketing carrier. These legs are 
assumed to be ground transfers between airports, often in the same 
metropolitan area (JFK/LGA/EWR, SJC/SFO/OAK, and MIA/FLL). 
o Only the specific coupon is removed with the short distance. Other 
coupons are left in the dataset. This is last step of cleaning, so removing 
single coupons from an itinerary does not affect later steps. 
 
Through the cleaning process, around fifteen percent of all itineraries, corresponding to 
nineteen percent of the coupon data, were removed from each quarter of ticket data. The 
cleaned datasets were then able to be used to attribute revenue information to different 
origin and destination pairs in the supply data, and analyzed for their role in determining 
spoke destinations to shift in the schedule. 
 
3.4.6 Prorating Fares 
The Coupon dataset does not have fare information attributed to it, but coupon level fares 
are necessary for attributing revenue information to different markets flown from a hub. 
Multi-coupon markets must have fare data split between the coupons that compose the 
flights in the market. In order to create coupon level fare data from the market level fare 
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data, two methods were assessed for performing the calculation: (1) linearly prorate 
coupon fares using a ratio of distances in the market, or (2) split the fares using a ratio of 
the square root of the distances in the market. 
 Method 1 of calculating coupon level fares is a common method to split up fares 
across two flight legs. By using the relative distance out of the total flown market 
distance, a fare can be easily calculated (Ater & Orlov, 2010; Dana & Orlov, 2007; Li & 
Netessine, 2011). In fact, the Market dataset’s fares are prorated by a ratio of distances 














 Method 2 of creating coupon level fares computes the square root of the distance 
of the segments in the itinerary. This method takes into account that there is a fixed cost 
for any flight legs which is operated, and the per mile rate decreases as the distance flown 
increases (Le, 2006; Wang et al., 2008). The SIFL calculation is an example of this 
rationale. Le (2006) notes that the idea to calculate fares in this manner came from Dr. 














 The effect of the square root method is that shorter distance fares receive a larger 
portion of the market fare than the longer distance fares in the market. This is accounting 
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for the fixed cost of any given trip. Figure 3.2 shows how a given fare in the square root 
method is larger to a certain point. In a two-leg market, the point where the linear and 
square root lines is when the two legs have equal lengths. 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Comparison of linear versus square root prorating of leg distance. Square root prorating 
helps account for fixed cost. Source: Le (2006) 
 
 
Both methods had similar distributions of prorated fares, with the square root method 
having a distribution slightly less skewed towards higher fares. It was determined, 
however, that the impact of our assumption of one technique over another is minimal. 
Both methods would be used to assess revenue before and after depeaking. As long as 
there are not vast differences in the distances aircraft are flying from an airport before 
and after a depeaking date then how one prorates the fares should not impact the results. 
Fares, both before and after depeaking, would be equally affected by either prorating 
methods. We assume that there is not a vast difference in the distances aircraft flew 
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before and after depeaking, and thus either method would be good for comparison. 
Despite the rationale behind the square root method, the linear method was chosen over 
the square root method for this study because of its simplicity in calculation and more 
common usage – the market fare that is being prorated from the BTS dataset was itself 
prorated linearly! 
 
3.4.7 Choosing Time Periods for Case Studies’ Datasets 
A major contribution of this study is using publicly available supply and demand data and 
linking them into a single analysis. This combination allows for revenue analysis on 
historical schedules. An issue with using the publicly available datasets provided by BTS 
is the On-Time database and the DB1B database have different time periods. The former 
has specific date and time information for each flight and is distributed on a monthly 
basis. The latter, however, provides only the calendar quarter in which a passenger ticket 
was traveled on as temporal information. 
 
3.4.7.1 Time Periods Used for Analysis 
In order to have the same time periods for comparison of markets, it is necessary to thus 
either aggregate the supply data for comparisons to a quarter of demand data, or create 
average daily values from the demand data and compare it to a single day of the supply 
data. Because the fine details of the airline schedule were preferred for measuring 
depeaking and connections, the time period was chosen as a single day, with averages of 
the demand data used for comparisons with supply. 
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 Choosing to use a single day to represent the supply of an airline for a period of 
time (the peaked period or the depeaked period) will not precisely match up with the 
average of the demand data, but still provides a consistent measure across cases within 
the study. By averaging demand data, one includes all of weekdays, weekends, and 
holiday traffic and fares, and thus the revenue values which are being assumed for a 
single day are not precisely what would have occurred on the typical day being used for 
the supply data.  
 The single days used to represent the supply data is a Tuesday one to two weeks 
before depeaking for the peaked schedule and a Tuesday one to two weeks after 
depeaking for the depeaked schedule. Tuesdays that are within three days of a national 
holiday are avoided.  
 Choosing the peaked and depeaked quarters to be averaged for daily demand was 
more complex than choosing the peaked and depeaked days for the supply data. Because 
a depeaking event is unlikely to happen on the first or last day of a quarter, the same 
quarter corresponds to the representative before and after days. Thus a quarter of demand 
data includes both tickets flown on a peaked schedule and tickets flown on a depeaked 
schedule. It is not possible to distinguish which tickets in a quarter were flown on either 
schedule. Because of this issue, it is necessary to use the quarter before and the quarter 
after to represent the demand before and after depeaking. Thus, if an airport was 
depeaked in the second quarter, the first quarter and third quarter would serve as the 
peaked and depeaked demand data, respectively.  
 An exception to the demand data quarter decision is made if the depeaking date is 
within one week of the start or end of the quarter. In this case only one of the thirteen 
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weeks of the quarter operated under a different schedule from the rest of the quarter. The 
demand data for that quarter thus has a reasonably large enough proportion of one 
schedule type’s resulting traffic and fares that it was deemed appropriate to use as the 
representative quarter. The corresponding quarter for the other schedule type would 
remain the quarter before or after the depeaking quarter, but now the corresponding 
supply date would be within that quarter. 
 An example of how time periods are determined for use in this study is shown in 
Figure 3.3. Note how in Figure 3.3 (a), the peaked and depeaked quarter do not contain 
the peak and depeak dates quarter, and in Figure 3.3 (b) the depeaked quarter includes 







Figure 3.3  Time periods for supply and demand data used in analysis. Peaked and depeaked dates 
refer to dates in supply data, while peaked and depeaked quarters refer to quarters in demand data. 
(a) shows the situation where the depeaking date is in the middle weeks of a quarter, while (b) shows 





3.4.7.2 Validating Supply-Demand Time Period Decision 
With the supply data coming from dates immediately before and after the depeaking date, 
and the demand data coming (generally) from the quarters before and after the depeaking 
quarter, a check was performed to see how much the supply shifted in the months prior to 
depeaking, and the months after. Tuesday schedules in the quarter prior to depeaking 
were compared to the date used as the representative peaked schedule, and similarly for 
the quarter after depeaking and the representative depeaked date. Generally, the supply 
barely changed over these periods (see Results chapter for the degree of change), and the 
decision to use the system shown in Figure 3.3 is validated. 
 Because the demand data is quarterly, and from the beginning to the end of the 
analysis of each case nine months elapse, seasonality of prices must be considered. Year-
over-year controls are put in place to standardize revenue and fare changes across the 
industry and within the airline. These controls adjust for changes across the industry, 
within the airline, and major external events. 
 
3.5 Analysis Methodology 
The case study approach to this project was chosen because each occurrence of 
depeaking has unique reasons for its implementation. The airline hubs at which flight 
banks were shifted to continuous schedules vary in geography, the number of airline 
competitors, capacities, and flight volumes. A case study allows an understanding of 
depeaking within the bounds of the circumstances under which it occurred. Each case can 




 The setup of each case focuses on three primary parts, outlined in bold in Figure 
3.4. The first part examines the supply in reference to how the flight schedule changed 
for the depeaking airline and its competitors. The second part focuses on demand and will 
examine how revenues changed, how the passenger base responded to the changes, and 
the changes for competitors. Lastly, the operations of the airlines that were affected by 
depeaking are studied in terms of occurrences of delay. Along the way, after a portion of 
the supply analysis, the cases which do not have verified depeaking are terminated. The 
cases carried through the demand and operations analysis are compared with one another 
through a difference-in-difference analysis and a multivariate regression at the spoke 








The following section describes how cases were chosen, the steps taken with the data to 
prepare parameters, and how the analyses were performed. 
 
3.5.1 Choosing Cases 
A number of case studies were identified early in the study using findings from the 
literature review. From this initial set, the cases were reduced in number based on 
whether it was possible to identify if the airline in the case actually depeaked the hub. 
This section describes the initial list and why certain cases were not carried through to the 
full study. 
 
3.5.1.1 Initial Case List 
Only the domestic airline implementations of depeaking that have been noted during the 
literature review are examined for potential case studies. International examples are not 
included because this study only makes use of U.S. domestic data. 
The literature review identified many occurrences of depeaking since 2000, with a 
wide range of information currently available on them. Not all instances of depeaking 
have been discussed in depth or studied through quantitative analysis in the literature. 
Several of the depeaking examples were only casually mentioned in the literature as 
having occurred, but were without additional information or references. In looking for 
potential instances of depeaking or verifying when they happened, it was sometimes 
necessary to use Internet airline forums. Using these forums, evidence could be initially 
found on which airports were depeaked and the time period or the precise date the 
depeaking occurred. Due to the uncertainty and lack of information on many of the 
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depeaking cases, the list of potential occurrences need to be checked for when and how 
they occurred before any are chosen to be carried through the full analysis. 
For this study, thirteen instances of depeaking were identified as potential case 
studies. Each of these was mentioned either in the literature or in online forums. The 
thirteen potential cases are listed by airline, hub, and the year each reportedly depeaked in 
Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4  Depeaking Occurrences for Selection of Case Studies 
Airline Hub Year Depeaked 
Alaska SEA No Information 
American DFW 2002 
American MIA 2004 
American ORD 2002 
Continental EWR 2000 
Continental IAH No Information 
Delta ATL 2005 
Delta CVG 2005 
Delta SLC 2005 
United LAX 2005 
United ORD 2004 
United SFO 2006 
US Airways PHL 2005 
 
 
A map of the cases and their location in the U.S. is shown in Figure 3.5, with the airlines 
noted next to each airport and the year of reported depeaking. 
The American cases for ORD and DFW were assessed first, to validate the 
procedure such that the measure results are similar to those found in Bogusch (2003). The 
remaining cases were then verified in no particular order to check if depeaking had 





Figure 3.5  Map of the reported U.S. depeaking cases. 
 
 
3.5.1.2 Removed Case Studies 
To ensure the case studies were credible, each was assessed by their change in supply, as 
described at the beginning of the Supply Analysis section that follows. Those which had 
an identifiable difference between before and after schedules, such that the depeaking can 
be verified, were kept as a potential case study. Just because the following cases are 
removed from the study, does not necessarily mean the airport did not get depeaked. In a 
few cases, it was because there was a lack of data available for verification (e.g. obvious 
affiliate airline carriers were missing from the On-Time database). 
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 The following subsections describe the cases that were not able to be verified for 
depeaking, and the reasons this occurred. The next section then lists the final set of cases 
and the date they depeaked. 
 
3.5.1.2.1 Alaska Airlines at Seattle 
Alaska Airlines was reported to have depeaked SEA by Williams and Weiss (2005), 
citing an Alaska Airline’s 2004 publication. Recreating the schedule proved to be 
difficult because Alaska Airline’s primary affiliate carrier, Horizon Air Industries (QX), 
did not report On-Time performance data in years 2004 and earlier. Horizon flew many 
routes for Alaska during this time period, and thus it is not possible to fully reproduce the 
schedule. 
 
3.5.1.2.2 American Airlines at Miami 
American Airlines was reported to have depeaked MIA in May 2004 (Jiang, 2006). 
Reproducing the schedules did not provide enough evidence of depeaking to say with 
certainty when MIA was depeaked, or if it was at all. As seen in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, 
there is a banked schedule structure in both April and May of 2004. The latter seems to 
have had the peaks reduced slightly and slightly spread out, but not depeaked into a 
continuous schedule. It must be noted that MIA has an extensive international network, 
and lacking the international flights in the schedule for reproduction means there is a 
large portion of the traffic not represented. The lack of international data, for MIA in 





Figure 3.6  Recreated schedule of AA’s operations at MIA in April 2004. The schedule has banks 
indicating the peaked schedule. 
 
 
Figure 3.7  Recreated schedule of AA’s operations at MIA in May 2004. The schedule still has banks, 




3.5.1.2.3 Continental Airlines at Newark  
Continental Airlines was reported to have depeaked EWR in 1997 (Ott, 2002) or  the 
summer of 2000 (McCartney, 2000). Based on the schedule reproduction, 1998 appeared 
to be the time period when EWR was depeaked. Although it is difficult to tell when the 
depeaking occurred – it appears to have occurred gradually over a several month period – 
it is clear that the schedule changed from December 1997 to September 1998, as seen in 
Figures 3.8 and 3.9. Recreating the schedule proved to be difficult because Continental 
Airline’s primary affiliate carrier, ExpressJet Airlines (RU), did not report On-Time 
performance data during this time period. ExpressJet flew many routes for Continental 
during this time period, and thus it is not possible to fully reproduce the schedule. 
 
 
Figure 3.8  Recreated schedule of CO’s operations at EWR in December 1997. The schedule still 





Figure 3.9  Recreated schedule of CO’s operations at EWR in September 1998. The schedule looks 
depeaked as compared to the December 1997 schedule. 
 
 
3.5.1.2.4 Continental Airlines at Houston 
Continental Airlines was reported to have depeaked IAH in 2005 or prior, as mentioned 
by Williams and Weiss (2005), although Continental was claimed to have been 
experimenting earlier than (Ott, 2002). Continental’s schedule was recreated at IAH for 
the years prior to 2005, and there was no indication that Continental ever removed the 
banked structure from its schedule. A strong peaked schedule exists continuously 




3.5.1.2.5 Delta Airlines at Cincinnati 
Delta Airlines was reported to be planning to depeak CVG in a news article from 2004 
(Hirschman) along with SLC and ATL. Delta’s schedule was recreated from the date of 
the article to early 2006. During the late summer of 2005, it seemed that Delta had done 
some spreading of peaks at CVG for the arrival banks only, as displayed in Figure 3.10. 
Through analysis of the schedule during the second half of 2005, it appeared that Delta 
decided to reduce the CVG hub instead of depeak the banks. By December of 2005, the 
volume of flights per day had dropped from around 1,140 in August, to 680 in December. 
The number of destinations was also scaled back, from 126 to 115. The banked schedule 
form was retained through the schedule reduction. It appears Delta did not depeak CVG. 
 
 
Figure 3.10  Recreated schedule of DL’s operations at CVG in August 2005. Note the peaks in the 




3.5.1.2.6 Delta Airlines at Salt Lake City 
Delta Airlines was reported to be planning to depeak SLC in a news article from 2004 
(Hirschman) along with CVG and ATL. Delta’s schedule was recreated from the date of 
the article to early 2006, and there was no indication that Delta ever removed the banked 
structure from its schedule. A peaked schedule exists continuously during this period, 
although the schedule gets reduced in number of flights in late 2005. The number of 
flights per day drops from 744 in August to 504 in December, while the number of 
destinations served is reduced from 84 to 81. It appears that Delta never depeaked SLC, 
but instead reduced its activity at the hub instead while maintaining the banked structure. 
 
3.5.1.2.7 United Airlines at Chicago 
United Airlines was reported to have depeaked ORD in a company news brief in April of 
2004 (United Airlines, 2004), describing that the schedule at ORD was depeaked in 
February of the same year as a means of reducing congestion at the airport. Recreating 
the schedule proved to be difficult because one of United Airline’s primary affiliate 
carriers, Air Wisconsin (ZW), did not report On-Time performance data in years 2004 
and earlier. Air Wisconsin was one of three affiliate airlines to operate flights for United 
from ORD during this time, alongside Atlantic Coast and SkyWest that did report 
performance data in 2004. Because Air Wisconsin served many destinations for United 
from ORD during this time period, it is not possible to fully reproduce the schedule. The 
flight schedules that can be reproduced are shown in Figures 3.11 and 3.12, displaying 
the schedule in January and March. A change certainly occurred, but analysis on what 
happened is not recommended due to the lack of information on flights flown by Air 
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Wisconsin. The incomplete schedule does not allow for verification of depeaking in 
February 2004, nor analysis on how United depeaked ORD. 
 
 
Figure 3.11  Recreated schedule of UA’s operations at ORD in January 2004. This shows the 
schedule before UA’s depeaking at the airport. The schedule is not able to be fully reproduced 





Figure 3.12  Recreated schedule of UA’s operations at ORD in March 2004. This shows the schedule 
after UA’s depeaking at the airport. The schedules are not able to be fully reproduced without Air 
Wisconsin, and thus United’s depeaking at ORD is not included in this study. 
 
 
3.5.1.3 Final Case Study List 
Six of the initial cases were verified as having been depeaked by the airport’s hub airline. 
Each of these cases had a clear indication the depeaking occurred, such that peaks 
beforehand were clearly identifiable, and the change when depeaked was obvious. In 
Table 3.5, each of the airlines and airports are listed along with the date of depeaking is 






Table 3.5  Final Case Study List of Verified Depeaked Airports 
Airline Hub Date Depeaked 
American ORD April 7, 2002 
American DFW November 1, 2002 
Delta ATL January 31, 2005 
US Airways PHL February 6, 2005 
United LAX June 7, 2005 
United SFO January 9, 2006 
 
 
3.5.2 Schedule Reproduction and Measurements 
Reproducing the schedule for each case study makes use of a cleaned On-Time 
performance database file with the affiliate airline codes changed to be the parent airline.  
The schedule is recreated for a Tuesday for the month of interest. Only the airline of 
interest’s flights are retained for the reproduced schedule. Each flight is labeled as a 
departure or arrival into and out of the airport, and placed into bins representing the 96 
15-minute periods throughout a day. 15-minute periods were chosen to stay consistent 
with Bogusch’s (Bogusch, 2003) study. 
 Unlike the cleaning process which made use of actual arrival and departure times, 
the schedule reproduction process uses CRS times. The CRS times provide information 
on the flights that were actually scheduled by the airline at an airport, before actual 
operations occurred. These times better achieve the goals of this study. 
 Using a table of daily flights classified into type of flight and time, a visual 
display of the schedule is created, which has been displayed several times so far in this 
report. Arrivals are plotted above the x-axis, and departures plotted below the y-axis, 
similar to what was seen in Jiang (2006). 
110 
 
 Several measurements are made on this schedule and used later for the supply 
analysis. These parameters which describe the schedule include: 
• the number of operations throughout the day, 
• the number of unique destinations served from the airport,  
• the maximum number of one type of operation (either arrival or departure) in a 
given 15-minute period,  
• the maximum combined number of operations in a given 15-minute period,  
• the coefficient of variation of the number of flights in 15-minute period for both 
arriving flights and departing flights, 
• the number of arrival banks, 
• and the number of departure banks, 
• the percentage of flights that operated within flight banks,  
• the percentage of flights operated by affiliates, 
• the number of potential connections between arriving and departing flights, 
• the average number of potential connections per arriving flight, 
• the maximum number of connections between any two spokes, 
• and the total ASM offered from the airport by the hub airline. 
To calculate the three parameters referencing banks, the flight banks need to be defined 
and identified from the schedule. The process to do this is described in the next section. 
The parameters involving connections are described further in 3.5.4. 
 Each spoke airport from the hub is summarized by the average inbound and 
outbound flight times, ASM, number of flights per day in and out of the hub airport, 
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number of flights in and out of the peak (for peaked schedule only), the percentage of 
those flights in the peaks, and the competitors operating between the spoke and hub. 
 
3.5.3 Measurement of Schedule Banks 
Measuring the degree to which a schedule depeaked provides an important measure for 
comparison among depeaking cases. A measure of depeaking, however, first needs a 
measure of peaking to compare against within each case, so that comparisons can then be 
made later between cases. As such, the banks of the peaked schedule need to be 
identified, so that the corresponding depeaked measure can be compared against it.  
 There is a need to develop a robust measure of schedule peaking. As discussed by 
Kanafani and Ghobrial (1985), typical peak-hour statistics are not suitable for capturing 
flight banks as the banks occur over shorter periods of time and throughout the day. The 
only measurement that could be used for peaking and depeaking comparisons in the 
literature was the peak index, used by Jenkins, Marks, and Miller (Jenkins et al., 2012). 
The peak index is a granular approach to describing an airport’s schedule, measuring the 
coefficient of variation of one-hour periods of activity through the day. Standard 
deviation is not enough because it is unique to each sample. Increases in the peak index 
over time indicated a change to more peaking, while decreases in the peak index showed 
a depeaking airport. Jenkins, Marks, and Miller applied the peak index across all 
operations at the airport, and not a specific depeaking airline. 
 The peak index is useful in many regards, and a similar version of it is used in this 
study. The coefficient of variation is measured only on the depeaking airline’s schedule, 
and using 15-minute periods. The more granular approach is used to better capture the 
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reality of flight banks – they often are 45 to 60 minutes in length, and thus hour-long 
periods miss out on much of the intricacies of banking. 
 Another way of looking at the measurement of peaking and depeaking was to 
quantify the percentage of flights that existed within banks. This required banks to be 
able to be found consistently. Two methods were considered to identify the banks: 1) 
employing a Fourier series to decompose the schedule’s periodic nature and 2) a heuristic 
procedure to find the local maxima in the schedule. 
 
3.5.3.1 Fourier Series for Finding Banks 
A Fourier analysis was performed to assess whether the periodic banks in a peaked flight 
schedule could be decomposed into a sum of a number of sine and cosine functions. The 
hope in combining these oscillating functions was to be able to express the aggregated 
time series data as a continuous function. As a continuous oscillating function, it would 
be simple to identify the peaks of the banks and the troughs between.  
 The Fourier series was not useful in identifying banks in the schedule. When 
running the Fourier analysis large errors were created. The reason these errors arose is the 
non-periodic distribution of the banks throughout the day and the varying lengths of the 
banks. The time between the banks are not consistent, as there are longer lengths of time 
between banks midday than in the mornings and evenings. In addition to the irregular 
spacing between banks, the banks themselves are of varying lengths, typically ranging 
between 45 and 90 minutes. The lack of periodicity causes the Fourier series to break 




3.5.3.2 Identifying the Flight Banks in the Schedule 
Because of the irregularity in the spacing and length of banks, a heuristic procedure for 
identifying banks was developed specifically for this study, as the researchers were 
unable to find a method in the literature that could be used to identify local maxima in 
aggregated time-series data. The measure used to determine the degree to which a 
schedule is peaked is the percentage of flights that are within the flight banks of a 
schedule. To make this measurement, one first has to locate where the banks are in an 
airline’s schedule. The following sections describe the method used to identify flight 
banks in an airline’s schedule, prior to the schedule being depeaked, and how the 
measurement is made for before and after depeaking. 
 To find the flight banks in an airline’s schedule, a two-step process was created. 
The first step is identifying the 15-minute periods of the day which would be considered 
peaks in the schedule. The second step is adding to the peaks by examining the 15-minute 
periods on either side of the identified peaks. Each of the two steps has several criteria 
used to include 15-minute periods into flight banks. 
 In order to perform the process, statistical measures of the 15-minute periods must 
be collected. Arrivals and departures are maintained as separate populations for these 
statistical measures and throughout the equations that follow. The variable used is the 
magnitude of operations Xi,t in a given 15-minute period (where i is an airport-airline 
combination and t is a 15-minute period within the day’s schedule being examined). This 
generic form of the variable could be written as Ai,t or Di,t for arrivals and departures, but 
is left as X for simplicity in the expressions that follow. When a 15-minute period is 
identified to be a peak in the bank of the schedule, the period is denoted by Xi,t’. 
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 The entire day is used for the population set for 15-minute periods, and thus N=96 
in both the arrival and departures populations. For both populations, the mean and 
standard deviation are calculated, giving µA, σA, µD, and σD, but in the expressions that 
follow the generic µ and σ are used for simplicity. 
 
3.5.3.2.1 Identifying Peaks 
The first step in finding the banks in a schedule is identifying the departure peaks and 
arrival peaks. Four checks were developed to find the peaks in a schedule, and they are 
performed in order. These are listed in Table 3.6.  
 
Table 3.6  Checks Performed to Identify Peaks Within a Daily Schedule. 
Check 1 
 ," > $ + 1.5' 
Check 2 
 ," −  ,"± > 2' 
Check 3 
 ," ≥ , - ,"./01 
Check 4 
 ," >  ,"2345  ," >  ,"6345  ," > $ + ' 
Note: 78,9:/; indicates a 15-minute period which already is identified as a peak in the first two checks. 
 
The first of these four checks attributes peak status to 15-minute periods that have 
operations greater than 1.5 times the standard deviation above the mean. The second 
check attributes peak status to 15-minute periods which have operations greater than two 
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standard deviations more than a 15-minute period which is thirty minutes earlier or later. 
This second check is perform in addition to the first check because peaks may not always 
be extremely high, but are distinct from their surrounding 15-minute time periods. By 
looking before and after thirty minutes, it is possible to tell if a large sudden increase in 
volume occurred, which indicates a bank occurring. The thirty minute value is used 
because flight banks are typically 45 minutes to one hour in length, so the peak of a bank 
would be about thirty minutes into the bank. Figure 3.13 shows the identified peaks after 
the first two checks. 
 The third check attributes peak status to any 15-minute period which has 
operations greater than or equal to the smallest peak identified with check 1 and 2. The 
fourth and final check attributes peak status to any 15-minute period which has 
operations greater than both the 15-minute periods directly before and after, and is greater 
than one standard deviation above the mean. Figure 3.14 shows the peaks after the final 





Figure 3.13  Example of identified peaks after Checks 1 and 2. Shown using Delta’s January 2005 
schedule in Atlanta. 
 
 
Figure 3.14  Example of identified peaks after all four checks. Shown using Delta’s January 2005 
schedule in Atlanta. 
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3.5.3.2.2 Filling out the Banks 
The second step in identifying the banks is to add the portions of the schedule which are 
next to peaks and should be considered as part of that peak’s bank of flights. There are 
two parts to this step. The first part adds to the side of the peaks based on two checks, 
including a minimum for the first check, as shown in Table 3.7. The first check assesses 
15-minute periods which are immediately adjacent to a peak 15-minute period, and adds 
them to the bank if they are greater than two standard deviations below the peak. These 
15-minute periods must, however, be greater than 0.25 standard deviations below the 
mean. The second check assesses 15-minute periods and adds them to the bank if they are 
greater than the mean. In addition, any 15-minute period that is between two peaks 
identified in step one is added automatically to the bank. 
 
Table 3.7  Checks Performed to Add to the Peaks Within A Daily Schedule. 
Check 1 
 ,"<± >  ,"< − 2' 
Minimum Requirement 
 ,"<± > $ − 0.25' 
Check 2 
 ,"<± > $ 
Note: 78,9< indicates a 15-minute period which already is identified as a peak in the first step. 
 






Figure 3.15  Example of flight banks after the first part of the adding step. Shown using Delta’s 
January 2005 schedule in Atlanta. 
 
The second part of the step of adding to the banks adds a 15-minute period to a bank if 
the 15-minute period is next to a bank and is greater or equal to the adjacent periphery 
15-minute period of the bank. This part is repeated until there are no more possible 15-
minute periods to add that satisfy this condition, shown in Table 3.8. Figure 3.16 shows 
the final banks as they are identified after this second part of the adding step.  ,"<< refers 







Table 3.8  Iterated Step to Build Up the Remainder of the Banks 
 
 ,"<± ≥  ,"<  >?  ,"<<± ≥   ,"<< 
 
Note: 78,9< indicates a 15-minute period which already is identified as a peak in the first step. 78,9<<  
indicates a 15-minute period which already is identified as part of a bank, but is not the peak, from 




Figure 3.16  Example of flight banks after the second part of the adding step. Shown using Delta’s 




As shown in the example, ten banks are identified for Atlanta as of January 2005, ranging 






3.5.3.3 Measurement of Depeaking 
A key aspect of this study is to determine if a schedule was depeaked, and if so, the 
degree to which it was depeaked. Once peaks are identified, a method to compare the 
peaked schedule to a depeaked schedule, coupled with a comparison of coefficients of 
variation (a modified version of Jenkins, Marks, and Miller’s peak index), aids in 
determining if a schedule depeaked. 
 
3.5.3.3.1 Percentage Depeaking Measure: First Attempt with Bank Shadow Assumption 
As mentioned earlier, one of the measurements made on the schedule was to calculate the 
percentage of flights that occurred within the flight banks. When the schedule is peaked, 
the meaning of this parameter is straightforward: the percentage represents a degree to 
which the airline clustered its flights into banks. If 100% of flights were within banks, the 
peak measure would be 100%. Creating a similar and appropriate measurement for a 
depeaked schedule, however, is slightly ambiguous.  
 The initial depeaking measure developed in this study involved overlaying the 
peaked schedule’s flight bank time periods (e.g. 7:15-8:00, 8:30-9:30, etc.) onto the 
depeaked schedule. This measurement was based on the assumption that airlines 
depeaked their schedules by maintaining the same banks, but spread out each bank 
slightly over a longer time period and reducing the peak level of operations. Under this 
assumption, flights were shifted away from flight banks, without a major schedule 
overhaul, and the time periods of the banks in the peaked schedule are transferred to the 
depeaked schedule. This action would thus have “bank shadows” left in the depeak 
shadows, where it would be easy to see the previous banks. It also assumed that flight 
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times were kept essentially the same for flights in the banks, while the flights that were 
spread out received the major changes. The number of flights within these bank shadows 
as a percentage of all flights was calculated and compared to the similar measure of the 
peaked schedule. The application of this is shown in Figure 3.17, with the banks from 
Figure 3.16 projected onto the depeaked schedule. 
 
 
Figure 3.17  Incorrect initial depeaking measure using bank projection assumption. Bank shadows 
are shown as peaks in red and blue. 
 
 
The assumption that a depeaked schedule always retains the time periods of the peaked 
schedule’s banks was incorrect. As seen in Figure 3.17, this type of depeaking does not 
seem to be occurring. There were several bank shadows that had operation levels less 
than the rest of the day. This observation meant that the depeaking measure was arbitrary, 
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and would not be good for comparing depeaking measures across cases. It is clear that the 
assumption was incorrect, as a more robust measure is needed. 
 
3.5.3.3.2 Percentage Depeaking Measure: Second Attempt with Most Activity Assumption 
The refined depeaking measure tosses out the assumption that the bank’s time periods are 
retained. The assumption instead is the entire schedule was depeaked and wholly 
recreated. To calculate a depeaking measure, it is thus preferred to simply find the busiest 
periods of the depeaked schedule and calculate the number of operations during these 
times. This measure can then be compared to the peaked measure, where one is then 
comparing two measures that calculate the busiest periods of a flight schedule. 
Effectively, it is a measure of the concentration of activity between the two schedules 
into periods of the day. 
 The measure requires a count, n, of the number of 15-minute periods in the 
peaked schedule that are in banks. The n busiest 15-minute periods in the depeaked 
schedule are then identified, and highlighted in the depeaked schedule. If, for example, n 
is equal to 12, then a comparison is made between the busiest three hours-worth of 15-
minute periods in the peaked and depeaked schedule. The number, n, of 15-minute 
periods in banks in Figure 3.16 is calculated, and the n busiest minute periods are 
highlighted on the schedule seen in 3.18. The percentage of operations in these 15-minute 
periods as compared to all operations in the day is calculated as the depeaking measure. 
This value is compared to the peaking measure to show the difference between the 





Figure 3.18  Final depeaking measure using the n busiest 15-minute periods. Figure 3.16 is used to 
calculate n for this example, as the busiest 15-minute periods from the peak schedule are identified 
and used for the depeaked schedule. 
 
 
3.5.3.3.3 Coefficient of Variation Depeaking Measure 
In addition to the percentage depeaking measure, a second measure was created as a 
complementary tool for evaluating depeaking. The second measure makes use of the 
variance in the schedule throughout the day. The coefficient of variation for the number 
of operations in the schedule’s 15-minute periods are calculated, and compared between 
the peaked and depeaked schedules. This is different from Jenkins, Marks, and Miller’s 
(2012) peak index which used one-hour periods. The coefficients of variation are 
calculated separately for arrivals and departures, so each schedule has two values of 
standard deviations.  
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 A high coefficient of variation indicates a peaked schedule, as there is a greater 
difference between the busiest and slowest periods. A lower value coefficient of variation 
indicates a more depeaked schedule, such that the 15-minute periods have a more 
consistent level of activity through the day. Coefficients of variation, unlike standard 
deviation, can be compared between cases since they reflect the magnitude of operations 
in their measurement of variation from the mean. 
 
3.5.4 Creating Connection Opportunities 
A critical measure to the changes in supply is the number of potential reasonable 
connections between aircraft at the depeaked hub airport before and after depeaking. In 
order to calculate connections, the minimum and maximum connection times denoted as 
MCT and MxCT, respectively, needed to be calculated for each case study airport. Each 
airport has a different MCT, based on the geometry of the airport and congestion within 
the terminal (Hanlon, 1996). If a terminal was purposely built to facilitate short 
connection times, the MCT for the airport could be lower. Airports with a large 
proportion of long-haul flights require greater MCTs because of longer loading and 
unloading times. 
 The MCT and MxCT are calculated from the MIDT dataset. All trips with 
passenger connections between the hub carrier’s aircraft are included in the distribution 
of passenger connection times for a given hub airport. Each passenger is considered a 
single case, so a multi-passenger ticket gets included once for each passenger. From the 
distribution, the MCT was chosen as the 5th percentile of connection times for a given 
airline at the hub airport. The MxCT was chosen as the 75th percentile. A passenger is 
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considered able to make a connection between two flights if the arriving time of the first 
flight and the departing time of the second flight is greater than the MCT for the airport, 
the time needed to walk between the two airport gates, and less than the MxCT, a time 
considered reasonable to most passengers to wait between flights. A graphical example of 
how this is calculated in shown in Figure 3.19. In this figure, the bold arrival flight 
carries passengers who desire to make a connection onward. Their choice set is limited to 
departing flights that leave after the MCT and before the MxCT, with respect to the 
arrival time. Potential connecting departing flights are shown in bold.  
 
 
Figure 3.19  Connection creation technique using MCT and MxCT. For a given arrival flight, shown 
in bold, the set of potential connections are departure flights that leave after a minimum connection 
time (MCT) and before a Maximum Connection Time (MxCT), shown in bold. 
 
 
Connection lists were generated by examining each arriving flight for an airline at the 
hub airport and determining all possible connections from the airline’s set of departing 
flights. Departing flights which have a destination that is the same as the originating 
airport for the arriving flight are not considered a connection. The number of potential 
connections is calculated in three ways: 1) for the entire day for an airline at the hub 
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airport; 2) for each spoke airport to all other spoke airports over an entire day; and 3) for 
each market pair. 
 
3.5.5 Supply Analysis 
Each case study will include analysis on how changes to airline schedules occurred when 
the airline depeaked. The depeaking airline is assessed through an examination of its 
flight schedule before and after its implementation of depeaked schedules. The cases are 
examined individually, and then compared as a group. 
 
3.5.5.1 Degree of Depeaking 
The first step in the supply analysis is to visually inspect the reproduced peaked and 
depeaked schedules. Looking at the schedules side-by-side, using the same scale, gives 
the researcher perspective on how peaked the schedule was, and what it was transformed 
to through the depeaking decision. 
Next, the schedules are evaluated through the two depeaking measures – the peak 
and depeaking percentages and the coefficient of variation of flights in 15-minute 
periods. It is important to measure the degree to which each depeaked to compare the 
airlines for their different approaches to making a depeaked schedule. It is critical to 
consider how peaked, and how many banks, the initial peaked schedule had, because the 
airlines already had unique conditions they were operating under prior to depeaking. 
A useful way to see the change in the airline’s schedule types is to visually 
examine the distribution of activity within the 15-minute periods of a day. Plotting the 
15-minute periods from the most to least busiest in terms of the number of operations, as 
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seen in Figure 3.20, shows how the depeaked schedule has a much more consistent level 
of operations throughout the day. This is done separately for arrivals and departures. 
 
 
Figure 3.20  Change in 15-minute period activity distributions. The depeaked schedule has a more 
level distribution of flights across its 15-minute periods.  
 
 
3.5.5.2 Capacity Effects 
Comparing the peaked and depeaked schedules for their level of activity and flight 
offerings available through the hub enables understanding of how depeaking affected the 
airline’s business. The change in the number of operations per 15-minute period across 
the day shows how an airline reduced their gate, staffing, and equipment needs, and 
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establish how much the airlines chose to spread out their peaks. The maximum number of 
operations per 15-minute period also shows how busy runway operations became during 
the peaks.  
 The offerings to passengers before and after depeaking are reflected in the number 
of potential connections between all markets in the two schedule types. The number of 
ASMs reflects the total capacity of the airline to serve their passenger base. The total 
number of operations and the number of destinations similarly indicate what the airline 
did with its change in schedule, such as adding capacity or destinations. This is useful in 
understanding the goal of an airline that has constructed its depeaked schedule. 
 The change in the number of connections also provides indication on how the 
airline restructured its schedule to maintain connections. It is possible from the schedule 
changes that connections could either decrease or increase.  
 
3.5.5.3 Spoke Level  
The changes that happen at the spoke level help to reveal the results of the airline’s 
decision to depeak. Each destination from the hub receives some change from the peaked 
schedule when banks are removed and the depeaked schedule is implemented. The 
change in supply is examined for shifts in capacity as well as the change in the number of 
connections to other markets. Each spoke destination is compared before and after 
depeaking for the frequency of flights, number of connections, and total ASM. Spokes 
are tagged for positive and negative changes. This comparison begins to reveal the 




 Spokes are also examined for their connections through the hub to other 
destinations. This market level examination of connections before and after depeaking 
shows how the airline changed its network through the hub and which markets they chose 
to reduce with the depeaked schedule. 
 
3.5.5.4 Affiliate Airlines 
The proportion of flights operated by the major airline’s affiliate airlines is examined 
before and after depeaking. Changes in this value indicate how the airline’s contractual 
promises to the affiliate airline had to be figured in when depeaking. In addition, using 
the reproduced schedule figures with the proportion of affiliate airline flights in each 15-
minute period shows where in the schedule affiliate airline flights were moved during 
depeaking. 
 
3.5.6 Demand Analysis 
The changes in demand due to depeaking are the least understood in the literature. In this 
study, the demand analysis is focused on assessing how passengers were affected within 
the system, the effect of dropped connections in the itineraries of passengers in market 
pairs, and the changes in revenue due to depeaking. The demand analysis is connected to 
many of the variables produced by the supply analysis. Four revenue analyses were 
performed focused on the depeaked hub: 1) the change in total revenue, 2) the changes in 
revenue for each spoke, 3) detailed demand parameters on each spoke route for the hub 
airline, and 4) the network effects for the depeaking airline. 
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 Revenue is calculated from the DB1B data, which as mentioned previously, is a 
ten percent sample of all tickets on reporting carriers. Although some of the data is 
removed during the cleaning process, such that ultimately the data is less than a ten 
percent sample, the revenue is still multiplied by ten for adjustment. This multiplication 
could create small differences between quarters’ datasets, as each have different amounts 
of data removed, but these differences are not accounted for in this study. The revenue is 
further adjusted to calculate average daily revenue, dividing the total revenue by the 
number of days in the quarter. 
 When discussing revenue, it is important to consider that the revenue between two 
time periods cannot be directly compared. Rising and falling ticket prices, seasonality, 
changes within the industry, and inflation all affect revenue for an airline at a given point 
in time. Before discussing the demand analysis, how to control for these external 
variables that affect revenue is discussed. 
 
3.5.6.1 Revenue Normalization Measures 
Depeaking analysis must be considered in the context of what is occurring in the rest of 
the industry. Large industry changes such as mergers, dehubbing, and fuel prices can all 
affect revenue. Ticket prices change from season to season, and with inflation over time. 
When comparing revenue over time periods, it is critical to compare the revenue in 
comparison to the rest of the industry. 
 To control for the changes observed in the before and after quarters at the 
depeaking airport, the RASM for the industry overall, other airlines, and the depeaking 
airline as a whole are compared for the same time periods. Within each case, the change 
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in revenue can be compared for the depeaking airline at its hub airport against the 
revenue generated for the airline as a whole. This same change can also be compared to 
the industry’s overall change.  
 When comparing revenue between cases, there is the same issue of dealing with 
different time periods. To handle this issue, the change in revenue for the depeaking 
airline at its depeaked hub is expressed as a percentage change as compared to the overall 
revenue change in the industry during that time period. This percentage change can then 
be compared between cases to see which depeaking case, for example, had the most 
positive revenue change against the rest of the industry. 
 
3.5.6.2 Overall Revenue Change 
The first step of the revenue analysis is an examination of the revenue for the depeaked 
hub as a whole. The revenue at the airport for only the depeaking airline is calculated for 
the before and after depeaking periods. The RASM is also calculated for the two schedule 
types, as a whole for all aircraft serving all destinations. These figures can be compared 
across cases, after normalization. 
 
3.5.6.3 Overall Spoke Revenue Change 
The second step of the revenue analysis is an examination of the revenue changes at the 
spoke level. Each spoke airport’s revenue is summed for all flights occurring between the 
depeaked hub to the spoke airport on the depeaking airline. This calculation is made for 
the peaked and depeaked period, and then compared for each spoke. The number of 
spokes which had an increase or decrease in revenue and RASM are reported to show 
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how, at a high-level view, the depeaking had an effect on revenue in the depeaking 
airline’s markets. 
 
3.5.6.4 Spoke Revenue Change 
At the spoke level, there are many changes that happen simultaneously in terms of 
revenue. For a given spoke, revenue may go up or down for a number of reasons. Fares 
could go up for example, while traffic could decrease, and revenue could go up or down 
depending on which factor was more influential on the revenue stream. The following 
parameters are calculated for both the peaked and depeaked schedule: 
• average fare for a spoke airport from the hub,  
• average daily number of passengers,  
• average daily revenue,  
• and RASM. 
In addition to the revenue figures, the types of passengers are recorded to better 
understand the passenger base that booked tickets on the depeaking airline. The number 
of passengers flying between the spoke and the hub on non-stop tickets and as part of a 
two-coupon ticket is calculated. For each of these two passenger groups flying in the hub-
spoke market, the average fare and revenue is calculated. These figures are calculated for 
both before and after depeaking. The change in each hub-spoke pair for the percentage of 
passengers flying non-stop versus connecting onward is calculated and compared before 





3.5.6.5 Airline Network Effects 
When an airline depeaks one of its hubs, traffic may get shifted within the airline’s 
network. The opposite can occur as well under different conditions, with the depeaked 
hub gaining traffic from the other hubs in an airline’s network. As fares and connections 
change at the depeaked airport, passengers may fly through the depeaked airport more, 
shift to another hub airport in the airline’s network, or move out of the airline’s network 
entirely. For example, if connection times get longer and make a connection undesirable, 
passengers may fly through another of the airline’s hubs.  
 All markets in the airline’s network are compiled – whether non-stop, through the 
depeaked hub, or through other hubs – and compared before and after depeaking for 
changes in fares, passengers, revenue, and percentage of traffic in terms of all airlines and 
of the depeaking airline. Capturing this effect of depeaking on the rest of the airline’s 
network aids in explaining how depeaking affects the system as a whole. 
 
3.5.6.6 Relationship Between Supply and Demand 
Key to this study is linking the supply and demand measures to understand how shifts in 
the supply affected the demand and revenue. High-level parameters such as the 
depeaking measures, changes in ASM, number of flights and destinations, and the 
number of connections available at the hub are linked to the overall revenue, RASM, 
traffic, and average fares. Each case is examined on its own and then compared between 




 At the spoke level, the spoke level supply changes are related to the spoke level 
demand changes to see how different markets were affected by depeaking. Using these 
relationships, it is possible to see how broken connections affected the revenue to 
different airports, or decreased the share of connecting passengers. It is also possible to 
examine the underperforming routes prior to depeaking and see if those were the ones 
most likely to lose connections in the new schedule. This process provides insight into 
the airline’s decision-making process on when to remove possible connections. 
 
3.5.7 Operations Analysis 
Depeaking is expected to improve the utilization and on-time rates for aircraft for the 
depeaking airline. By spreading out the demand for gates and staff at an airport, an airline 
becomes less at risk to being overwhelmed by aircraft, passengers, and baggage, and thus 
can more readily respond to disruptions to the schedule. This ultimately shows up in the 
performance of the airline through improved on-time rates. In addition, changes to the 
taxi-in and taxi-out times after depeaking acts as a performance measure for airside 
congestion. 
 The operations analysis focuses on the on-time performance of the depeaking and 
competing airlines to examine the effect of continuous schedules. In each case study, the 
depeaking airlines will be examined for changes in carrier delay and taxiing times. Data 
are analyzed at the month-level because at the daily level weather and disturbance events 
can greatly affect operations. The quarter-level is not used because the issue of 
seasonality becomes more noticeable. The month prior to the month in which depeaking 
occurs is chosen for the peaked schedule operational measures, and the month after the 
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depeaking month is chosen for the depeaked schedule measures. If depeaking occurred 
on the last or first day of a month, two consecutive months were used instead. The data 
are from the On-Time Performance database. 
Departures and arrival delays are analyzed separately. The factors that cause these 
delays are slightly different, despite sharing some similarities. An aircraft is considered a 
delayed aircraft if it is 15 minutes behind its scheduled departure or arrival time, as per 
the definition used by BTS. In this study, an aircraft can be considered a delayed aircraft 
for its departure and not for its arrival, and vice versa. The measures which are collected 
for both arrivals and departures are: 
• Average time of delay for all aircraft (early aircraft have negative delay)  
• Average time of delay for all aircraft (early aircraft have zero delay) 
• Number of on-time aircraft 
• Number of delayed aircraft 
• Percentage of aircraft which are delayed 
• Average time of delay for delayed aircraft 
• Total delay time for delayed aircraft 
In addition, two additional measures are recorded, but not for both arrivals and 
departures: 
• Average taxi-out time for departures 
• Average taxi-in time for arrivals 
These changes are related to the degree of depeaking which occurred, in order to 




 Competitors at a depeaked hub will likely also benefit from the change in 
scheduling in terms of on-time performance. The potential for delay caused by the banks 
of a peaked hub affects all airlines, and thus the benefits of a continuous schedule on on-
time rates for a depeaking airline should also benefit its competitors. Operational 
measures are collected for the competing airlines at the depeaked hub for comparison 
with the depeaking airline, both before and after depeaking. 
 
3.5.7.1 Operations Normalization Measures 
The operational portion of the depeaking analysis must be considered in the context of 
what is occurring in the rest of the industry. Major weather events, for example, can 
affect entire regions of the country, and delay aircraft throughout the system. Seasonality 
also has some effect, as higher demand during different times of the year can cause 
aircraft to not perform as well. Thus, it is useful to compare the operational performance 
of the depeaking airline and its competitors at the depeaked hub to the operation 
performance of the rest of their respective networks and the industry as a whole. 
 To control for the non-observable changes that occurred between the before and 
after months at the depeaking airport, four variables are compared between the depeaking 
case, the rest of the airline’s network, and the industry overall. These four variables are 
the average departure delay for delayed departing aircraft, the percent of departing 
aircraft which are delayed, the average arrival delay for delayed arriving aircraft, and the 
percent of arriving aircraft which are delayed. Within each case, the change in operations 
can be compared for the depeaking airline at its hub airport against the operations for the 
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airline as a whole and the industry’s overall change, to gain perspective if the changes 
seen are unique to the depeaking airline.  
 
3.5.8 Competition 
Depeaking airlines affect more than their own hub operations. The competition at the hub 
airport is also affected by the removal of flight banks. Elsewhere in the aviation system, 
traffic may shift to or from other airlines. In some cases, an airport serves as the hub for 
two airlines, and thus the competing hub airline has an opportunity to retool their own 
schedule to respond to the reduced strains on capacity. 
 The following subsections describe the parameters which are used in this study to 
describe competition. The last of the subsections describes the particular cases where two 
airline hubs operate out of the same airport, and one of them becomes depeaked. 
 
3.5.8.1 Herfindahl Index 
In order to measure the degree to which an airline dominated in a given hub-spoke 
market, the Herfindahl index is used. This index is a measurement of the concentration of 
an industry or market in relation to the number of firms who participate; it could be 
described as a weighted market share that takes into account that firms with a larger 
presence receive more than their share of business. In terms of airlines, this can be 
described as the market power influence of the dominant carrier. On a given trip, for 
example, the dominant carrier’s flights are more likely to be at the right time of day for a 
traveler, and thus the passenger will choose that carrier. On subsequent trips, the 
passenger will think first of the dominant carrier when booking, and a positive feedback 
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loop results. Thus the dominant carrier gets more passengers than what would be 
expected simply by its proportion of flights in the market. 
 The Herfindahl Index has been used by many previous studies when describing 
the competition in a market. Researchers have used it as a measure of market power in 
studies dealing with Open Skies Agreements (Cristea & Hummels, 2011), price 
dispersion to passengers (Borenstein & Rose, 1994; Van Dender, 2007), and in hubbing 
(Borenstein, 1989). 
 To calculate the Herfindahl Index, one sums up the squares of the proportion of 









The Herfindahl Index can be between zero and one, with zero indicating an infinite 
number of firms with equal market share and one indicating a monopoly. Thus larger 
numbers indicate a market where one airline dominates over other competition, typical 
for hub-spoke markets because of the hub airline’s presence. 
 The Herfindahl Index is used as an input in the spoke level analysis of this study 
when running linear regressions. 
 
3.5.8.2 Competition at the Hub Airport 
The spoke level results from the supply analysis also include a list of competitors for 
each of the depeaking airline’s markets. Each competitor in each market is analyzed by 
the number of daily flights in and out of the hub airport that are offered, the ASM for the 
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same day of the schedule reproduction, and the average inbound and outbound flight 
times. These supply figures are produced for the before and after periods surrounding the 
hub airline’s depeaking. It is noted which spokes gained or received service in relation to 
the depeaking. 
 For demand effects, the competitors at the hub are analyzed for their changes in 
revenue, due to passenger demand changes. RASM is examined for each of the airlines in 
each spoke market, and the average fare is recorded. In addition, the proportion of traffic 
on the competing airlines is compared, calculating the market share that each airline has 
in the hub-spoke market. When analyzing this before and after depeaking, it is possible to 
see which competitors, and on which routes, benefited the most from depeaking. 
 A similar analysis is performed at the system level, essentially an assessment of 
how the national system was affected by the depeaking of a single hub. In this part, the 
competing routes of other airlines that may or may not go through the depeaked hub are 
assessed to see how ticket sales changed and if shifts in prices occurred. All OD markets 
through the depeaked hub are compared with other airlines’ performance in the same OD 
markets before and after depeaking. The key measurement is whether passengers left the 
system or rather were displaced. For example, the OD market of Boston to Seattle, as it 
connects through ORD on American, is examined to see its volume and revenue level 
before and after depeaking. The same market is then assessed as it connects through other 
airlines’ hubs such as Delta in Atlanta, Continental in Denver, United in ORD, etc. As 





3.5.8.3 Competition Indicator Variables 
In preparation for linear regression at the spoke level, several indicator variables are 
produced. These are determined at the spoke level, so are only in relation to the spoke 
airport or flights between the hub and the spoke airport, depending on the variable. These 
variables included: 
• The depeaking airline is the largest carrier in the market (1 if yes, 0 if no) 
• The airport is a dual-hub, a hub for two airlines 
• The airport depeaked the same day another dehubbed (1 if yes, 0 if no – Delta 
dehubbed DFW the same day it depeaked ATL) 
• Spoke is north or south of depeaked hub (1 if north, 0 if south) 
• Spoke is east or west of depeaked hub (1 if east, 0 if west) 
• Spoke is another hub for the depeaking airline 
• Spoke is a hub for another airline 
• Spoke is a Southwest Airlines focus city 
These indicator variables are included in the regression models to see if any of these 
factors are significant in an airline’s depeaking decision-making process. 
 
3.5.8.4 Dual-Hub Depeaking 
There are three cases in which the depeaking airline has a competing airline also 
operating a hub at the same airport. These dual-hub depeaking cases provide an 
opportunity to see how a major airline with hub operations adjusts its schedule to the 
additional capacity in the terminals and on the tarmac. The three cases are listed in Table 
3.9. Of these, two airlines (Delta at DFW and United at ORD) operated a peaked 
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schedule before and after depeaking, while one (AirTran at ATL) operated a continuous 
schedule.  
 
Table 3.9  Dual-Hubbing Cases 
Depeaking Airline Hub Hub Competitor Competitor Schedule Type 
American DFW Delta Peaked 
American ORD United Peaked 
Delta ATL AirTran Continuous 
 
 
For the competitors in these dual-hub cases all schedule measures are created to assess 
their schedules before and after depeaking. Differences in the number of destinations 
served, operations per 15-minute period, and the number of potential connections are 
most indicative as to whether the competitor had a reaction to depeaking. The peak 
measures are also telling, and are useful for determining if the competitor created an even 
more peaked schedule (in the DFW and ORD cases) to take advantage of freed capacity. 
If the coefficient of variation increases and the peak percentage rises, it is likely that the 
airline increased clustering of operations to provide faster connections in order to counter 
the depeaking airline’s longer transfers. 
 The competing airline also is assessed for changes it made within the depeaking 
airline’s bank periods. Regardless of whether the competitor made their schedule more 
peaked, it may have shifted operations into the depeaking airline’s bank shadows. Using 
reproduced schedule diagrams, the bank shadows from the depeaking airline’s peaked 
schedule can be overlaid on the competitors’ schedule, both before and after depeaking. 
An example is shown in Figure 3.21, with American’s bank shadows on United’s post-
depeaking schedule. The percentage of the competitor’s flights that are within these 
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Figure 3.21  Depeaking airline bank shadows on competitor schedule. Shown here using American’s 
bank shadows, post-depeaking, on its competitor, United’s, peaked schedule. 
 
 
The dual-hub competitors’ schedule measures are calculated at several points to see if 
they had prior notice of depeaking and reacted to it, waited for depeaking to occur in 
order to react, or did not react at all. In addition to the dates which the depeaking airlines’ 
schedule measures are calculated, the competitors’ schedule measures are calculate three 
months before depeaking, one month before depeaking, one month after depeaking, and 




3.5.9 Multivariate Relationships 
The spoke level is suited for a linear regression model to analyze the types of factors that 
are used in making depeaking decisions. All spoke airports which are served by the hub 
airline before and/or after depeaking during the depeaking period are included in the 
regression model. The goal of this analysis is to use the before period supply and demand 
measures to predict changes in supply in the depeaking period. Using the revenue figures 
from the peaked quarter, such as RASM, total revenue, and average fare, it is possible to 
evaluate the changes in supply. This model is useful to hub airports which could 
potentially predict what hub airlines would do in terms of their route network if that 
airline decided to depeak. Doing so provides insight into the motivation for the airline to 
increase or reduce connections between certain markets and for particular spokes, and for 
increasing or reducing the frequency of flights from the schedule. 
 The model developed in this study is one that predicts the changes in flights to 
and from the spoke airport from the hub. Thus, six roundtrip trips by the airline’s aircraft 
in a given day to a spoke airport would be credited for 12 flights. The reason for doing so 
is that many spoke airports have an uneven number of arrivals and departures. The 
change in flights was chosen over predicting the change in ASMs because it is a variable 
that cannot be decomposed into other variables. When airlines consider ASMs, they have 
to consider both frequency and aircraft type, which increases the ambiguity in predicting 
the changes. A change in ASMs may not be due to depeaking, but could involve 









Supply Initial number of flights  
Log of the initial number of flights  
Available seat miles 
Traffic Total number of passengers 
Number of direct passengers 
Number of connecting passengers 
Percent connecting passengers 
Revenue Total revenue 
Revenue per available seat mile (RASM) 
Ticket Fares Average ticket fare 
Log of average ticket fare 
Average ticket fare for direct passengers 
Average ticket fare for connecting passengers 
Connections Number of daily potential connections to other spokes in the network 
Log of the number of potential connections 
Flight Banks Percent of flights in banks 
*Majority of flights are in banks 
Competition Number of competitors on route 
Herfindahl Index in terms of flights 
Market share in terms of flights 
Market share in terms of number of passengers 
*Monopoly route 
*Largest carrier in terms of number of flights 
Available seat miles of competitors 
Total number of passengers served by competitors 
Average fare of competitors 
Ratio of depeaking airline’s fare to average competitor fare 
Number of flights for competitors 
*Hub is also a hub for a competitor 
*Spoke airport is a hub for a competitor 
*Spoke airport is a Southwest Airlines focus city 
Locative Average distance 
*Spoke airport is north of hub airport 
*Spoke airport is east of hub airport 
Other *Another airport of depeaking airline was dehubbed on same day (DL) 
*Spoke airport is a hub for depeaking airline 
*Indicator variable (1 = yes) 
 
A number of variables were considered in preparing the models. These are listed in Table 
3.10, although some have been discussed previously as competition indicator variables in 
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3.5.8. All variables are in terms of flights between the spoke and the hub, and are refer to 
the levels of supply and demand during the peaked period. 
 For the variable of the ratio of the depeaking airline’s fare to the average 
competitor fare, routes which did not have a competitor were assigned a ratio of one for 
use in a model.  
 An iterative modeling approach was used to determine the set of variables that 
were associated with an airline’s decision to add or remove flights during the depeaking 
process. 
 Each regression model was examined to ensure it satisfied the linear regression 
modeling assumptions related to linearity, normality, and homoscedasticity. The linearity 
assumption aims to establish there is in fact a linear relationship, as opposed to a non-
linear relationship, between the dependent and independent variables included in the 
model. The normality assumption can be ensured by checking that there is no outlier 
driving the model’s relationships because of the large standard error a model not fit to an 
outlier would have. The homoscedasticity assumption is verified by checking the constant 
variance of the errors versus the predictions, ensuring too much weight was not given to 
one part of the data. Many regression models also have an independence assumption with 
regards to a serial correlation, but because there is no time element to this study, this 
assumption does not need to be checked for. Models were also checked for outliers that 
could be affecting model results.  
 In order to verify models which failed the tests of assumptions, count models with 
Poisson distributions were developed to ensure that the directions were consistent with 
the regression models. In these models, the predicted variable (change in flights) was 
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adjusted such that the minimum value of the variable, a negative number, was shifted to 
become zero. Count models are not able to predict negative values. 
 In developing the various regression models, an overall regression model was 
attempted to be developed that included all case studies. Because of the wide variety of 
factors that each airline considered in depeaking, however, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, this model did not have any significant results. The correlation was 
consistently very low, and thus indicated that a comprehensive model that could predict 
depeaking changes was not possible. This helped solidify that each depeaking case has 
unique factors. For future airports that may experience depeaking, it would be necessary 
to determine which case they are most like before choosing to run a model to predict the 
supply changes that would occur. 
 
3.5.10 Assessing Depeaking and Effects 
The regression models provide insights into the decision-making process that airlines 
used to determine which airports to increase or decrease service to. In order to evaluate 
supply, revenue, and on-time impacts, a difference-in-difference comparison and year-
over-year measures were used in order to isolate the effects of depeaking and control for 
external factors that may have had a large impact on revenue measures for the industry as 
a whole. 
 
3.5.9.1 Difference-in-Difference Technique 
Comparing the RASM of the depeaking airline at the depeaked hub to the rest of the 
airline and the industry is useful, particularly if done using a difference-in-difference 
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technique. Using difference-in-difference has been used to discuss a localized change in 
the perspective of the larger industry for airlines in the past. Examples of the method’s 
usage includes measuring the change in market power before and after alliance-building 
occurred in 2003 (Li & Netessine, 2011) and assessing the originating passenger volume 
for airports that adopted Transportation Security Administration procedures versus those 
that did not (Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). Difference-in-difference refers to a 
comparison measuring the mathematical difference between two unique changes. The 
basis of this technique is that although the change that occurs in a measure may appear to 
tell one story, when juxtaposed with another change over the same time period, the true 
nature of the first change would be revealed.  
 One instance of using the difference-in-difference technique in this study involves 
the change in RASM from the peaked to the depeaked quarter. This difference is 
juxtaposed with the differences in RASM for the rest of the airline’s network and the 
industry. Lagging behind these two comparison differences would show the depeaked 
airport underperformed, while the opposite would indicate depeaking may have 
influenced revenue growth. If an airline sees an increase in RASM, for example, it may 
not be as much as the increase that the industry had. Thus the difference between the 
differences would indicate slower growth, and lead to the conclusion that depeaking 
could cause underperformance in revenue. 
 This study also makes use of the difference-in-difference technique in evaluating 
on-time performance. The on-time statistics at a depeaked airport are measured for the 
month before and after depeaking. The difference between the two is taken to see the 
change over time. This difference is then compared to the difference in on-time statistics 
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for the full airline network and the industry as a whole, similar to the RASM 
measurement. The difference between the depeaked airport difference and the airline or 
industry difference puts the first change into perspective.  
 
3.5.9.2 Year-over-year Technique 
Assessing whether the changes which occurred in the supply, demand, and operational 
results were unique to the depeaking year can be checked using a year-over-year 
assessment. There is no difference-in-difference for the same time period that can be 
performed for the supply data because no suitable comparison set is available since each 
airport is unique. Bogusch (2003) compared qualitatively the supply changes for 
depeaking to other hub airports for comparison, but did not do a quantitative control 
comparison. By using a year-over-year comparison, however, the same measurement can 
be made for the same time period over multiple years.  
   
 
Figure 3.22  Location of time periods for year-over-year measurements. 
 
 
As seen in Figure 3.22, dates similar to the peaked (A0) and depeaked (B0’) dates are 
chosen from the year before (A-1 and B-1) and year after (A1’ and B1’), and the 
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differences between the two dates in each of the three years are compared. Similarly, for 
demand, the change in the depeaking year (between quarters 1 and 3) is compared to the 
changes in the year before and the year after. Although not shown in the figure, the 
months used for the operational year-over-year measures would be the same months in all 
three years, with the changes between the pairs of months compared. 
 Using comparisons for the same time period in the surrounding years from the 
one of interest was done also in Bogusch’s (2003) depeaking study. If one year stands out 
as different, then it is reasonable that another force influenced that change. This is can be 
applied for checking to see if supply differences occurred annually between the peak and 
depeak dates, or if a difference was unique to the depeaking year. 
 As an example, it could be seen that in the depeaking year there was an increase 
from the peak date to the depeaked date in the number of destinations served. This may 
lead one to believe that a component of airline’s depeaking decision was to expand its 
network. When looking at the same difference in the measurement the year before (two 
peaked schedule dates) and the year after (two depeaked schedule dates), the same 
change may have occurred in the number of destinations served. When examined closely, 
it becomes evident that every year at the period of time when depeaking was performed, 
the airline expanded its network to capture seasonal travel destinations. Thus the year-
over-year comparison can aid in revealing which changes were typical, and which 
changes could be associated with depeaking. 
 The year-over-year comparison is most useful for assessing the demand and 
operations changes. This technique is perhaps more important for demand and operations 
than supply because of the longer time periods over which the demand and operations 
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data are measured: two quarters a half a year apart for demand and two months a month 
apart for operations, versus two dates just weeks apart for supply. The depeaked airport’s 
change in RASM and operational changes in relation to the airline’s and the industry’s 
changes could be a typical situation, as opposed to a unique change in the depeaking 
year. The same underperformance or growth could have occurred year after year over the 
same times of the year. By assessing these changes over a longer period of time, it can be 
seen how depeaking really affected the revenue growth and operations at the airport. 
 
3.5.11 Dwell Time and Airport Revenue 
It is hypothesized that the longer airport passengers spend in the airport, the more likely 
they are to spend and the more money they will spend. Using the passenger survey data 
from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) at its three major 
airports, the relationship between passenger dwell time and airport terminal revenue is 
examined. Regression models are used to explore which factors influence passenger 
spending. 
 In order to prepare variables of cost for comparison over time, the variables are 
adjusted for inflation. The variables which need adjusting are those that involve a 
monetary value such as price paid by passengers for food, beverage, and retail purchases. 
In addition, income must be adjusted for inflation. A price inflator (or deflator) is used to 
convert the historical prices and incomes to current U.S. dollars (Duval, 2012). To 
perform this conversion, it is necessary to use the Consumer Price Index (CPI), available 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)9. The CPI measures the changes in the price 





level of a collection of consumer goods and services. By using the CPI, one can measure 
the average change in time in the price consumers pay. Using the ratio of the CPI from 
two different years, one can convert what a good cost in the first year to what it would 
have cost in the second year. 
 In this study historical prices of food and beverage purchases at the PANYNJ 














Similar conversions are used to convert all monetary values to a common year, which in 
this part of the study is 2011, as this is the most recent data available both from PANYNJ 
and BLS. 
 
3.5.11.1 Regression Models 
Several steps were used to develop regression models to predict consumer spending 
patterns as a function of the number of connecting passengers and/or passenger dwell 
times. General plots of the data are used to explore potential relationships and functional 
forms. Simple regression is then used to find the correlation between potential variables, 
and to better define relationships. 
 The purpose of the regression models is to analyze the amount of money spent on 
retail and food purchases at the airport. The dependent variable is the amount of money 
spent, which is reported by the PANYNJ as an average annual value from across all 
passenger surveys, for retail and food/beverage at each of Newark (EWR), New York 
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LaGuardia (LGA), and New York John F. Kennedy (JFK). The potential independent 
variables that are tested include the average dwell time for local passengers, the average 
dwell time for connecting passengers, the average dwell time for all passengers, the 
difference in dwell time between local and connecting passengers, the mean income of 







This chapter describes the results for the six case studies identified in the previous 
chapter. Each case study is first discussed individually in chronological order by its 
depeaking date, and includes a discussion of supply, demand, and on-time measures. 
These measures are interpreted within the larger context of major external events that 
may have impacted revenues (e.g. the dehubbing of an airport or a merger during the 
analysis period of a case). Each case is individually assessed to see if the changes it saw 
in the depeaking year were noteworthy compared to other years and in relation to rest of 
the industry. The case studies are assessed using multivariate statistical methods to 
evaluate the decision-making process of the airline in choosing spoke destinations to 
increase or decrease flight frequency. 
 Also included in this section are the results of the analysis on passenger dwell 
time and airport revenue. In addition, for depeaked hubs which had two hub carriers, the 
competitor’s response to depeaking is reported. 
 
4.2 American Airlines at Chicago O’Hare (ORD) 
The first hub that depeaked in this study was ORD. In April 2002 American Airlines 
removed eight arrival and departure peaks from their schedule. This move was in 
response to the rising costs of operating the peaked schedule, coupled with the high 
market volatility in the post-9/11 market. 
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 The financial outlook for American Airlines had become bleaker over the year 
prior. The airline had purchased the bankrupt Trans World Airlines (TWA) in the spring 
of 2001, and had inherited TWA’s debt. American immediately dehubbed Saint Louis, 
TWA’s former hub, already having two mid-American hubs in its network. After the 
merger, American immediately began losing money. The 9/11 terrorist attack’s 
detrimental effect on the airline industry would bankrupt two major airlines in 2002, and 
put American at risk as well. One strategy American used to help avoid bankruptcy was 
depeaking hub airports in order to reduce costs: ORD in April and DFW later in 
November. 
 This case has the unique aspect that ORD serves as a hub airport for two major 
airlines. United Airlines also has a major hub operation at ORD, and thus this case is 
useful to assess how a competitor at a dual-hub responds to depeaking. Included in this 
section is a description of United’s changes after American depeaked. 
 
4.2.1 Data Periods Used and Input Parameters 
American Airlines depeaked ORD on Sunday April 7, 2002. The date used to represent 
the peak schedule is Tuesday March 26, 2002. The date used to represent the depeaked 
schedule is Tuesday April 9, 2002.  
 Because American depeaked ORD just one week into the second quarter of 2002, 
the second quarter was used as the depeaked quarter for demand data. Although this 
assumption includes one week (out of 13 total weeks) of demand data in a peaked 
schedule, the alternative was to use demand data 3-6 months in the future to represent 
depeaking effects. The first quarter of 2002 is used as the peaked quarter for demand 
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data. For operational measures, the peaked month used is March 2002; the depeaked 
month is May 2002. 
 For creating year-over-year measures, March 27, 2001 and April 10, 2001 were 
used as the supply comparison dates the year prior. March 25, 2003 and April 8, 2003 
were used as the supply comparison dates for the year after depeaking. The first and 
second quarters of 2001 are used as the year prior demand comparison quarters, and the 
same quarters in 2003 are used for the year after. March 2001 and May 2001 are used for 
the year prior operational comparison months, and March 2003 and May 2003 are used 
for the year after. 
 
 







The distribution of actual connection times made at ORD for passengers flying on 
American itineraries is shown in Figure 4.1. This distribution is from itineraries flown in 
June 2010. At that time, ORD was still operating under a depeaked schedule. The 5th and 
75th percentiles, indicating the MCT and MxCT, are denoted in the figure. For this case, 
the MCT is 35 minutes and MxCT is 110 minutes. 
 
4.2.2 Supply Results 
The following section describes the supply-side results for American’s depeaking of 
ORD, which includes data derived from the On-Time database. Table 4.1 summarizes the 
supply measures representing peaked and depeaked schedules that are discussed in this 
section. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of Supply Changes for American at ORD 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. in a 15-minute interval 23 14 
Max. number of flight operations in a 15-minute interval 26 25 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 869 935 
Total available seat miles flown into or out of hub 92,827,870 98,523,721 
Number of destinations served from hub 96* 92* 
Coefficient of variation in number of arr./dep. flights 124.5/132.3 84.9/86.0 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 35.3% 34.9% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 73.3% 53.9% 
Number of potential connections 16,806 16,904 
Average connections per arriving flight 38.7 36.3 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 18 18 




4.2.2.1 General Supply 
American Airlines’ reproduced peaked schedule at ORD is shown in Figure 4.2 and the 
reproduced depeaked schedule in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.2  Peaked schedule for American at ORD.   
 
 
The peaked schedule has eight arrival and departure peaks. The first arrival peak starts 






Figure 4.3  Depeaked schedule for American at ORD.   
 
 
The maximum number of a single type of operations in a 15-minute period drops greatly 
from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. In the peaked schedule, the maximum number 
of either arrivals or departures is 23, while in the depeaked schedule it is 14. The 
combined number of arrivals and departures in a 15-minute period does not decrease as 
much: in the peaked schedule the value is 26, while it drops to 25 in the depeaked 
schedule. 
 The distribution of American’s operations at ORD is more spread out throughout 
the day, as seen in the density function plot shown in Figure 4.4. In this plot, the 15-
minute periods are ranked in order of frequency. There are more 15-minute periods that 
have greater than zero operations in the depeaked schedule, in addition to having a more 
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flat distribution. It is clear that busiest periods are much lower in the depeaked schedule, 
but the peaked schedule drops off sharply from its busiest periods. 
 
 
Figure 4.4  Density function plot of American operations at ORD. 
 
 
Although the flights are more distributed throughout the day in the depeaked schedule, 
the total number of flights increased from the peaked schedule. In the peaked daily 
schedule in late March of 2002 American operated 869 flights out of Chicago O’Hare, 
and this increased to 935 flights by early April. American decreased the number of 
destinations served from ORD, from 96 to 92. These destinations, however, are seasonal 
ski destinations - American cut out flights to Burlington, Vermont; Eagle, Colorado; 
Yampa Valley, Colorado; and Jackson Hole Wyoming. Thus, to non-seasonal 
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destinations, American retained its network. Due to the increased number of flights, daily 
ASMs increased as well, from just fewer than 93 million to over 98 million. 
 
4.2.2.2 Affiliate Airlines 
The percentage of flights operated by affiliate airlines stays mostly constant from the 
peaked to the depeaked schedule, decreasing just slightly. This percentage is 35.3% in the 
peaked quarter and 34.9% in the depeaked quarter. This value is for the affiliate airline 
that reported on-time statistics to the On-Time database, which in early 2002 included 
American Eagle. As seen in Figure 4.5, American Eagle primarily operates in the banks 








In the depeaked schedule shown in Figure 4.6, American Eagle operates at a consistent 
level throughout the day. 
 
 
Figure 4.6  Affiliate airlines in the depeaked schedule of American at ORD.   
 
 
4.2.2.3 Peak/Depeak Measurement 
The coefficient of variation decreases from the peaked to the depeaked schedule, as the 
level of activity becomes more consistent across 15-minute periods. The arrivals in the 
peaked schedule have a coefficient of variation of 124.5, which drops to 84.9 in the 
depeaked schedule. The change for the departures goes from 132.3 to 86.0. 
 The peak and depeak percentage measures show a drop in the peaked nature of 
the schedule. In the peaked schedule, 73% of flights occur within the banks, highlighted 
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in Figure 4.7. In the depeaked schedule, 54% of flights occur in the corresponding busiest 
periods of the depeaked schedule, as shown in Figure 4.8. This drop, combined with the 
changes in the coefficient of variation, both indicate a quantitative reduction in the peak 













The number of connections increased slightly from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. 
The peak schedule has 16,806 potential connections from each arriving to departing 
flights within the MCT and MxCT for the given arriving flight. This value increases to 
16,904 in the depeaked schedule. The average number of connections per arriving flight 
decreases however due to the increase in number of flights needed to make those 




 The market which had the maximum number of potential connections stayed the 
same from the peaked to the depeaked schedule at 18. In both schedules, this market was 
between LaGuardia (LGA) and Dallas-Fort Worth. 
 
4.2.2.5 Validation of Supply-Demand Time Decision 
As discussed in subsection 3.4.7.2, schedules representing supply during the peaked 
(depeaked) periods in the quarters directly before (or after) the depeaking event were 
verified to be similar. 
 Table 4.2 shows the changes in supply over time for the quarter before the peaked 
date up until the peaked date. Table 4.3 shows the changes in supply for the quarter after 
the depeaked date from the depeaked date and after. 
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Table 4.2  Supply Measures Over Time for American’s Peaked Schedule at ORD 
Measure 1/8/02 1/15/02 1/29/02 2/12/02 2/19/02 3/5/02 3/19/02 3/26/02 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-minute interval 22 22 22 22 22 24 23 23 
Max. number of flight operations in 15-minute interval 26 26 26 26 26 27 27 26 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 861 852 849 878 835 851 875 869 
Total available seat miles flown into or out of hub (000s) 79671 79023 78993 80553 78266 90653 91940 92828 
Number of destinations served from hub 97 97 97 97 97 96 96 96 
Coefficient of variation in number of arr./dep. flights 127.5/132.2 127.5/132.6 127.3/134.2 126.2/131.9 128.7/135.1 125.8/133.9 124.4/132.3 124.5/132.3 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 37.4% 36.7% 36.6% 37.9% 35.9% 35.5% 37.7% 35.3% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 74.7% 75.5% 76.1% 70.5% 74.3% 72.2% 74.2% 73.3% 
Number of potential connections 16969 16698 16520 17230 15743 16197 16980 16806 
Average connections per arriving flight 39.6 39.4 39.0 39.4 37.7 38.3 38.7 38.7 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 14 14 13 17 13 17 13 18 
 
 
Table 4.3  Supply Measures Over Time for American’s Depeaked Schedule at ORD 
Measure 4/9/02 4/16/02 4/23/02 5/7/02 5/21/02 6/18/02 6/25/02 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-minute interval 14 13 14 14 14 14 15 
Max. number of flight operations in 15-minute interval 25 25 25 25 24 24 24 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 935 922 937 922 934 937 842 
Total available seat miles flown into or out of hub (000s) 98524 97928 98798 99015 98983 995161 92365 
Number of destinations served from hub 92 92 92 90 91 91 91 
Coefficient of variation in number of arr./dep. flights 84.9/86.0 85.1/85.7 84.8/85.7 84.8/86.4 84.8/85.6 84.0/84.7 86.5/88.9 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 34.9% 34.1% 34.2% 33.3% 34.8% 33.3% 32.9% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 53.9% 53.6% 53.6% 53.5% 53.8% 53.7% 55.5% 
Number of potential connections 16904 16425 17015 16462 16960 16988 13594 
Average connections per arriving flight 36.3 35.7 36.5 35.9 36.4 36.5 32.7 











4.2.3 Demand Results 
The changes in demand and related parameters before and after the depeaking of ORD 
are shown in Table 4.4. The data comes from the peaked and depeaked quarters. The 
values are the average daily values from across the quarter. Just over 25 thousand average 
daily passengers traveled on American through ORD in the peaked schedule during the 
peaked quarter, and this increased to nearly 32 thousand during the depeaked quarter. 
Overall the revenue increased from the first to second quarter of 2002, from $4.7 million 
to $5.7 million. More importantly, even though ASMs increased, the RASM increased as 
well: from 5.11 cents per mile to 5.80 cents per mile. 
 
Table 4.4  Summary of Demand and Revenue Changes for American at ORD 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Total passengers 25,413 31,836 
Revenue ($) 4,746,042 5,712,689 
Revenue per available seat mile (RASM) (cents per mile) 5.11 5.80 
Percent connecting passengers 38.9% 34.4% 
 
 
On a per market basis, the number of markets in which gross revenue increased between 
the two quarters was 85, while 11 markets saw a decrease. RASM increased in 77 
markets and decreased in 19.  
 Across the spokes of ORD there was an average decrease in connecting traffic 
from the spoke airports. 38.9% of passengers at ORD on American were connecting 
passengers under the peaked schedule, and 34.4% were connecting passengers under the 
depeaked schedule. At the spoke level, 20 spoke routes had an increase in the percentage 
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of passengers on flights between ORD and the spoke that made connections. However, 
76 spoke routes saw an increase in the percentage of passengers whose trips were only 
non-stop flights between the spoke and ORD. It is clear that connecting traffic suffered 
after depeaking. 
 Revenue measures, much more so than supply measures, must be considered in 
terms of market conditions at the time. Across any time period, macroeconomic changes 
influence the revenue of a business, and this is much more poignant in the travel industry. 
Fares change and passenger numbers vary depending on the economy, seasons, and 
competition. Thus, the 0.69 cents per mile increase from the peaked to the depeaked 
period must be considered in the context of the rest of the airline’s revenue and the 
industry during this period. Over this same time period, the entire American network saw 
a 1.01 cents per mile increase in RASM, including American’s other hubs in Dallas and 
Miami. The industry as a whole saw a 1.18 cents per mile increase between these two 
quarters. American’s revenue growth at ORD lagged behind the rest of American and the 
industry as a whole. It is thus possible that the depeaking of ORD could have influenced 
slower revenue growth. 
 
4.2.4 On-Time Results 
The operational effects of depeaking are shown in Table 4.5 using on-time statistics from 
before and after depeaking. Using these aggregated measures, it is seen that between the 
peaked and depeaked months there was an improvement in operations. There was an 




Table 4.5  Summary of Operational Changes for American at ORD 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Average departure delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 13.3 6.8 
Average departure delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 51.3 40.7 
Percentage of delayed departing aircraft  23.4% 14.3% 
Total delay for delayed departing aircraft (minutes) 155,846 80,850 
Average taxi-out time (minutes) 18.6 17.8 
Average arrival delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 13.6 8.1 
Average arrival delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 55.2 46.2 
Percentage of delayed arriving aircraft  22.1% 15% 
Total delay for delayed arriving aircraft (minutes) 157,947 96,100 
Average taxi-in time (minutes) 8.7 7.5 
*Early arriving and early departing aircraft were assigned zero delay 
 
The improvement in operations, like demand, must be considered in context with what 
was occurring across the system. The peaked quarter was in the winter, while the 
depeaked quarter was in the spring, so that alone could account for the improvement in 
delay statistics.  
 What is seen is that the improvements at ORD for American in terms of departure 
delay were better than what seen across American’s network and throughout the industry. 
Nearly 11 minutes of delay were removed from the ORD departing flights, whereas 
across American it was about 2 minutes. Meanwhile the industry actually saw an increase 
during this time period, seeing just over 2.5 more minutes of departure delay. Across the 
board, a lower percentage of aircraft saw departure delay, but the decrease for American 
at ORD after depeaking was the greatest reduction at 39%. The entire American network 




 Arrival delay also saw a similar degree of improvement over the whole American 
route network and the industry. In terms of delay in minutes per arriving aircraft, the 
ORD operations saw a 16% decrease, while only a 3% decrease occurred across all of 
American’s flights. The industry as a whole increased 4% during this same time period. 
As a percentage of aircraft that were delayed on arrival, ORD exceeded the American and 
industry averages. A decrease of 32% exceeded the network’s and industry’s decrease of 
about 20% each. 
 American’s operations at ORD saw a greater improvement in operations than the 
rest of American’s network and the industry. This is indicative of a possible influence by 
depeaking on operations, and could mean that depeaking in this case improved 
operations. 
 
4.2.4.1 Operations for Dual-Hub Competitor 
The ORD case provides an opportunity to assess the operations of a depeaking airline’s 
competition because of its dual-hub status with American and United. Because American 
saw an improvement at ORD in its operations, it is possible that with reduced congestion 
American’s main competitor United could have as well. It is important to know if 
depeaking has positive spillover effects for all airport operations, as it could potentially 
affect an airline’s decision. 
 The operational effects for United before and after American’s depeaking are 
shown in Table 4.6, created using statistics from the On-Time database. Using these 
aggregated measures, it is seen that between the peaked and depeaked months there was 
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an improvement in operations. There was an overall decrease in average delay per 
aircraft, with less delayed aircraft overall  
 
Table 4.6  Summary of Operational Changes for United at ORD 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Average departure delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 7.6 5.2 
Average departure delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 48.6 45.6 
Percentage of delayed departing aircraft  13.2% 9.6% 
Total delay for delayed departing aircraft (minutes) 64,568 45,027 
Average taxi-out time (minutes) 18.2 19.2 
Average arrival delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 10.1 7.2 
Average arrival delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 49.0 41.7 
Percentage of delayed arriving aircraft  17.8% 14.2% 
Total delay for delayed arriving aircraft (minutes) 87,350 60,848 
Average taxi-in time (minutes) 7.6 7.4 
*Early arriving and early departing aircraft were assigned zero delay 
 
Just like with American’s operations, the improvement in United’s operations needs to be 
considered in the context with what was occurring across the system. Thus United’s 
operations are compared to the rest of United’s network and the industry overall, the 
latter being the same statistics American was compared to in the previous subsection. 
 United at ORD did have improvements in operations as compared to the rest of 
United’s network and the industry. In terms of minutes of delay for delayed aircraft, 
United saw a decrease of 6% and 15% for departing and arriving flights, respectively. 
These figures outperformed United as a whole, an improvement of 2% and 4% for 
arriving and departing flights, respectively, and the industry, which gained delay for both 
measures. United’s ORD operations did not see as great of an improvement in terms of 
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the proportion of aircraft which were delayed. Its 27% less delayed departures and 20% 
less delayed arrivals were not as good of improvements as United overall (34% and 27% 
improvements) and were slightly better or on par with the industry (23% and 20% 
improvements). 
 United’s operational benefits over the depeaking period are good, but the airline 
did not see as great of an operational improvement as American. The operations of 
American had a greater degree of improvement than United across the comparison 
measures. Thus it is seen that although the depeaking airline’s competitor saw operational 
improvements, the depeaking airline’s gains were to a larger degree. 
 It appears that United’s operations at ORD for the most part saw a greater 
improvement in operations than the rest of United’s network and the industry. The airline 
saw operational benefits because of American’s depeaking, but American saw a larger 
improvements. Thus it is likely that a depeaking airline sees the bulk of the operational 
benefits when it depeaks its hub, although the competitors are also likely to see benefits. 
 
4.2.5 Dual-Hub: United Airlines’ Response 
ORD is a dual-hub airport, with both American’s and United’s hubbing operations. When 
American depeaked, United had the option to move some of its flights into peak time 
periods in which American had previously concentrated its flights.  
 The initial schedule United was operating at ORD was a heavily peaked schedule, 
as seen in Figure 4.9. There are 10 arrival and departure peaks. The schedule’s peak 
measurements indicate a peaked schedule, with a peak percentage of 80.5% and 
coefficients of variation for arrivals and departures of 140.6 and 131.8. Based on these 
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values, United’s schedule at the time before depeaking was more concentrated into banks 
than the schedule American would depeak.  
 The United measurements for the peaked date, as well as the preceding months 
before depeaking and the months after American depeaked are shown in Table 4.7. 
United had a fairly consistent schedule in terms of peak measurements and connections 
per arriving flights. One measure unique to the dual-hub competitor that is not seen for 
the depeaking airline is the percentage of flights operated by the competitor during the 
time of the depeaking airline’s banks. Thus, for this case, it is a measurement of the 
percentage of flights in United’s schedule which were flown during the American banks. 
 
 
























Coefficient of variation in # of arr. 150.5 140.5 140.6 130.0 128.3 96.8 
Coefficient of variation in # of dep.  133.0 133.2 131.8 137.7 135.9 128.9 
Percentage of flights in peak period 79.9% 77.9% 80.5% 69.4% 70.1% 77.2% 
Percentage of flights in AA banks  51.3% 51.3% 51.4% 48.2% 47.7% 42.1% 
Number of potential connections 9255 9815 10015 10045 9917 12158 
Average connections per arriving flight 28.7 29.8 29.7 29.5 29.0 30.6 
Max. potential connections in a market 18 20 21 19 18 27 
 
 
After American’s depeaking on April 7, 2002, United’s peak level in its schedule reduced 
for some time. Although the peak level ultimately increased back to its former levels by 
three months after depeaking, the coefficients of variation did not, particularly that for 
arrivals. Meanwhile, United managed to increase its number of potential connections per 
arriving flight, and the number of connections in its most important markets increased as 
well (as indicated by the maximum potential connections in a given market). This could 
have occurred because United increased the number of peaks from 10 arrival and 
departure banks to 11 arrival banks and 12 departure banks. The schedule for United 





Figure 4.10  Identified banks in the United schedule at ORD, 3 months after. 
 
  
The decision by United to increase the number of banks, while reducing their peak level, 
helped United increase their number of connections per arriving flight. United did not, 
however, move their flights to the times of day in which American was operating their 
flights. Instead, they moved flights away from those times. As seen in Table 4.7, United 
reduced the percentage of flights operated in American’s banks (and later bank shadows), 
from 51% during American’s peak period, to 42% by three months later. Figures 4.11 
and 4.12 show the American banks overlaid on United’s peaked date schedule and three 





Figure 4.11  American’s banks overlaid on United’s peaked date schedule. 
 
 




It appears that in some ways United found ways to create more connections in their 
schedule to counter American’s reduction in connections per arriving flight. This did not 
appear to include though, the shifting of flights to make use of the time slots American 
once dominated. 
 
4.2.6 Predicting Changes in Supply 
Employing the use of a regression model, analysis was performed on the ORD case study 
to assess the decision-making process American used in determining how to depeak their 
schedule. Analysis is done at the spoke level, such that all data is summarized for a spoke 
airport destination that was served by American during the depeaking period.  
 
Table 4.8  Regression Model Results for Change in Flights at ORD 
Variable Coefficient t-stat p > |t| 
Intercept -0.2840 -0.69 0.492 
Connecting Passengers 0.0039 3.34 0.001 
Connecting Fare 0.0131 1.93 0.057 
Distance to Spoke Airport -0.0015 -2.50 0.014 
Spoke is hub for AA* -2.4871 -2.76 0.007 
Spoke is hub for another airline* 0.8275 2.56 0.012 
*Indicator variable (1 = yes) 
  
The dependent variable, defined as the change in the number of flights on the route 
between ORD and a spoke, was associated with some of the variables listed in Table 4.8. 
The variables include the number of connecting passengers, the fare for connecting 
passengers, the distance to ORD from the spoke airport, and whether the spoke airport is 
a hub for American or for another airline. Four of these variables are significant at the 
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95% confidence level, while the connecting fare is significant at the 90% confidence 
level. The adjusted R2 for the model is 0.176. 
 This model did not pass the normality assumption, but passed the linearity and 
homoscedasticity assumptions. The normal probability plot in Figure 4.13 shows a bowed 
portion in the plot, indicating that there could be excessive skewness. To check to see if 
the model holds up, it was checked against a count model with the same parameters. 
 
 
Figure 4.13  Normal probability plot for ORD case. The bowed shape indicates excessive skewness. 
 
 
The count model results provided the same directional results as the regression model 
with the exception of connecting passengers. That ORD is an important mid-continental 
hub in American’s network, the connections that are made are critical for having a 
successful network. It must be noted, however, of the three major connecting hubs in this 
study (ORD, DFW, and ATL), ORD has the highest percentage of local traffic. 61% of 
ORD’s passenger traffic for American is locally originating, compared to 53% for DFW 
and 46% for ATL. Thus American is focused on capturing local originating traffic, likely 
because of United operating a hub out of the same airport. Thus, although connecting 
178 
 
traffic is significant in the model, it is likely not as important of a factor in depeaking 
ORD due to the volume of originating traffic at ORD. 
 American’s strategy for depeaking ORD, as determined by the model’s results, 
shows a focus on boosting revenue from high-value connecting traffic, with less 
frequency to farther away spokes. In addition, American went after competitor’s hubs, 
without prioritizing their own. ORD only dropped frequency to five airports. The greatest 
increases occurred at competitor hubs with high priced connecting tickets. These included 
Houston (IAH), Newark (EWR), and Minneapolis (MSP). Other high priced connecting 
tickets that were not hubs included Fayetteville, AR (XNA), Boston (BOS), and Austin 
(AUS). Airports which are also hubs for American did not gain flights, as Miami (MIA) 
lost flights and Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) maintained frequency. The distance factor’s 
role mainly caused farther away spokes to lose frequency or stay constant. Airports like 
Tucson (TUS), Orange County (SNA), San Jose, Puerto Rico (SJU), and San Jose, CA 
(SJC) did not receive gains to ORD on American. Meanwhile spokes which gained 
flights were less than 1000 miles from ORD, including the greatest gain at Indianapolis 
(IND). 
 In summary, the strategy American employed at ORD to expand frequency 
focused on going after other airlines’ hubs, targeting high value connecting traffic, and 
mostly excluding spoke airports far from ORD. The airline mostly added flights to 
spokes, and only took away frequency from a few. Thus, when American depeaked ORD, 
they did not refocus operations, but rather boosted to destinations where they wanted to 




4.2.7 Assessing Depeaking and Effects 
The supply and demand results over the depeaking period show changes that likely could 
have been due to depeaking. To get a better understanding as to whether the changes that 
occurred were likely due to depeaking as opposed to being a typical change for that time 
of the year, year-over-year measures were calculated. The percentage change between the 
peaked and depeaked dates is calculated, and also for the year before and year after on 
similar dates. 
 For the ORD case, it is evident that much of the supply changes were due to 
depeaking. Table 4.9 shows schedule measures and reports a percentage change 
associated with each year. For example, in the case of American, depeaking occurred in 
2002. March 26, 2002 was used as the representative Tuesday peaked schedule and April 
9, 2002 was used as the representative Tuesday depeaked schedule. The percentage 
associated with the year 2002 shows the change in schedule measures between these two 
dates. The process is repeated for two dates each in the years 2001 and 2003, using 
representative Tuesday dates closest to the year-over-year depeaking date. Note that the 
year before and year after changes are respectively for the same types of schedules: the 
2001 change is between two peaked schedules and the 2003 change is between two 
depeaked schedules. Thus only the 2002 change is for changes that occurred between 
different schedule types. 
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Table 4.9  Supply Year-Over-Year Changes for American at ORD 
Measure 
 2001  2002  2003 
 3/27 4/10 ∆ %  3/26 4/9 ∆ %  3/25 4/10 ∆ % 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. 
in a 15-minute interval 
 
25 22 -3 -12%  23 14 -9 -39%  14 14 0 0% 
Max. number of flight operations in 
a 15-minute interval 
 
27 24 -3 -11%  26 25 -1 -4%  21 21 0 0% 
Number of flights flown into 
or out of hub 
 
922 883 -39 -4%  869 935 66 8%  915 873 -42 -5% 
Total available seat miles flown into 
or out of hub (000s) 
 
86503 84946 -1557 -2%  92828 98524 5696 6%  90625 88793 -1831 -2% 
Number of destinations served 
from hub 
 
90 88 -2 -2%  96 92 -4 -4%  92 88 -4 -4% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of arrivals 
 
116.9 120.8 3.9 3%  124.5 84.9 -39.6 -32%  82.6 82.9 0.3 0% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of departures 
 
132.9 129.2 -3.7 -3%  132.3 86 -46.3 -35%  81.6 82.1 0.5 1% 
Percentage of flights served 
by affiliate airline(s) 
 
35.3% 33.1% -2.2% -6%  35.3% 34.9% -0.4% -1%  40.9% 39.8% -1.1% -3% 
Percentage of flights served in 
peak period 
 
78.3% 77.5% -0.8% -1%  73.3% 53.9% -19.4% -26%  51.8% 52.0% 0.2% 0% 
Number of potential 
connections 
 
17546 16143 -1403 -8%  16806 16904 98 1%  16079 14509 -1570 -10% 
Average connections per 
arriving flight 
 
38.1 36.7 -1.4 -4%  38.7 36.3 -2.4 -6%  35.3 33.4 -1.8 -5% 
Maximum potential connections 
serving a market 
 
24 25 1 4%  18 18 0 0%  26 22 -4 -15% 
*Bold percentages are for measures identified to be likely due to depeaking 






Bolded percentages represent changes most evident by American’s depeaking. From the 
year-over-year data, it is evident that depeaking involved a reduction in the number of 
flights flown in a given period and the creation of a more even distribution of flights (as 
evidenced by the reduction in the coefficients of variation and reduction in peak 
percentage). Depeaking thus allowed American to increase the number of flights flown in 
the schedule, increase the ASMs, and maintain potential connections in the schedule. 
 The year-over-year measurements are also useful in comparing the demand and 
revenue changes. The time frame is longer in these cases, because the demand data is 
gathered for an entire quarter, but the results are still useful. The year-over-year changes 
for revenue and total passengers are not included because these values heavily depend on 
what is going on in the market, more so than the schedule. Thus RASM is used in 
comparison still with the RASM of the airline network and for the industry.  
 One measurement which is useful in terms of demand in measuring it year-over-
year is the percentage of connecting passengers. Surprisingly, despite the increase in 
potential connections in the schedule, the percent of connecting passengers in 2002 
decreased 12%, while in 2001 and 2003 it increased, 2% and 3% respectively. Depeaking 
may have actually led to a decrease in connecting traffic, despite the relative increase in 
connections. 
 The change in RASM for American’s ORD schedule lagged behind the rest of 
American and industry in the depeaking year. This underperformance seems to be tied to 
the depeaking change, as without a change in schedule, American’s ORD RASM was 




Table 4.10  RASM Year-Over-Year Changes for American at ORD 
Measure 
2001 2002 2003 
Q1 Q2 ∆ % Q1 Q2 ∆ % Q1 Q2 ∆ % 
RASM for 
Depeaked Airport 
7.17 7.94 0.77 11% 5.11 5.80 0.69 14% 5.30 6.20 0.90 17% 
RASM for 
Airline Network 
8.53 8.74 0.21 2% 5.98 6.99 1.01 17% 6.19 7.18 0.99 16% 
RASM for 
Industry 
9.87 10.28 0.41 4% 7.95 9.13 1.18 15% 8.17 9.63 1.46 18% 
 
 
Operationally, American saw an improvement in operations at ORD year-over-year, as 
seen in Table 4.11. For departure delay there was an improvement in the depeaking year 
that was greater than the rest of American’s network and the industry, which 
outperformed that which occurred in the years before and after. Percent of delayed 
departures also saw a greater improvement in the depeaking year in relation to the 
comparative measures than in the surrounding years. Arrival delay improved in the 
depeaking year compared to the industry and the rest of the American network, while in 
the years before and after arrival delay worsened at ORD. For the percentage of delayed 
arrivals, there was a big improvement in the depeaking year when compared using the 
difference-in-difference method, and this improvement was much greater than the year 
after’s improvement (the year before saw a worsening in relation to the industry and 







Table 4.11  Operations Year-Over-Year Changes for American at ORD 
Measure 
2001 2002 2003 
Mar May ∆ % Mar May ∆ % Mar May ∆ % 
Dep. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
48.7 51.5 2.8 6% 51.3 40.7 -10.6 -21% 49.2 50.2 1 2% 
Dep. Delay Airline 
Network 
56.4 52.6 -3.8 -7% 54.1 52.2 -1.9 -4% 52.7 55.1 2.4 5% 
Dep. Delay  
Industry 
50.7 48.2 -2.5 -5% 45.8 47.5 1.7 4% 49.4 50.1 0.7 1% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Depeaked Airport 
22.4 22.4 0 0% 23.4 14.3 -9.1 -39% 15.8 13.2 -2.6 -16% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Airline Network 
18.8 15.5 -3.3 -18% 15.4 11.8 -3.6 -23% 10.3 10.7 0.4 4% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Industry 
19 13.9 -5.1 -27% 16.6 12.8 -3.8 -23% 12.5 10.9 -1.6 -13% 
Arr. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
49.8 55.3 5.5 11% 55.2 46.2 -9 -16% 57.9 62.2 4.3 7% 
Arr. Delay Airline 
Network 
52.6 49.2 -3.4 -6% 50.6 48.9 -1.7 -3% 50.7 51.5 0.8 2% 
Arr. Delay  
Industry 
48.3 45.7 -2.6 -5% 44.2 46 1.8 4% 47.4 47.4 0 0% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Depeaked Airport 
20.7 21.8 1.1 5% 22.1 15 -7.1 -32% 19.7 16.6 -3.1 -16% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Airline Network 
22.5 19.6 -2.9 -13% 19.8 15.8 -4 -20% 13.6 15.2 1.6 12% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Industry 
22 16.9 -5.1 -23% 20.2 16.3 -3.9 -19% 15.9 14.3 -1.6 -10% 
 
 
American appears to have considerable changes from depeaking, and ones that provided 
positive results in terms of cutting cost and getting more use out of their operations. They 
increased ASM and flights while reducing their gate and staff needs by spreading out the 
flights. Oddly, they were able to increase potential connections, but connecting passenger 
traffic reduced. This may be due to lack of coordination between scheduling and revenue 
management decisions, e.g. the schedule was constructed to allow for higher numbers of 
connecting passengers but the revenue management system may have been expecting the 
same number of local and connecting passengers as in the past. The airline saw notable 
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improvements in operations when examined against comparative measures in the 
depeaking year and assessed year-over-year. 
 
4.2.8 Summary 
The need to cut cost drove the decision to make big supply changes that completely 
altered the schedule at ORD. American spread operations out throughout the day, and 
thus reduced the need for gates and staff. Despite this change, American was able to 
increase the number of flights and ASMs in the schedule, which boosted the overall 
number of connections. Because American added flights, there were only a few spokes 
which lost frequency. The decision on how to restructure the schedule and add flights 
focused on targeting high value connecting traffic. The additions occurred mostly for 
spokes closer to Chicago and reinforced frequency in markets in which the airline wanted 
to pursue growth, including markets served by competitor’s hubs. 
 The effects of these changes were mixed for American. Operationally the airline 
saw improvements in delay and taxi times. American reduced the percentage of flights 
that experienced delays out of ORD. American was unable to maintain their revenue 
stream with the changes. The airline also saw a drop in the connecting percentage of the 
passenger traffic despite the focus on maintaining valuable connections in depeaking. 
American’s prime competitor, United, did not respond with major schedule changes and 
kept a mostly consistent schedule, although United did change their schedule to increase 
potential connections. United saw an improvement in operations, but it did not match the 




4.3 American Airlines at Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) 
American Airlines depeaked their second major mid-continental hub, DFW, in October 
of 2002. American Airlines removed nine arrival and departure peaks from their 
schedule. This move, like the ORD depeaking, was in response to the rising costs of 
operating the peaked schedule, coupled with the high market volatility in the post-9/11 
market and the losses from acquiring TWA. Depeaking DFW aided American in 
avoiding bankruptcy. 
 DFW served as a hub airport for two major airlines during the depeaking period. 
Delta Air Lines also had a hub operation at DFW until 2005, and thus this case is useful 
to assess how a competitor at a dual-hub responds to depeaking. Included in this section 
is a description of Delta’s changes after American depeaked. 
 
4.3.1 Data Periods Used and Input Parameters 
American Airlines depeaked DFW on Friday November 1, 2002. The date used to 
represent the peak schedule is Tuesday October 22, 2002. The date used to represent the 
depeaked schedule is Tuesday November 5, 2002.  
 American depeaked DFW in the middle of the fourth quarter of 2002, so the 
representative peaked quarter is the third quarter of 2002. The representative depeaked 
quarter is the first quarter of 2003. The peaked month used for operational measures is 
October 2002; the depeaked month is November 2002. 
 For creating year-over-year measures, October 23, 2001 and November 6, 2001 
were used as the supply comparison dates the year prior. October 21, 2003 and November 
4, 2003 were used as the supply comparison dates for the year after depeaking. The third 
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quarter of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 are used as the year prior demand 
comparison quarters, and the third quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004 are used 
for the year after. October 2001 and November 2001 are used for the year prior 
operational comparison months, and October 2003 and November 2003 are used for the 
year after. 
 The distribution of actual connection times made at DFW for passengers flying on 
American itineraries is shown in Figure 4.14. This distribution is from itineraries flown in 
June 2010. At that time, DFW was still operating under a depeaked schedule. The 5th and 
75th percentiles, indicating the MCT and MxCT are denoted in the figure. For this case, 
the MCT is 40 minutes and the MxCT is 105 minutes. 
 
 







4.3.2 Supply Results 
The following section describes the supply-side results for American’s depeaking of 
DFW, which includes data derived from the On-Time database. Table 4.12 summarizes 
the supply measures representing peaked and depeaked schedules that are discussed in 
this section. 
 
Table 4.12  Summary of Supply Changes for American at DFW 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. in a 15-minute interval 48 21 
Max. number of flight operations in a 15-minute interval 49 34 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 1,270 1,245 
Total available seat miles flown into or out of hub 131,767,721 127,660,919 
Number of destinations served from hub 105 105 
Coefficient of variation in number of arr./dep. flights 141.7/176.4 88.4/86.8 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 32.5% 33.6% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 82.7% 53.5% 
Number of potential connections 35,513 26,743 
Average connections per arriving flight 55.9 43.1 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 14 15 
 
 
4.3.2.1 General Supply 
American Airlines’ reproduced peaked schedule at DFW is shown in Figure 4.15 and the 










Figure 4.16  Depeaked schedule for American at DFW.   
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The maximum number of operations in a 15-minute period drops greatly from the peaked 
to the depeaked schedule. In the peaked schedule, the maximum number of either arrivals 
or departures is 48, while in the depeaked schedule it is 21. The combined number of 
arrivals and departures in a 15-minute period in the peaked schedule is 49, while it drops 
to 34 in the depeaked schedule. 
 The distribution of American’s operations at DFW is more spread out throughout 
the day, as seen in the density function plot shown in Figure 4.17. In this plot, the 15-
minute periods are ranked in order of frequency. There are more 15-minute periods that 
have greater than zero operations in the depeaked schedule, in addition to having a less 
steeply sloped distribution. It is clear that busiest periods are much lower in the depeaked 
schedule, but the peaked schedule drops off sharply from its busiest periods. It is also 





Figure 4.17  Density function plot of American operations at DFW. 
 
 
In the depeaked schedule, American slightly decreased the total number of flights from 
the peaked schedule. In the peaked daily schedule in late October of 2002 American 
operated 1,270 flights out of DFW, and this dropped to 1,245 flights by early November. 
American retained the same set of destinations in their network from DFW under the 
depeaked schedule. Due to the decreased number of flights, daily ASMs decreased as 
well, from just fewer than 132 million to under 128 million. 
 
4.3.2.2 Affiliate Airlines 
The percentage of flights operated by affiliate airlines stays mostly constant from the 
peaked to the depeaked schedule, increasing just slightly. This percentage is 32.5% in the 
peaked quarter and 33.6% in the depeaked quarter. This value is for the affiliate airline 
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that reported on-time statistics to the On-Time database, which in early 2002 included 
American Eagle. As seen in Figure 4.18, American Eagle primarily operates in the banks 
of the schedule, although American Eagle certainly has a large number of flights outside 
the banks. In the depeaked schedule shown in Figure 4.19, American Eagle operates at a 
consistent level throughout the day. 
 
 





Figure 4.19  Affiliate airlines in the depeaked schedule of American at DFW.   
 
 
4.3.2.3 Peak/Depeak Measures 
The coefficient of variation decreases from the peaked to the depeaked schedule, as the 
level of activity becomes more consistent across 15-minute periods. The arrivals in the 
peaked schedule have a coefficient of variation of 141.7, which drops to 88.4 in the 
depeaked schedule. The change for the departures is even greater, dropping from 176.4 to 
86.8. 
 The peak and depeak percentage measures show a drop in the peaked nature of 
the schedule. In the peaked schedule, 83% of flights occur within the banks, highlighted 
in Figure 4.20. In the depeaked schedule, 53% of flights occur in the corresponding 
busiest periods of the depeaked schedule, as shown in Figure 4.21. This drop, combined 
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with the changes in the coefficient of variation, both indicate a quantitative reduction in 
the peak level of the schedule. 
 
 









The number of connections decreased greatly from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. 
The peak schedule has 35,513 potential connections from each arriving to departing 
flights within the MCT and MxCT for the given arriving flight. This value decreases to 
26,743 in the depeaked schedule. The average number of connections per arriving flight 
also decreases considerably. The number of connections per arriving flights operated is 
55.9 in the peaked schedule, but drops to 43.1 per arriving flight in the depeaked 
schedule. 
 The market which had the maximum number of potential connections increased 
slightly from 14 in the peaked schedule to 15 in the depeaked schedule. In the peaked 
schedule, 14 connections existed from LGA to LAX, from ORD to Shreveport (SHV), 
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and from Tulsa (TUL) to ORD. In the depeaked schedule, 15 connections existed daily 
between TUL to ORD. 
 
4.3.2.5 Validation of Supply-Demand Time Decision 
The schedule on the peaked date (or depeaked date) supply data was verified as being 
similar to the schedule used in the peaked quarter (or depeaked quarter) for the analysis.  
 Table 4.13 shows the changes in supply over time for the quarter before the 
peaked date up until the peaked date. Table 4.14 shows the changes in supply for the 
quarter after the depeaked date from the depeaked date and after.  
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Table 4.13  Supply Measures Over Time for American’s Peaked Schedule at DFW 
Measure 7/16/02 7/30/02 8/13/02 8/27/02 9/10/02 9/24/02 10/1/02 10/8/02 10/22/02 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 49 49 47 47 47 47 47 47 48 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 51 53 50 50 51 50 49 49 49 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 1285 1281 1271 1214 1165 1282 1258 1267 1270 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 136692 136674 136514 131295 118995 134725 130741 133024 131768 
Number of destinations served from hub 109 108 109 109 108 108 106 106 105 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 142.5/176.2 142.0/176.8 139.2/175.3 138.8/174.5 150.9/178.6 140.6/174.2 140.4/177.8 140.4/176.9 141.7/176.4 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 30.5% 30.4% 31.1% 31.4% 34.9% 32.8% 32.9% 32.3% 32.5% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 83.4% 82.8% 81.0% 77.4% 81.9% 78.3% 78.1% 78.9% 82.7% 
Number of potential connections 36477 36181 35303 32485 32173 36083 34773 35198 35513 
Average connections per arriving flight 56.8 56.7 55.7 53.6 55.1 56.5 55.5 55.8 55.9 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 15 15 14 14 13 15 15 15 14 
 
 
Table 4.14  Supply Measures Over Time for American’s Depeaked Schedule at DFW 
Measure 11/5/02 11/19/02 12/3/02 12/17/02 1/7/03 1/28/03 2/11/03 3/4/03 3/25/03 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 21 21 20 20 22 22 20 19 20 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 34 35 36 34 38 37 37 36 37 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 1245 1261 1240 1267 1226 1201 1217 1214 1219 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 127661 128899 129054 132516 123736 121043 122889 124782 125768 
Number of destinations served from hub 105 105 106 109 108 107 107 107 107 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 88.4/86.8 88.8/86.4 87.6/88.7 85.1/86.0 87.5/85.7 88.2/85.7 88.3/86.2 87.6/87.6 86.2/87.4 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 33.6% 33.8% 32.3% 32.8% 33.7% 33.0% 32.9% 32.1% 31.8% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 53.5% 53.6% 53.7% 52.2% 53.2% 53.3% 53.6% 53.5% 53.1% 
Number of potential connections 26743 27275 26357 27509 25879 24818 25435 25532 25424 
Average connections per arriving flight 43.1 43.4 42.6 43.5 42.5 41.4 42.0 42.2 41.8 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 15 16 14 14 13 11 14 11 14 






4.3.3 Demand Results 
The changes in demand and related parameters before and after the depeaking of DFW 
are shown in Table 4.15. The data comes from the peaked and depeaked quarters. The 
values are the average daily values from across the quarter. Around 43 thousand average 
daily passengers traveled on American through DFW in the peaked schedule during the 
peaked quarter, and this decreased to about 38 thousand during the depeaked quarter. 
Overall the revenue decreased from the third quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2002, 
from $8.4 million to $7.8 million. Most important though is that RASM decreased over 
this period for flights flying through DFW: from 6.35 cents per mile to 6.13 cents per 
mile. 
 
Table 4.15  Summary of Demand and Revenue Changes for American at DFW 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Total passengers 43,142 37,608 
Revenue ($) 8,366,379 7,831,576 
Revenue per available seat mile (RASM) (cents per mile) 6.35 6.13 
Percent connecting passengers 46.6% 47.3% 
 
 
On a per market basis, the number of markets in which gross revenue increased between 
the two quarters was only 30, compared to the 75 markets that saw decreases. RASM 
increased in 38 markets, and decreased in 67.  
 Across the spokes of DFW there was an average increase in connecting traffic 
from the spoke airports. 46.6% of passengers at DFW on American were connecting 
passengers under the peaked schedule and 47.3% were connecting passengers under the 
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depeaked schedule. At the spoke level, 61 spoke routes had an increase in the percentage 
of passengers on flights between DFW and the spoke that made connections. Only 44 
spoke routes saw an increase in the percentage of passengers whose trips were only non-
stop flights between the spoke and DFW. It is clear that connecting traffic benefited from 
depeaking due to American’s depeaking. 
 The revenue measures were compared to what was occurring for the airline during 
the same time period, as well as across the industry. From the peaked to the depeaked 
quarter, there was a 0.22 cents per mile decrease in RASM. Over this same time period, 
the entire American network saw only a 0.06 cents per mile decrease in RASM, including 
American’s other depeaked hub at ORD. The industry as a whole saw a 0.18 cents per 
mile increase between these two quarters, and thus American’s RASM at DFW lagged 
behind the industry by 0.40 cents per mile. It is thus possible that the depeaking of ORD 
could have influenced slower revenue growth. 
 
4.3.4 On-Time Results 
The operational effects of depeaking are shown in Table 4.16 using on-time statistics 
from before and after depeaking. Using these aggregated measures, it is seen that 
between the peaked and depeaked months there was an improvement in operations. There 
was an overall decrease in average delay per aircraft, with less delayed aircraft overall as 
a percentage of all aircraft. Delay decreased for both departures and arrivals over this 




Table 4.16  Summary of Operational Changes for American at DFW 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Average departure delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 6.8 4.9 
Average departure delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 47.6 39.3 
Percentage of delayed departing aircraft  12.2% 10% 
Total delay for delayed departing aircraft (minutes) 111,913 70,177 
Average taxi-out time (minutes) 19.6 15.7 
Average arrival delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 7.5 5.3 
Average arrival delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 47.4 47.5 
Percentage of delayed arriving aircraft  12.9% 8.9% 
Total delay for delayed arriving aircraft (minutes) 117,262 75,966 
Average taxi-in time (minutes) 11.8 10.6 
*Early arriving and early departing aircraft were assigned zero delay 
 
These operational improvements were not seen across American’s system overall nor at 
the industry level, indicating that American’s operations at DFW may have seen 
improvement due to depeaking. Although the departure delay for delayed aircraft 
decreased for American at DFW, it increased from 51.1 to 51.9 minutes for the rest of the 
network and from 45.2 to 46.5 minutes industry-wide. The percentage of delayed 
departures was higher at DFW for American than the rest of American’s network, but 
while DFW saw an improvement by 2.2 percentage points, American as a whole got 
worse by a tenth of a percentage point. The industry improved, but at a slower rate than 
DFW. 
 American’s aircraft at DFW saw nearly the same amount of delay from the 
peaked to the depeaked schedule. Meanwhile, over the same period, the rest of 
American’s network had an increase in arrival delay by almost 2.5 minutes, and industry 
saw an increase by 1.2 minutes. A similar situation occurred with the percent of arriving 
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aircraft which were delayed. American’s DFW depeaked operations were 4 percentage 
points better than the peaked operations, which surpassed the improvements seen 
network-wide, 0.7 percentage points, and industry-wide, 0.8 percentage points. 
 American’s depeaking of DFW caused an overall improvement in operational 
delay from the peaked to the depeaked period, even when compared to the normalizing 
measures. The differences in the measures from the peaked to depeaked schedule 
indicated a faster rate of improvement at DFW than the rest of American’s network and 
the industry. Thus, there is reason to believe depeaking played some role in improving 
operations at DFW. 
 
4.3.5 Dual-Hub: Delta Air Lines’ Response 
The dual-hub status of DFW lasted until Delta dehubbed in December 2005, but during 
American’s 2002 depeaking, Delta still was operating a hub out of DFW. Unlike the near 
equal size hubbing operations at ORD for American and United, Delta’s hubbing 
operations at DFW were considerably smaller than American’s.  
 The initial schedule Delta was operating at ORD was concentrated into several 
peaks, with very little traffic in between, as seen in Figure 4.22. The figure has the same 
scale as American’s schedule reproduction figures, to be able to visually compare the 
differences in the schedules. Delta’s schedule had five arrival and six departure peaks. 
The schedule’s peak measurements indicate a peaked schedule, with a peak percentage of 
81.3% and coefficients of variation for arrivals and departures both of 201.3. Based on 
these values, Delta’s schedule at the time before depeaking was very concentrated into 
banks, much more than American’s, but at a smaller scale. 
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 The Delta measurements for the peaked date, October 22, 2002, as well as the 
preceding months before depeaking and the months after American depeaked are shown 
in Table 4.17. Delta had a fairly consistent schedule in terms of peak measurements and 
connections per arriving flights. Like the ORD case, there is a measurement of the 
percentage of flights in Delta’s schedule which were flown during the American banks. 
 
 



























Coefficient of variation in # of arr. 203.9 201.3 201.3 201.3 201.3 202.9 
Coefficient of variation in # of dep.  198.5 203.3 201.3 201.3 221.8 226.1 
Percentage of flights in peak period 83.0% 81.0% 81.3% 81.3% 83.3% 84.5% 
Percentage of flights in AA banks  42.7% 47.1% 46.6% 46.6% 43.5% 44.1% 
Number of potential connections 881 869 898 899 859 819 
Average connections per arriving flight 10.1 10.0 10.3 10.3 9.9 10.1 
Max. potential connections in a market 5 5 5 5 4 3 
 
 
Delta’s schedule, after American’s depeaking, saw practically no changes as compared to 
the peaked schedules. Delta maintained a similar level of peaking, and a similar level of 
flights within the schedule where American’s banks were operating. The schedule for 
Delta three months after American’s depeaking is shown in Figure 4.23. Potential 





Figure 4.23  Identified banks in the Delta schedule at DFW, 3 months after. 
 
  
Delta’s operations in relation to American’s banks are shown in Figures 4.24 and 4.25. 





Figure 4.24  American’s banks overlaid on Delta’s peaked date schedule. 
 
 





The evidence supports that American’s primary competitor at DFW, Delta, did not alter 
its schedule in response to American’s depeaking. 
 
4.3.6 Predicting Changes in Supply 
Analysis was performed on the DFW case study to assess the decision-making process 
American used in determining how to depeak their schedule using a regression model. 
The analysis at the spoke level makes use of data that is summarized for all spoke airports 
destination that were served by American during the depeaking period.  
 
Table 4.18  Regression Model Results for Change in Flights at DFW 
Variable Coefficient t-stat p > |t| 
Intercept 1.229 2.20 0.030 
Connecting Passengers 0.0012 2.63 0.010 
Log of # of flights in peaked schedule -0.6690 -2.88 0.005 
RASM 7.2704 2.39 0.019 
AA is the largest carrier in the market* -0.9299 -1.91 0.059 
*Indicator variable (1 = yes) 
 
The dependent variable, defined as the change in the number of flights on the route 
between DFW and a spoke, was found to be well predicted by the variables listed in 
Table 4.18. The variables include the number of connecting passengers, the log of the 
number of flights to the spoke in the peaked schedule, the RASM on the route, and 
whether American had the most flights on the route between DFW and the spoke. Three 
of these variables are significant at the 95% confidence level, while the largest carrier 
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indicator variable is significant at the 90% confidence level. The adjusted R2 for the 
model is 0.095. 
 This model did not pass the normality assumption, but passed the linearity and 
homoscedasticity assumptions. The normal probability plot in Figure 4.26 shows a bowed 
portion in the plot, indicating that there could be excessive skewness. A count model was 
used to verify the directionality of the results held from the regression model. 
 
 
Figure 4.26  Normal probability plot for DFW case. The bowed shape indicates excessive skewness. 
 
 
In the count model, it was found that all the variables in the regression model have the 
same direction. This gave assurance that the regression model was performing as it 
should, and thus the results were suitable for interpretation. 
 American Airlines’ strategy for depeaking DFW, as determined by the results of 
the regression model showed a focus on high-value connections. The DFW hub is a 
critical mid-continental hub along with ORD, and thus connections from spokes to major 
coastal destinations are critical. American increased frequency to routes which had high 
levels of connecting passengers on routes where there was a lower frequency. Cities such 
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as Cincinnati (CVG), Greensboro (GSO), and Greenville/Spartanburg (GSP) are 
examples. Service was cut to low connecting passenger cities that had high frequency, 
such as Shreveport (SHV), Memphis (MEM), San Francisco (SFO), Minneapolis (MSP), 
and Denver (DEN). Frequency was also added to routes that had high RASM including 
Lubbock (LBB), San Antonio (SAT), and Amarillo (AMA), even though frequency was 
already high to these spokes. Markets in which American was not the biggest airline, 
such as CVG and ATL, were targeted by American, while all spoke cities which lost 
frequency were destinations in which American dominated. In these markets, low RASM 
was common, including Honolulu (HNL), Grand Rapids (GRR), Little Rock (LIT), 
Newark (EWR), and Columbus (CMH). 
 In summary, American’s strategy at DFW can be described as pulling out of high 
frequency markets where American already dominated but RASM was low. These 
inefficient markets did not prove to be worth the number of flights American was giving 
them. Instead, American focused on maintaining valuable hub connections where RASM 
was higher, and going after markets where they were not the largest airline. 
 
4.3.7 Assessing Depeaking and Effects 
The supply and demand results over the depeaking period show changes that likely could 
have been due to depeaking. To get a better understanding as to whether the changes that 
occurred were likely due to depeaking as opposed to being a typical change for that time 
of the year, year-over-year measures were calculated. The percentage change between the 




 For the DFW case, it is evident that much of the supply changes were due to 
depeaking. Table 4.19 shows schedule measures and reports a percentage change 
associated with each year. In the case of American, depeaking occurred in 2002. October 
22, 2002 was used as the representative Tuesday peaked schedule and November 5, 2002 
was used as the representative Tuesday depeaked schedule. The percentage associated 
with the year 2002 shows the change in schedule measures between these two dates. The 
process is repeated for two dates each in the years 2001 and 2003, using representative 
Tuesday dates closest to the year-over-year depeaking date. Note that the year before and 
year after changes are respectively for the same types of schedules: the 2001 change is 
between two peaked schedules and the 2003 change is between two depeaked schedules. 
Thus only the 2002 change is for changes that occurred between different schedule types. 
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Table 4.19  Supply Year-Over-Year Changes for American at DFW 
Measure 
 2001  2002  2003 
 10/23 11/6 ∆ %  10/22 11/5 ∆ %  10/21 11/4 ∆ % 
Max. number of flight arrs. or 
deps. in a 15-minute interval 
 
44 44 0 0%  48 21 -27 -56%  21 25 4 19% 
Max. number of flight operations 
in a 15-minute interval 
 
45 46 1 2%  49 34 -15 -31%  37 40 3 8% 
Number of flights flown into 
or out of hub 
 
1127 1145 18 2%  1,270 1,245 -25 -2%  1219 1277 58 5% 
Total available seat miles flown 
into or out of hub (000s) 
 
121694 119368 -2326 -2%  131768127661 -4107 -3%  126692 135855 9163 7% 
Number of destinations served 
from hub 
 
107 106 -1 -1%  105 105 0 0%  104 105 1 1% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of arrivals 
 
156.5 155.6 -0.9 -1%  141.7 88.4 -53.3 -38%  86.7 89.6 2.9 3% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of departures 
 
177.8 186.7 8.9 5%  176.4 86.8 -89.6 -51%  88.2 93.9 5.7 6% 
Percentage of flights served 
by affiliate airline(s) 
 
33.9% 34.2% 0.3% 1%  32.5% 33.6% 1.1% 3%  32.7% 29.8% -2.9% -9% 
Percentage of flights served in 
peak period 
 
83.1% 85.2% 2.1% 3%  82.7% 53.5% -29.2% -35%  53.6% 55.5% 1.9% 4% 
Number of potential  
connections 
 
29871 31771 1900 6%  35513 26743 -8770 -25%  25423 28317 2894 11% 
Average connections per 
arriving flight 
 
52.9 55.5 2.7 5%  55.9 43.1 -12.8 -23%  41.8 44.4 2.6 6% 
Maximum potential connections 
serving a market 
 
12 14 2 17%  14 15 1 7%  15 14 -1 -7% 
*Bold percentages are for measures identified to be likely due to depeaking 






Bolded percentages represent changes most evident by American’s depeaking. From the 
year-over-year data, it is evident that depeaking involved a reduction in the number of 
flights flown in a given period and the creation of a more even distribution of flights (as 
evidenced by the reduction in the coefficients of variation and reduction in peak 
percentage). Depeaking allowed American to decrease the number of flights flown in the 
schedule. The consequence of depeaking the tight banks was a big loss of potential 
connections, both gross and per arriving flight. 
 The year-over-year measurements are also useful in comparing the demand and 
revenue changes. The time frame is longer in these cases, because the demand data is 
gathered for an entire quarter, but the results are still useful. The year-over-year changes 
for revenue and total passengers are not included because these values heavily depend on 
what is going on in the market, more so than the schedule. Thus RASM is used in 
comparison still with the RASM of the airline network and for the industry.  
 One measurement which is useful in terms of demand in measuring it year-over-
year is the percentage of connecting passengers. Surprisingly, despite the decrease in 
potential connections in the schedule, the increase in the percent of connecting 
passengers in 2002 is similar to the percentage increases in 2001 and 2003 – all between 
one and three percent. Depeaking did not shift the types of passengers flying through 
DFW. 
 The change in RASM for American’s DFW schedule lagged behind the rest of 
American and industry in the depeaking year. This was also the case in the year prior, but 
in the year after the RASM change was on par with that occurring elsewhere. As seen in 
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Table 4.20, the drop in RASM in the depeaking year may not be entirely tied to the 
depeaking of the schedule, since it lagged behind in other years as well. 
 
Table 4.20  RASM Year-Over-Year Changes for American at DFW 
Measure 
2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 
Q3 Q1 ∆ % Q3 Q1 ∆ % Q3 Q1 ∆ % 
RASM for 
Depeaked Airport 
6.94 6.34 -0.30 -4% 6.35 6.13 -0.22 -3% 6.65 7.02 0.37 6% 
RASM for 
Airline Network 
7.71 9.50 1.79 23% 8.36 8.54 0.18 2% 6.64 7.25 0.61 9% 
RASM for 
Industry 
9.72 10.00 0.28 3% 6.33 6.27 -0.06 -1% 9.01 9.32 0.31 3% 
 
 
American saw an improvement in all operational measures in the depeaking year, but 
when compared year-over-year the arriving aircraft measures do not show a notable 
change from the surrounding years, as seen in Table 4.21. The average arrival delay in 
the depeaking year improved compared to the rest of American’s network and the 
industry, but this improvement also occurred in the year after to the same degree. The 
percentage of delayed arriving aircraft saw an improvement in the depeaking year, but a 
similar improvement occurred in the year before. In terms of departure delay, there was 
an improvement in the depeaking year in relation to the comparative measures, and this 
improvement was not seen in the years before and after where departure delay worsened 
comparatively. For the percentage of delayed aircraft, the improvement in the depeaking 
year was greater when compared to the network and industry in the depeaking year than 




Table 4.21  Operations Year-Over-Year Changes for American at DFW 
Measure 
2001 2002 2003 
Oct Nov ∆ % Oct Nov ∆ % Oct Nov ∆ % 
Dep. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
39.4 43.1 3.7 9% 47.6 39.3 -8.3 -17% 37.5 45 7.5 20% 
Dep. Delay Airline 
Network 
43.4 47.6 4.2 10% 51.1 51.9 0.8 2% 49.2 53.1 3.9 8% 
Dep. Delay  
Industry 
43.2 44.4 1.2 3% 45.2 46.5 1.3 3% 48.4 50.8 2.4 5% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Depeaked Airport 
21.9 17.3 -4.6 -21% 12.2 10 -2.2 -18% 9 14.5 5.5 61% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Airline Network 
17.1 13.4 -3.7 -22% 9.3 9.4 0.1 1% 8.2 16.4 8.2 100% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Industry 
13.5 12.5 -1 -7% 11.4 10.8 -0.6 -5% 9.7 13.8 4.1 42% 
Arr. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
45.8 48.6 2.8 6% 47.4 47.5 0.1 0% 51.2 50.7 -0.5 -1% 
Arr. Delay Airline 
Network 
45.1 44.2 -0.9 -2% 44.8 47.2 2.4 5% 43.8 51.8 8 18% 
Arr. Delay  
Industry 
43.6 42.8 -0.8 -2% 41.7 42.9 1.2 3% 43.9 47.5 3.6 8% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Depeaked Airport 
14.9 12.6 -2.3 -15% 12.9 8.9 -4 -31% 7.5 12.5 5 67% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Airline Network 
16.8 16.3 -0.5 -3% 13.1 12.4 -0.7 -5% 11.2 22.1 10.9 97% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Industry 
13.8 14.2 0.4 3% 14.8 14 -0.8 -5% 12.7 18.5 5.8 46% 
 
 
American appears to have had considerable changes from depeaking, particularly in areas 
that allowed the airline to cut cost through the removal of gates and staff. This came at a 
cost of lost potential connections, but the drop in RASM was not necessarily attached to 
the depeaking because the year prior was also an underperforming year in relation to the 
comparison measures. Operationally, when compared year-over-year, American saw an 






DFW was the second airport American depeaked in 2002. The supply changes were 
substantial, as the airline dropped its level of operations per 15-minute period by a 
considerable degree. The result was a flat schedule that allowed the airline to cut costs 
through the use of less gates and a reduction in staff and equipment. The airline also 
removed flights throughout the schedule. Many flights were removed in markets in which 
American dominated in market share, operated a high number of flights, but had a low 
RASM. American’s depeaking strategy with respect to DFW was thus distinct from its 
ORD strategy and focused more on cutting low RASM flights versus adding connections 
to competitor hubs. Despite these moves by American, DFW’s other hub operator Delta 
did not make a noteworthy change in its schedule in response. 
 The drop in supply at DFW came at the expense of potential connections. Without 
the busy banks in their schedule, it was not possible for American to maintain the high 
connectivity which they had been operating with. Despite the loss in connections, though, 
American did not have slower revenue growth in 2002 more so than in other years when 
comparing to the rest of American and the industry. It did, however, see a considerable 
improvement in operations, reducing delay and the percentage of delayed aircraft in 
relation to comparable measures. 
 
4.4 Delta Air Lines at Atlanta (ATL) 
In January 2005 Delta Air Lines removed ten arrival and departure peaks from their 
schedule in Atlanta (ATL). Delta’s depeaking happened about a year after the SARS 
crisis, which affected a large portion of international travel for the industry. It also 
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occurred amongst a series of bankruptcies during the end of 2004 through 2005, 
including Delta’s in September 2005.  
 The airline in 2005 was implementing a number of cost-cutting measures, 
including depeaking, but was unable to avoid bankruptcy. Delta had expanded its Atlanta 
operations and closed its hub at DFW in 2005, to focus its energy at its largest hub 
operation. The dehubbing of DFW actually took place on the same date of ATL’s 
depeaking. Delta would later reduce its operations in Cincinnati as well.  In order to help 
avoid bankruptcy, the pilots of Delta took a pay cut. At the end of the summer of 2005, 
Delta sold its connection carrier to SkyWest Airlines. Despite all these changes, Delta 
was unable to avoid bankruptcy. 
 This case has the aspect that ATL serves as a hub airport for two major airlines. 
AirTran Airways also has a major hub operation at ATL, and thus this case is useful to 
assess how a low-cost competitor at a dual-hub responds to depeaking. AirTran does not 
have a banked schedule. Included in this section is a description of AirTran’s changes 
after Delta depeaked. 
 Because ATL was depeaked on the same day that DFW was dehubbed, this case 
is carefully inspected when analyzing changes in the network. Any Delta markets which 








4.4.1 Data Periods Used and Input Parameters 
Delta Air Lines depeaked ATL on Monday January 31, 2005. The date used to represent 
the peak schedule is Tuesday January 25, 2005. The date used to represent the depeaked 
schedule is Tuesday February 8, 2005.  
 Delta depeaked ATL in the middle of the first quarter of 2005, so the 
representative peaked quarter is the fourth quarter of 2004. The representative depeaked 
quarter is the second quarter of 2005. The peaked month used for operational measures is 
January 2005; the depeaked month is February 2005. 
 For creating year-over-year measures, January 27, 2004 and February 10, 2004 
were used as the supply comparison dates the year prior. January 24, 2006 and February 
7, 2006 were used as the supply comparison dates for the year after depeaking. The 
fourth quarter of 2003 and the second quarter of 2004 are used as the year prior demand 
comparison quarters, and the fourth quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 2006 are 
used for the year after. January 2004 and February 2004 are used for the year prior 
operational comparison months, and January 2006 and February 2006 are used for the 
year after. 
 The distribution of actual connection times made at ATL for passengers flying on 
Delta itineraries is shown in Figure 4.27. This distribution is from itineraries flown in 
June 2010. At that time, ATL was operating under a peaked schedule with twelve daily 
banks. The 5th and 75th percentiles, indicating the MCT and MxCT are denoted in the 





Figure 4.27  Connection time distribution for DL at ATL. MCT and MxCT are denoted. 
 
 
4.4.2 Supply Results 
The following section describes the supply-side results for Delta’s depeaking of ATL, 
which includes data derived from the On-Time database. Table 4.22 summarizes the 










Table 4.22  Summary of Supply Changes for Delta at ATL 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. in a 15-minute interval 33 20 
Max. number of flight operations in a 15-minute interval 54 38 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 1742 1856 
Total available seat miles flown into or out of hub 160,342,865 172,866,078 
Number of destinations served from hub 144 146 
Coefficient of variation in number of arr./dep. flights 86.6/94.5 68.9/70.6 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 34.3% 33.8% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 71.5% 60.8% 
Number of potential connections 45,866 45,425 
Average connections per arriving flight 52.7 49.2 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 12 13 
 
 
4.4.2.1 General Supply 
Delta Air Lines’ reproduced peaked schedule at ATL is shown in Figure 4.28 and the 















The maximum number of operations in a 15-minute period drops greatly from the peaked 
to the depeaked schedule. In the peaked schedule, the maximum number of either arrivals 
or departures is 33, while in the depeaked schedule it is 20. The combined number of 
arrivals and departures in a 15-minute period in the peaked schedule is 54, while it drops 
to 38 in the depeaked schedule. 
 The distribution of Delta’s operations at ATL is more spread out throughout the 
day, as seen in the density function plot shown in Figure 4.30. In this plot, the 15-minute 
periods are ranked in order of frequency. Delta operated both schedules over the same 
length of time in a day, encompassing the same number of 15-minute periods to operate 
both schedules, but the depeaked schedule has a much more even distribution of both 
arrivals and departures. It is clear that busiest periods are much lower in the depeaked 
schedule, especially for the top twenty busiest periods, but the peaked schedule drops off 





Figure 4.30  Density function plot of Delta operations at ATL. 
 
 
Although the activity is more spread out in the depeaked schedule, the total number of 
flights increased from the peaked schedule. In the peaked daily schedule in late January 
of 2005 Delta operated 1,742 flights out of Atlanta, and this increased to 1,856 flights by 
early February. Delta also added two destinations to their network under the depeaked 
schedule: Kalamazoo/Battle Creek International Airport (AZO) and Long Island 
MacArthur Airport (ISP). Due to the increased number of flights, daily ASMs increased 






4.4.2.2 Affiliate Airlines 
The percentage of flights operated by affiliate airlines stays near constant from the 
peaked to the depeaked schedule. This percentage is 34.3% for the affiliate airlines in the 
peaked schedule and 33.8% in the depeaked schedule. This value is for affiliates that 
reported on-time statistics to the On-Time database, which in early 2005 primarily 
included Atlantic Southeast Airlines. As seen in Figure 4.31, the affiliate airlines 
primarily operate in the banks of the schedule, although the affiliate certainly has a large 
number of flights outside the banks. In the depeaked schedule shown in Figure 4.32, the 
affiliate airlines operate at a consistent level throughout the day. 
 
 





Figure 4.32  Affiliate airlines in the depeaked schedule of Delta at ATL.   
 
 
4.4.2.3 Peak/Depeak Measures 
The coefficient of variation decreases from the peaked to the depeaked schedule, as the 
level of activity becomes more consistent across 15-minute periods. The arrivals in the 
peaked schedule have a coefficient of variation of 86.6, which drops to 68.9 in the 
depeaked schedule. The change for the departures goes from 94.5 to 70.6. 
 The peak and depeak percentage measures show a drop in the peaked nature of 
the schedule. In the peaked schedule, 72% of flights occur within the banks, highlighted 
in Figure 4.33. In the depeaked schedule, 61% of flights occur in the corresponding 
busiest periods of the depeaked schedule, as shown in Figure 4.34. This drop, combined 
with the changes in the coefficient of variation, both indicate a quantitative reduction in 




Figure 4.33  Identified banks in the peaked Delta schedule at ATL.   
 
 






The number of connections decreases very slightly from the peaked to the depeaked 
schedule. The peak schedule has 45,866 potential connections from each arriving flight to 
departing flights within the MCT and MxCT for the given arriving flight. This value 
decreases to 45,425 in the depeaked schedule. This change, however, occurs even though 
there is an increase in the number of flights overall. The average number of connections 
per arriving flight operated is 52.7 in the peaked schedule, and drops to 49.2 per arriving 
flight in the depeaked schedule. 
 The market which had the maximum number of potential connections increased 
from 12 to 13 potential connections from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. In the 
peaked schedule, 12 connections existed from Washington (DCA) to Tampa (TPA), 
EWR to TPA, and Baltimore-Washington (BWI) to TPA. In addition there were also 12 
possible connections from Washington (IAD) to Washington (DCA), but this is 
disregarded because the two airports are in the same city. In the depeaked schedule, 13 
possible connections existed daily from Boston (BOS) to LGA, but this connection to be 
made through ATL because of BOS and LGA are close geographically, as compared to 
the distance to ATL. Thus, the busiest connection for cities not in the same region is 12 
connections in the depeaked schedule from DCA to DFW, LGA to Orlando (MCO), BOS 






4.4.2.5 Validation of Supply-Demand Time Decision 
The schedule on the peaked date (or depeaked date) was verified as being similar to the 
schedule used in the peaked quarter (or depeaked quarter) for the analysis. Table 4.23 
shows the changes in supply over time for the quarter before the peaked date up until the 
peaked date. Table 4.24 shows the changes in supply for the quarter after the depeaked 
date from the depeaked date and after.  
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Table 4.23  Supply Measures Over Time for Delta’s Peaked Schedule at ATL 
Measure 10/5/04 10/19/04 11/2/04 11/16/04 11/30/04 12/14/04 12/28/04 1/11/05 1/25/05 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 34 34 33 33 34 33 33 33 33 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 46 45 47 44 47 55 53 54 54 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 1786 1683 1747 1755 1727 1764 1719 1741 1742 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 154495 151224 157099 157558 158083 160880 160763 158341 160343 
Number of destinations served from hub 140 141 141 142 142 143 145 144 144 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 92.4/95.6 95.1/97.2 91.9/97.1 91.8/97.4 92.8/97.7 89.2/94.9 88.8/94.2 87.5/94.4 86.6/94.5 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 35.9% 35.0% 34.6% 35.2% 33.5% 34.4% 33.7% 35.3% 34.3% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 75.0% 74.2% 73.8% 74.0% 75.3% 69.0% 73.1% 70.5% 71.5% 
Number of potential connections 48813 43790 47027 47423 46089 47374 45068 45977 45866 
Average connections per arriving flight 54.8 52.0 53.9 54.0 53.2 53.7 52.2 53.2 52.7 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 14 13 13 13 12 12 12 13 12 
 
 
Table 4.24  Supply Measures Over Time for Delta’s Depeaked Schedule at ATL 
Measure 2/8/05 2/22/05 3/8/05 3/22/05 4/19/05 5/3/05 5/17/05 6/7/05 6/21/05 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 20 20 21 19 21 21 22 19 21 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 38 37 40 37 39 38 39 36 40 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 1856 1862 1788 1658 1905 1940 1920 1787 1843 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 172866 174440 161912 165334 174132 176235 174775 168055 170172 
Number of destinations served from hub 146 146 146 145 146 148 148 150 150 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 68.9/70.6 69.5/70.6 69.9/70.9 70.3/73.9 69.4/70.9 70.0/70.1 70.5/70.5 70.3/70.7 70.5/71.7 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 33.8% 32.4% 34.8% 31.4% 33.7% 35.6% 35.2% 34.0% 34.5% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 60.8% 61.3% 61.1% 62.9% 61.3% 60.5% 60.9% 61.7% 61.9% 
Number of potential connections 45425 45554 42321 37084 48203 50015 49138 42709 45321 
Average connections per arriving flight 49.2 49.4 46.9 45.0 50.8 51.7 51.4 48.4 49.4 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 13 13 12 12 13 13 13 12 12 






4.4.3 Demand Results 
The changes in demand and related parameters before and after the depeaking of ATL are 
shown in Table 4.25. The data comes from the peaked and depeaked quarters. The values 
are the average daily values from across the quarter. Just over 85.5 thousand average 
daily passengers traveled on Delta through ATL in the peaked schedule during the 
peaked quarter, and this increased to over 90.5 thousand during the depeaked quarter. 
Overall the revenue increased from the fourth quarter of 2004 to second quarter of 2005, 
from $14.6 million to $16.5 million. More importantly, the RASM increased as well: 
from 9.12 cents per mile to 9.54 cents per mile. 
 
Table 4.25  Summary of Demand and Revenue Changes for Delta at ATL 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Total passengers 85,578 90,515 
Revenue ($) 14,627,088 16,497,380 
Revenue per available seat mile (RASM) (cents per mile) 9.12 9.54 
Percent connecting passengers 54.3% 53.8% 
 
 
On a per market basis, the number of markets in which gross revenue increased between 
the two quarters was 121, while 25 markets saw a decrease. RASM increased in 92 
markets, and decreased in 54.  
 Across the spokes of ATL there was an average decrease in connecting traffic 
from the spoke airports. 54.3% of passengers at ATL on Delta were connecting 
passengers under the peaked schedule, which decreased to 53.8% under the depeaked 
schedule. At the spoke level, 61 spoke routes had an increase in the percentage of 
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passengers on flights between ATL and the spoke that made connections. However, 85 
spoke routes saw an increase in the percentage of passengers whose trips were only non-
stop flights between the spoke and ATL. It is clear that connecting traffic reduced slightly 
after depeaking. 
 The 0.42 cents per mile increase in RASM from the peaked to the depeaked 
period looks successful, but must be considered in terms of the rest of the airline’s 
revenue and the industry during this period. Over this same time period, the entire Delta 
network saw a 1.39 cents per mile increase in RASM, including Delta’s other hubs such 
as Cincinnati and Salt Lake City. The industry as a whole saw a 1.92 cents per mile 
increase between these same two quarters. Delta’s revenue growth at ATL lagged behind 
the rest of Delta by nearly a cent per mile, while it was behind the industry as a whole by 
1.5 cents. It is thus possible that the depeaking of ATL could have influenced slower 
revenue growth. 
 
4.4.4 On-Time Results 
The operational effects of depeaking are shown in Table 4.26 using on-time statistics 
from before and after depeaking. Using these aggregated measures, it is seen that 
between the peaked and depeaked months there was a slight improvement in operations 
in terms of departures, while arrival delay slightly increased. Taxi-out times decreased, 





Table 4.26  Summary of Operational Changes for Delta at ATL 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Average departure delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 12.9 11.9 
Average departure delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 49.4 50.5 
Percentage of delayed departing aircraft  23.1% 21.4% 
Total delay for delayed departing aircraft (minutes) 286,540 275,908 
Average taxi-out time (minutes) 19.2 18.5 
Average arrival delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 14.9 16.2 
Average arrival delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 53.9 55.8 
Percentage of delayed arriving aircraft  24.9% 26.7% 
Total delay for delayed arriving aircraft (minutes) 334,424 380,031 
Average taxi-in time (minutes) 11.8 11.9 
*Early arriving and early departing aircraft were assigned zero delay 
 
Evaluating the Delta depeaking and its effect on its operations requires comparing to the 
rest of the airline’s on-time statistics and the industry’s as well. What is seen is that the 
operations at Delta were outperformed by the rest of Delta and the industry. 
 While the departure delay increased for Delta at ATL, in the rest of its network it 
decreased. The industry also saw a decrease during this time period. Although the 
percentage of departing aircraft that were delayed decreased for Delta at ATL, a 
reduction of 7%, this was less than the improvement across Delta, 13%, and in the 
industry, 19%. 
 Arrival delay was worse than departure delay for Delta. While at ATL both arrival 
and departure times and the percentage of aircraft delayed increased over the period, 
Delta as a whole and the industry both saw decreases in both of these measures. 
 Delta did not see an improvement in operations after it depeaked. Depeaking at 
Atlanta did not appear to provide operations benefits. 
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4.4.5 Dual-Hub: AirTran’s Response 
AirTran operates a hub alongside Delta at ATL. Unlike the ORD and DFW cases though, 
this dual-hub example is with a low-cost competitor that does not operate a peaked 
schedule. AirTran’s continuous operations were in place before and after Delta changed 
from a peaked schedule. 
 The initial schedule AirTran was operating at ATL was a continuous schedule 
during most of the day, with higher levels of operations (which could be described as 
peaks) in the morning and evening high-demand travel periods. This operational set-up is 
seen in Figure 4.35. The figure has the same scale as Delta’s schedule reproduction 
figures, to be able to visually compare the differences in the schedules. AirTran’s 
schedule has two small peaks each in the morning and evening time periods. The AirTran 
measurements for the peaked date, as well as the preceding months before depeaking and 
the months after Delta depeaked are shown in Table 4.27. AirTran had a fairly consistent 
schedule in terms of the coefficient of variation, although the connections per arriving 
flight increases three months after Delta depeaked. Also included in the table is a 
measurement of the percentage of flights in AirTran’s schedule which were flown during 





Figure 4.35  AirTran schedule at ATL 
  



















Coefficient of variation in # of arr. 156.1 162.9 157.4 156.2 161.9 147.0 
Coefficient of variation in # of dep.  163.1 168.4 163.9 159.3 160.7 154.9 
Percentage of flights in peak period n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Percentage of flights in AA banks  57.9% 56.1% 56.1% 56.6% 57.5% 58.4% 
Number of potential connections 1815 1844 1751 1635 1882 2314 
Average connections per arriving flight 20.9 21.2 20.1 18.8 21.6 26.6 
Max. potential connections in a market 8 7 6 6 6 6 
 





Figure 4.36  AirTran schedule at ATL, 3 months after. 
 
  
AirTran’s operations in relation to Delta’s banks are shown in Figures 4.37 and 4.38. 
There is a consistent level of operations for AirTran in the time periods in which Delta 





Figure 4.37  Delta’s banks overlaid on AirTran’s peaked date schedule. 
 
 





The evidence supports that Delta’s primary competitor at ATL, AirTran, altered the 
schedule to provide more connections per flight in response to Delta’s depeaking. 
 
4.4.6 Predicting Changes in Supply 
Being able to predict the change in flight frequency at ATL after depeaking through a 
regression model helps to determine what Delta’s decision-making process was when 
making the new schedule. The analysis at the spoke level makes use of data that is 
summarized for all spoke airports destination that were served by Delta during the 
depeaking period.  
 The dependent variable, defined as the change in the number of flights on the 
route between ATL and a spoke, was found to be well predicted by the variables listed in 
Table 4.28. The variables include the number of connecting passengers, the connecting 
fare for connecting passengers for the portion of the route that was from the spoke to 
ATL, the distance to the spoke airport from ATL, and the number of flights already 
operated from ATL to the spoke. All of these variables are significant at the 99% 
confidence level or greater. The adjusted R2 for the model is 0.195. 
 
Table 4.28  Regression Model Results for Change in Flights at ATL 
Variable Coefficient t-stat p > |t| 
Intercept 1.0666 1.37 0.173 
Connecting Passengers 0.0031 5.49 < 0.001 
Connecting Fare 0.0287 2.79 0.006 
Distance to Spoke Airport -0.0027 -3.36 < 0.001 





This model passed all three tests for the normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity 
assumptions. The normal probability plot in Figure 4.39 shows a straight line of residuals 
falling close to the diagonal line in the plot, indicating that the distribution is normal. The 
regression was still checked against a count model and the direction of the variables were 




Figure 4.39  Normal probability plot for ATL case. 
 
 
Delta Airlines’ strategy for depeaking ATL, as determined by the results of the regression 
model showed a focus on connections, especially for spokes that did not already have 
high frequency. Spokes farther from ATL also received drops in frequency. The greatest 
increase in frequency was to Boston (BOS), which had a high level of connecting traffic 
at a high fare. BOS already had a high frequency, and it was pushed higher by Delta in 
depeaking. As a comparison of a high frequency spoke, flights to Washington-Dulles was 
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reduced substantially, due likely to its low connecting traffic and connecting passenger 
fare. Even though Boston was farther away, the connection piece was a big factor.  
 Other spokes which saw increases in flight frequency, and already had high 
frequency, with high levels of connecting traffic included Fort Lauderdale (FLL), 
Orlando (MCO), Norfolk (ORF), Fort Myers (RSW), Hartford (BDL), and Birmingham 
(BHM). As a comparison, spokes with high frequency but lower connecting traffic that 
lost flights were to Houston (HOU), Chattanooga (CHA), Mobile (MOB), and Jackson, 
MS (JAN). In addition, many of these latter cities had low connecting fares as compared 
to the former cities. 
 Low frequency spoke airports are seen to have mostly have increases. Airports in 
Peoria, IL (PIA), Outagamie, WI (ATW), Scranton, PA (AVP), Key West (EYW), and 
the Golden Triangle Airport in Mississippi (GTR). Many of these passengers connected 
onwards to other spoke cities. 
 The distance component of the regression is best seen in the airports which lost 
frequency with Delta, including Orange County (SNA), San Francisco, Oakland (OAK), 
and Los Angeles (LAX). A large portion of this traffic was for non-stop flights to 
Atlanta. 
 In summary, Delta’s strategy at ATL can be described as focusing on maintain 
valuable hub connections and decreasing traffic to high-frequency destinations. There 
was a strong focus on pulling up low frequency markets that would provide high 
connecting traffic at the ATL hub. High frequency routes with high connecting traffic 
gained flights, while those that were dominated by direct passengers, particularly from 
farther distances, lost flights. A competitive factor was not seen for Delta, perhaps 
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because it has a stronghold on its Atlanta operations, with only some competition from 
low-cost carrier AirTran. 
 
4.4.7 Assessing Depeaking and Effects 
The supply and demand results over the depeaking period show changes that likely could 
have been due to depeaking. In order to have a better understanding as to whether the 
changes that occurred were likely due to depeaking as opposed to being a typical change 
for that time of the year, year-over-year measures were calculated. The percentage 
change between the peaked and depeaked dates is calculated, and also for the year before 
and year after on similar dates. 
 For the ATL case, it is evident that much of the supply changes were due to 
depeaking. Table 4.29 shows schedule measures and reports a percentage change 
associated with each year. In the case of Delta, depeaking occurred in 2005. January 25, 
2005 was used as the representative Tuesday peaked schedule and February 8, 2005 was 
used as the representative Tuesday depeaked schedule. The percentage associated with 
the year 2005 shows the change in schedule measures between these two dates. The 
process is repeated for two dates each in the years 2004 and 2006, using representative 
Tuesday dates closest to the year-over-year depeaking date. Note that the year before and 
year after changes are respectively for the same types of schedules: the 2004 change is 
between two peaked schedules and the 2006 change is between two depeaked schedules. 




Table 4.29  Supply Year-Over-Year Changes for Delta at ATL 
Measure 
 2004  2005  2006 
 1/27 2/10 ∆ %  1/25 2/8 ∆ %  1/24 2/7 ∆ % 
Max. number of flight arrs. or 
deps. in a 15-minute interval 
 
29 30 1 3%  33 20 -13 -39%  25 29 4 16% 
Max. number of flight operations 
in a 15-minute interval 
 
48 47 -1 -2%  54 38 -16 -30%  46 43 -3 -7% 
Number of flights flown into 
or out of hub 
 
1649 1713 64 4%  1742 1856 114 7%  1453 1495 42 3% 
Total available seat miles flown 
into or out of hub (000s) 
 
146912 149830 2918 2%  160343172,866 12523 8%  126782 129475 2694 2% 
Number of destinations served 
from hub 
 
142 142 0 0%  144 146 2 1%  153 154 1 1% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of arrivals 
 
92.6 93.5 0.9 1%  86.6 68.9 -17.7 -20%  84.2 84.4 0.2 0% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of departures 
 
99.5 97.4 -2.1 -2%  94.5 70.6 -23.9 -25%  89.6 89.7 0.1 0% 
Percentage of flights served 
by affiliate airline(s) 
 
35.1% 36.1% 1.0% 3%  34.3% 33.8% -0.5% -1%  41.0% 41.5% 0.5% 1% 
Percentage of flights served in 
peak period 
 
75.0% 74.6% -0.4% -1%  71.5% 60.8% -10.7% -15%  71.7% 71.5% -0.2% 0% 
Number of potential  
connections 
 
41638 45437 3799 9%  45866 45425 -441 -1%  30063 31623 1560 5% 
Average connections per 
arriving flight 
 
50.8 53.1 2.3 5%  52.7 49.2 -3.5 -7%  41.2 42.3 1.1 3% 
Maximum potential connections 
serving a market 
 
13 13 0 0%  12 13 1 8%  10 10 0 0% 
*Bold percentages are for measures identified to be likely due to depeaking 






Bolded percentages are considered to be important changes that are likely due to Delta’s 
depeaking decision. From the year-over-year data, it is evident that depeaking involved a 
reduction in the number of flights flown in a given period and the creation of a more even 
distribution of flights (as evidenced by the reduction in the coefficients of variation and 
reduction in peak percentage). At the same time, Delta was able to increase flights and 
ASMs. These changes resulted though in a reduction in potential connections. 
 The year-over-year measurements are also useful in comparing the demand and 
revenue changes. The time frame is longer in these cases, because the demand data is 
gathered for an entire quarter, but the results are still useful. The year-over-year changes 
for revenue and total passengers are not included because these values heavily depend on 
what is going on in the market, more so than the schedule. Thus RASM is used in 
comparison still with the RASM of the airline network and for the industry.  
 One measurement which is useful in terms of demand in measuring it year-over-
year is the percentage of connecting passengers. Surprisingly, despite the decrease in 
potential connections in the schedule, the percent of connecting passengers in 2005 did 
not deviate much from the changes seen across the same time periods in 2004 and 2006. 
It was in fact between the two comparison years in terms of percent change. In order of 
year the percent change was 1%, -1%, and -3%. 
 The change in RASM for Delta’s ATL schedule lagged behind the rest of Delta 
and the industry in all three years. The underperformance in the depeaking year, however, 
lagged behind Delta and the industry by a greater margin, as seen in Table 4.30. Thus it is 
possible that depeaking hindered revenue growth, and caused RASM to increase more 
slowly than it would have if Delta had maintained their schedule. 
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Table 4.30  RASM Year-Over-Year Changes for Delta at ATL 
Measure 
2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 
Q4 Q2 ∆ % Q4 Q2 ∆ % Q4 Q2 ∆ % 
RASM for 
Depeaked Airport 
9.94 10.57 0.63 6% 9.12 9.54 0.42 5% 11.82 13.08 1.26 11% 
RASM for 
Airline Network 
10.53 11.93 1.40 13% 10.19 11.58 1.39 14% 12.30 15.18 2.88 23% 
RASM for 
Industry 
9.26 10.45 1.19 13% 9.49 11.41 1.92 20% 10.31 13.40 3.09 30% 
 
 
Delta did not see any notable improvements year-over-year in terms of operations after 
depeaking ATL, as seen in Table 4.31. Although operations appeared to lag behind the 
rest of Delta’s network and the industry in the depeaking year, there were no notable 
changes across all four measures when comparing Delta’s operations against the 
comparative measures in the year before and the year after. Thus in the years before and 
after, Delta’s Atlanta operations also generally lagged behind the rest of Delta’s network 












Table 4.31  Operations Year-Over-Year Changes for Delta at ATL 
Measure 
2004 2005 2006 
Jan Feb ∆ % Jan Feb ∆ % Jan Feb ∆ % 
Dep. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
45.1 50.4 5.3 12% 49.4 50.5 1.1 2% 54.9 44.3 -10.6 -19% 
Dep. Delay Airline 
Network 
50.2 52.1 1.9 4% 52.1 50.9 -1.2 -2% 57.6 47.8 -9.8 -17% 
Dep. Delay  
Industry 
52.6 49.3 -3.3 -6% 53.7 50.4 -3.3 -6% 53.1 51 -2.1 -4% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Depeaked Airport 
17.5 28.4 10.9 62% 23.1 21.4 -1.7 -7% 22 22 0 0% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Airline Network 
16.3 20.5 4.2 26% 20.8 18.1 -2.7 -13% 18.5 18 -0.5 -3% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Industry 
17.8 16.5 -1.3 -7% 21.4 17.4 -4 -19% 17.6 19.8 2.2 13% 
Arr. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
49.5 56.3 6.8 14% 53.9 55.8 1.9 4% 65.2 52 -13.2 -20% 
Arr. Delay Airline 
Network 
47.1 50 2.9 6% 50.6 48.9 -1.7 -3% 55.6 45.8 -9.8 -18% 
Arr. Delay  
Industry 
50.6 46.9 -3.7 -7% 52.9 48.7 -4.2 -8% 51.9 49.7 -2.2 -4% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Depeaked Airport 
21.8 35.8 14 64% 24.9 26.7 1.8 7% 24.4 25.5 1.1 5% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Airline Network 
21 25.1 4.1 20% 24.3 22.3 -2 -8% 21.2 22 0.8 4% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Industry 
22.8 21.1 -1.7 -7% 25.2 20.9 -4.3 -17% 19.7 22.9 3.2 16% 
 
 
Delta’s schedule change was beneficial from a cost perspective, and by comparing the 
change to the years before and after, it is clear that the shift in supply was related to 
depeaking. Despite the loss in potential connections, however, connecting traffic varied 
in roughly the same manner that it did in other years. Revenue saw a decline from the 
schedule changes, as the RASM over the depeaking period grew slower than the industry 
and the rest of Delta, and relatively slower than the years before and after. In terms of 





Delta’s depeaking of ATL was not as successful as other case studies. Revenue was 
negatively affected over the depeaking period, while operations did not improve. When 
depeaking operations, Delta sought to maintain valuable connections, particularly for low 
frequency markets that provided high levels of connecting traffic. Destinations farther 
from Atlanta with more direct traffic lost frequency. The airline made considerable 
changes in its supply, and created a more continuous schedule, with large reductions in 
the number of flights in the busiest 15-minute periods. Simultaneous to the flattening of 
the schedule, the airline increased flights and ASMs, but despite the depeaking strategy, 
this did not aid in preserving connections. Delta lost a substantial number of potential 
connections through depeaking, particularly in the measurement of the number of 
connections were available for each arriving flight.  
 The supply changes at ATL influenced a drop in RASM when compared to other 
years and the industry. This could be tied to the loss of connections when the banks were 
removed. The loss of connections in the schedule, despite Delta’s focus on connecting 
traffic in depeaking, resulted in no noteworthy change in the percentage of connecting 
passengers. Delta’s loss in revenue did not even come with an improvement in operations 
like other cases, as Delta saw delay in its schedule stay similar to surrounding years. To 
counter Delta’s depeaking, AirTran increased its potential connections in its schedule, 






4.5 US Airways at Philadelphia (PHL) 
In February 2005, US Airways removed seven arrival and departure peaks from their 
schedule in Philadelphia (PHL). US Airway’s depeaking of PHL occurred several months 
after its second bankruptcy, during a period where many airlines were declaring 
bankruptcy. The airline, however, did not keep to the depeaking experiment. In 
September of 2005, just seven months after depeaking, US Airways reinstitute a peaked 
schedule at PHL. 
 US Airways had one of the most chaotic half decades of any major U.S. airline. 
Immediately after 9/11, the airline scrapped its no-frills airline-within-an-airline Metrojet, 
and closed its hub operations at Baltimore-Washington International. Post-9/11, US 
Airways underwent the bankruptcy process twice. They were the first airline to declare 
bankruptcy after the economic downturn caused by the terrorist attacks, in August of 
2002. US Airways made many cost reduction efforts and received a government loan to 
stabilize its budget, but the airline declared bankruptcy again in September of 2004. Later 
in 2004, US Airways dehubbed its Pittsburgh operations; a couple of months later the 
airline depeaked PHL. Later in the year after depeaking, US Airways merged with 
America West Airlines, a reverse takeover by the Phoenix-based airline (America West 
purchased US Airways but retained the latter’s name). 
 Because PHL was repeaked months after it was depeaked, this case has a section 
briefly discussing why the airline may have repeaked. The analysis on repeaking was 
outside the scope of this study, so limited attention is given to this topic. 
 The PHL case study does not have any affiliate airlines in the reproduced 
schedule as all four of the affiliate airlines flying for US Airways did not report to the 
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On-Time database during this time period. Unlike other potential case studies that were 
excluded from analysis because of this situation, this case had clear evidence of 
depeaking with just the mainline carrier’s flights. For this reason, this case was retained 
for the full analysis. 
 
4.5.1 Data Periods Used and Input Parameters 
US Airways depeaked PHL on Sunday February 6, 2005. The date used to represent the 
peak schedule is Tuesday February 1, 2005. The date used to represent the depeaked 
schedule is Tuesday February 15, 2005.  
 US Airways depeaked PHL in the middle of the first quarter of 2005, so the 
representative peaked quarter is the fourth quarter of 2004. The representative depeaked 
quarter is the second quarter of 2005. The peaked month used for operational measures is 
January 2005; the depeaked month is March 2005. 
 For creating year-over-year measures, February 3, 2004 and February 24, 2004 
were used as the supply comparison dates the year prior. January 31, 2006 and February 
14, 2006 were used as the supply comparison dates for the year after depeaking. The 
fourth quarter of 2003 and the second quarter of 2004 are used as the year prior demand 
comparison quarters, and the fourth quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 2006 are 
used for the year after. January 2004 and March 2004 are used for the year prior 






Figure 4.40  Connection time distribution for US at PHL. MCT and MxCT are denoted. 
 
 
The distribution of actual connection times made at PHL for passengers flying on US 
Airways itineraries is shown in Figure 4.40. This distribution is from itineraries flown in 
June 2010. At that time, PHL was operating under a peaked schedule with eight daily 
banks. The 5th and 75th percentiles, indicating the MCT and MxCT are denoted in the 
figure. For this case, the MCT is 34 minutes and the MxCT is 82 minutes. 
 
4.5.2 Supply Results 
The following section describes the supply-side results for US Airways’ depeaking of 
PHL, which includes data derived from the On-Time database. Table 4.32 summarizes 







Table 4.32  Summary of Supply Changes for US Airways at PHL 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. in a 15-minute interval 14 12 
Max. number of flight operations in a 15-minute interval 14 13 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 448 439 
Total available seat miles flown into or out of hub 46,531,047 49,646,130 
Number of destinations served from hub 51 47 
Coefficient of variation in number of arr./dep. flights 131.6/142.8 102.3/105.8 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) n/a n/a 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 79.5% 64.9% 
Number of potential connections 3,373 2,408 
Average connections per arriving flight 15.0 10.9 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 9 11 
 
 
4.5.2.1 General Supply 
US Airways’ reproduced peaked schedule at PHL is shown in Figure 4.41 and the 













The maximum number of operations in a 15-minute period drops from the peaked to the 
depeaked schedule. In the peaked schedule, the maximum number of either arrivals or 
departures is 14, while in the depeaked schedule it is 12. The combined number of 
arrivals and departures in a 15-minute period in the peaked schedule is 14, and drops to 
13 in the depeaked schedule. 
 The distribution of US Airways’ operations at PHL is slightly more spread out 
throughout the day, as seen in the density function plot shown in Figure 4.43. In this plot, 
the 15-minute periods are ranked in order of frequency. What is seen, particularly with 
the arrivals, is that the distributions in the depeaked periods are not much flatter than in 
the peaked schedule. However, beyond the top two or three periods, the depeaked 
schedule does show more evenness as compared to the peaked schedule’s operations. In 
addition, US Airways operated across more 15-minute periods in the depeaked schedule, 





Figure 4.43  Density function plot of US Airways operations at PHL. 
 
 
In the depeaked schedule, US Airways essentially maintained the same number of flights 
from the peaked schedule. In the peaked daily schedule in the beginning of February of 
2002 US Airways operated 448 flights out of PHL, and this dropped only slightly to 439 
flights by two weeks later. Although the number of flights stayed relatively the same, US 
Airways cut five destinations and added one on the mainline routes. Service was cut to 
Allentown/Bethlehem, PA; Detroit; Harrisburg, PA; Minneapolis; and Greensboro, NC. 
At the same time, service was added to Charleston, SC. Despite the number of flights 






4.5.2.2 Affiliate Airlines 
The percentage of flights operated by affiliate airlines is not applicable in this case since 
none of the affiliate airlines flying for US Airways during this time period had enough 
revenue to be required to report to the On-Time database. The affiliate airlines included: 
PSA Airlines, Piedmont Airlines, Chautauqua Airlines, and Mesa Airlines. 
 
4.5.2.3 Peak/Depeak Measures 
The coefficient of variation decreases from the peaked to the depeaked schedule, as the 
level of activity becomes more consistent across 15-minute periods. The arrivals in the 
peaked schedule have a coefficient of variation of 131.6, which drops to 102.3 in the 
depeaked schedule. The coefficient of variation for the departures drops from 142.8 to 
105.8. 
 The peak and depeak percentage measures show a drop in the peaked nature of 
the schedule. In the peaked schedule, 79% of flights occur within the banks, highlighted 
in Figure 4.44. In the depeaked schedule, 65% of flights occur in the corresponding 
busiest periods of the depeaked schedule, as shown in Figure 4.45. This drop, combined 
with the changes in the coefficient of variation, both indicate a quantitative reduction in 





Figure 4.44  Identified banks in the peaked US Airways schedule at PHL.   
 
 






The number of connections decreased greatly from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. 
The peak schedule has 3,373 potential connections from each arriving flight to departing 
flights within the MCT and MxCT for the given arriving flight. This value decreases to 
2,408 in the depeaked schedule. The average number of connections per arriving flight 
also decreases substantially. The number of connections per arriving flights operated is 
15.0 in the peaked schedule, but drops to 10.9 per arriving flight in the depeaked 
schedule. 
 The market which had the maximum number of potential connections increased 
slightly from 9 to 11 from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. In the peaked schedule, 9 
connections existed from Raleigh (RDU) to Boston (BOS) and from Orlando (MCO) to 
BOS, while the latter market had 11 connections in the depeaked schedule. 
 
4.5.2.5 Validation of Supply-Demand Time Decision 
The schedule on the peaked date (or depeaked date) supply data was verified as being 
similar to the schedule used in the peaked quarter (or depeaked quarter) for the analysis. 
Table 4.33 shows the changes in supply over time for the quarter before the peaked date 
up until the peaked date. Table 4.34 shows the changes in supply for the quarter after the 
depeaked date from the depeaked date and after.  
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Table 4.33  Supply Measures Over Time for US Airways’ Peaked Schedule at PHL 
Measure 10/5/04 10/19/04 11/2/04 11/16/04 11/30/04 12/14/04 1/11/05 1/25/05 2/1/05 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 15 15 15 12 12 13 13 14 14 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 16 15 16 14 14 14 13 14 14 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 447 404 444 466 465 451 430 429 448 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 47128 45208 46788 50533 50240 46722 46461 44235 46531 
Number of destinations served from hub 50 50 50 50 51 51 51 51 51 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 134.2/154.9136.4/158.3 134.4/154.6127.8/135.1 128.6/136.4129.7/137.5 132.9/140.8134.9/145.0 131.6/142.8 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 72.3% 72.8% 73.9% 79.6% 80.7% 77.4% 82.1% 81.6% 79.5% 
Number of potential connections 3246 2651 3205 3512 3504 3349 3091 3155 3373 
Average connections per arriving flight 14.6 13.1 14.6 15.2 15.3 15.0 14.6 14.7 15.0 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 12 9 12 11 10 9 10 9 9 
 
 
Table 4.34  Supply Measures Over Time for US Airways’ Depeaked Schedule at PHL 
Measure 2/15/05 3/1/05 3/22/05 4/12/05 4/26/05 5/10/05 5/24/05 6/7/05 6/21/05 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 12 12 13 10 11 10 10 12 12 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 13 12 13 11 12 14 14 13 13 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 439 386 443 443 446 409 415 384 410 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 49646 45104 50701 49578 49529 45174 46431 45177 45805 
Number of destinations served from hub 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 48 48 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 102.3/105.8 109.9/109.6 99.1/100.8 93.1/99.7 95.3/98.1 106.9/116.0 106.7/114.5109.5/117.1 105.6/115.9 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 64.9% 66.3% 62.8% 61.4% 61.7% 67.7% 67.7% 67.7% 67.3% 
Number of potential connections 2408 1920 2419 2447 2453 2137 2199 1886 2158 
Average connections per arriving flight 10.9 10.1 11.0 11.1 11.0 10.5 10.6 9.9 10.5 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 11 8 11 12 11 9 10 9 11 







4.5.3 Demand Results 
The changes in demand and related parameters before and after the depeaking of PHL are 
shown in Table 4.35. The data comes from the peaked and depeaked quarters. The values 
are the average daily values from across the quarter. Just over 22 thousand average daily 
passengers traveled on US Airways through PHL in the peaked schedule during the 
peaked quarter, and this increased slightly to around 22.5 thousand during the depeaked 
quarter. Overall revenue increased from the fourth quarter of 2004 to the second quarter 
of 2005, from $3.4 million to $3.5 million. Along with the revenue, ASMs also increased, 
to the extent that RASM decreased from 7.24 cents per mile to 7.08 cents per mile. 
 
Table 4.35  Summary of Demand and Revenue Changes for US Airways at PHL 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Total passengers 22,252 22,631 
Revenue ($) 3,366,650 3,513,174 
Revenue per available seat mile (RASM) (cents per mile) 7.24 7.08 
Percent connecting passengers 31.8% 31.2% 
 
 
On a per market basis, the number of markets in which gross revenue increased between 
the two quarters was 36, while 15 markets saw a decrease. RASM increased in 31 
markets, and decreased in 20.  
 Across the spokes of PHL there was an average decrease in connecting traffic 
from the spoke airports. 31.8% of passengers at PHL on US Airways were connecting 
passengers under the peaked schedule, and 31.2% were connecting passengers under the 
depeaked schedule. At the spoke level, 29 spoke routes had an increase in the percentage 
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of passengers on flights between PHL and the spoke that made connections. 22 spoke 
routes saw an increase in the percentage of passengers whose trips were only non-stop 
flights between the spoke and PHL. Connecting traffic appears to taken a small hit 
overall, but in most markets the connecting passenger traffic increased. 
 The change in revenue is compared to the rest of US Airways’ network and the 
industry as a whole to determine if the decrease in RASM at PHL was perhaps due to 
depeaking, or rather on trend with the changes at the time elsewhere. The 0.16 cents per 
mile decrease from the peaked to the depeaked period is thus considered in terms of these 
other measures. Over this same time period, the entire US Airways network saw a 1.14 
cents per mile increase in RASM, including US Airways’ other hubs in Phoenix and 
Charlotte. The industry as a whole saw a 1.32 cents per mile increase between these two 
quarters. US Airways’ revenue growth at PHL lagged way behind the rest of US Airways 
and the industry as a whole; 1.5 cents per mile in the case of the latter. It is thus possible 
that the depeaking of PHL could have influenced slower revenue growth. 
 
4.5.4 On-Time Results 
The operational effects of depeaking are shown in Table 4.36 using on-time statistics 
from before and after depeaking. Using these aggregated measures, it is seen that 
between the peaked and depeaked months there was a slight improvement in delay for 
arrivals, and a slight decline for departures. Although the average delay for delayed 
departures went down slightly, there was an increase in delayed aircraft and the total 
delay. Arrivals had decreases in the percentage of delayed aircraft and the amount of 




Table 4.36  Summary of Operational Changes for US Airways at PHL 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Average departure delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 25.1 25.8 
Average departure delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 53.8 53.4 
Percentage of delayed departing aircraft  42.6% 44.3% 
Total delay for delayed departing aircraft (minutes) 146,057 151,409 
Average taxi-out time (minutes) 23.5 20.3 
Average arrival delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 23.4 19.7 
Average arrival delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 58.5 57.6 
Percentage of delayed arriving aircraft  37.3% 31.8% 
Total delay for delayed arriving aircraft (minutes) 138,586 116,919 
Average taxi-in time (minutes) 8.4 6.9 
*Early arriving and early departing aircraft were assigned zero delay 
 
The US Airways operations at PHL need to be considered in terms of the concurrent 
changes across US Airways’ network and the industry overall. 
 Departure delay for delayed aircraft at PHL slightly improved from the peaked to 
depeaked quarter, but the percentage of delayed aircraft increased by about 2 percentage 
points. These figures, however, when compared to the rest of US Airways and the 
industry, show a decline in operations. US Airways’ operations at PHL lagged behind the 
rest of its network, which had a greater decrease in departure delay over the same time 
period, and the industry, which also decreased a greater amount. The industry also had a 
drop in the percentage of delayed departures, while PHL operations for US Airways 
increased in percentage of the delayed aircraft. The only area where the PHL operations 
performed better for departures was that the US Airways network increased in the 
percentage of delayed departures, by 20%, while only by 4% at PHL. 
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 US Airways’ PHL arrival operations lagged slightly behind as compared to the 
rest of US Airways’ network and the industry as a whole. The average delay time for 
arriving delayed aircraft decreased 1.5% for PHL, while the change was a 4.6% decrease 
for all US Airways arrivals, and a 2.5% decrease for the industry. The percentage of 
delayed aircraft at PHL saw a decrease of 15% which was approximately equal to the 
industry’s improvement of about 14%. The airline as a whole though saw more aircraft 
be delayed, so the PHL operations improved in this sense. 
 The operations at PHL generally worsened in relation to the rest of US Airways 
and the industry as a whole. The fact that this change occurred could have played a part 
in the airline’s decision to repeak its operations at PHL. 
 
4.5.5 Predicting Changes in Supply 
Analysis was performed using a regression model on the PHL case study to assess the 
decision-making process of US Airways as the airline determined how to depeak their 
schedule. The analysis at the spoke level makes use of data that is summarized for all 
spoke airports destination that were served by US Airways during the depeaking period.  
 The dependent variable, defined as the change in the number of flights on the 
route between PHL and a spoke, was found to be well predicted by the variables listed in 
Table 4.37. The variables include the number of direct passengers, the number of flights 
to the spoke in the peaked schedule, whether the spoke city is a Southwest focus city, the 
ratio of US Airways’ average fare to the competitors’ average fare, and the market share 
of US Airways. Four of these variables are significant at the 95% confidence level, and 
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the fare ratio variable is significant at the 90% confidence level. The adjusted R2 for the 
model is 0.370. 
 
Table 4.37  Regression Model Results for Change in Flights at PHL 
Variable Coefficient t-stat p > |t| 
Intercept -3.2617 -0.89 0.380 
Direct Passengers 0.0032 2.33 0.025 
# of Flights in Peaked Schedule -0.1513 -2.16 0.037 
Spoke is a Southwest focus city* -1.5588 -2.25 0.031 
Fare ratio: US Airways to competitors 5.9284 1.82 0.077 
Market Share for US Airways by # of flights -2.8671 -2.40 0.022 
*Indicator variable (1 = yes) 
 
This model passed all three tests for the normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity 
assumptions. The normal probability plot in Figure 4.46 shows a straight line of residuals 
falling close to the diagonal line in the plot, indicating that the distribution is normal. The 
regression was still checked against a count model and the direction of the variables were 






Figure 4.46  Normal probability plot for PHL case. 
 
 
US Airways’ strategy for depeaking PHL, as determined by the results of the regression 
model, showed a focus on maintaining valuable hub O&D traffic, especially where the 
airline held a fare premium. US Airways also deemphasized Southwest focus cities where 
they were the dominant carrier, and emphasized Southwest focus cities where US 
Airways was splitting the route. In addition, US Airways went after cities where it had a 
competitor, and decreased frequency to cities where it was the dominant or only carrier. 
 Cities which US Airways boosted frequency because it held a fare premium and 
there was considerable direct passenger traffic include Atlanta (ATL), Tampa (TPA), 
Fort Lauderdale (FLL), Orlando (MCO), Miami (MIA), and New Orleans (MSY). It 
decreased traffic to cities where US Airways had low demand for direct flights and where 
it was underselling the competitor such as Milwaukee (MKE) and St. Louis (STL). 
 The Southwest focus city effect was seen as US Airways dropped down flights to 
Nashville (BNA) and St. Louis (STL), yet boosted flights to Orland (MCO). These three 
all are Southwest focus cities, but the former two are cities in which US Airways 
dominated the route, while in the latter they competed with Southwest. 
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 Overall, US Airways reduced flights in markets it had a monopoly in, and 
increased in markets in which it fought for market share. Markets in which it reduced and 
in which it was the monopoly carrier included Portland, Maine (PWM), Richmond (RIC), 
Charlotte (CLT), Norfolk (ORF), and Kansas City (MCI). It increased flights to the cities 
mentioned previously (ATL, TPA, FLL, MCO, MIA, and MSY) where it had to compete, 
but this also included DFW, IAH, and SFO, big competitor hubs. 
 In summary, US Airway’s strategy at PHL can be described as trying to capture 
market share in markets it was competing in already. This ramp-up included many large 
hubs of other airlines and cities where US Airways was holding a fare premium. Routes 
which already had a large number of flights were more likely to see reductions. In 
addition, there was a Southwest effect in which US Airways decreased frequency to 
Southwest focus cities, even when Southwest did not fly the route from PHL. Southwest 
focus cities with a Southwest flight saw an increase. In addition, although not represented 
by the model, routes Southwest flew were the ones that saw frequency increases. Thus, it 
could be deduced that the US Airways depeaking strategy was focused on winning routes 
from competition, particularly Southwest. 
 
4.5.6 Assessing Depeaking and Effects 
The supply and demand results that occurred during the depeaking period show changes 
that likely could have been due to depeaking. Year-over-year measures were calculated in 
order to better understand whether the changes that occurred were potentially due to 
depeaking as opposed to being a typical change for that time of the year. The percentage 
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change between the peaked and depeaked dates is calculated, as well as for the year 
before and year after on similar dates. 
 For the PHL case, it is evident that many of the supply changes were due to 
depeaking. Table 4.38 shows schedule measures and reports a percentage change 
associated with each year. In the case of US Airways, depeaking occurred in 2005. 
February 1, 2005, was used as the representative Tuesday peaked schedule and February 
15, 2005, was used as the representative Tuesday depeaked schedule. The percentage 
associated with the year 2005 shows the change in schedule measures between these two 
dates. The process is repeated for two dates each in the years 2004 and 2006, using 
representative Tuesday dates closest to the year-over-year depeaking date. Note that the 
year before and year after changes are respectively for the same types of schedules: the 
2004 and 2006 changes are both between two peaked schedules, because US Airways 
repeaked their schedule in late 2005. Thus only the 2005 change is for changes that 
occurred between different schedule types. 
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Table 4.38  Supply Year-Over-Year Changes for US Airways at PHL 
Measure 
 2004  2005  2006 
 2/3 2/24 ∆ %  2/1 2/15 ∆ %  1/31 2/14 ∆ % 
Max. number of flight arrs. or 
deps. in a 15-minute interval 
 
15 17 2 13%  14 12 -2 -14%  10 11 1 10% 
Max. number of flight operations 
in a 15-minute interval 
 
16 18 2 13%  14 13 -1 -7%  11 11 0 0% 
Number of flights flown into 
or out of hub 
 
340 342 2 1%  448 439 -9 -2%  305 323 18 6% 
Total available seat miles flown 
into or out of hub (000s) 
 
40128 41255 1126 3%  46531 49646 3115 7%  36812 41547 4735 13% 
Number of destinations served 
from hub 
 
45 45 0 0%  51 47 -4 -8%  42 44 2 5% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of arrivals 
 
158.6 150.5 -8.1 -5%  131.6 102.3 -29.3 -22%  146.5 139 -7.5 -5% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of departures 
 
190.6 192.6 2 1%  142.8 105.8 -37 -26%  145.8 158 12.2 8% 
Percentage of flights served 
by affiliate airline(s) 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Percentage of flights served in 
peak period 
 
79.1% 76.3% -2.8% -4%  79.5% 64.9% -14.6% -18%  77.4% 78.0% 0.6% 1% 
Number of potential  
Connections 
 
2304 2208 -96 -4%  3373 2408 -965 -29%  1525 1736 211 14% 
Average connections per 
arriving flight 
 
13.6 12.9 -0.7 -5%  15 10.9 -4.1 -27%  10.0 10.7 0.7 7% 
Maximum potential connections 
serving a market 
 
7 7 0 0%  9 11 2 22%  8 8 0 0% 
*Bold percentages are for measures identified to be likely due to depeaking 






Bolded percentages represent the most notable changes upon US Airways’ depeaking. 
From the year-over-year data, it is evident that depeaking involved a reduction in the 
number of flights flown in a given period, the number of flights flown overall, the 
number of destinations served, and the creation of a more even distribution of flights (as 
evidenced by the reduction in the coefficients of variation and reduction in peak 
percentage). These changes contributed to a drop in the number of potential connections, 
both gross and per arriving flight. 
 The year-over-year measurements are also useful in comparing the demand and 
revenue changes. The time frame is longer in these cases because the demand data is 
gathered for an entire quarter, but the results are still useful. The year-over-year changes 
for revenue and total passengers are not included because these values heavily depend on 
what is going on in the market, more so than the schedule. Thus, RASM is still used in 
comparison with the RASM of the airline network and for the industry.  
 One useful measurement in terms of measuring demand using it year-over-year is 
the percentage of connecting passengers. The percentage of connecting passengers in 
2005 did not deviate from the change seen across the same time periods in 2004, but was 
very different from the change seen in 2006. Thus, there is no evidence that depeaking 
caused a unique change in connecting traffic. 
 The change in RASM for US Airways’ PHL schedule lagged behind the rest of 
US Airways and the industry across all three years. As seen in Table 4.39, however, the 
lag in 2004/5 was more substantial in the depeaking year than the year before. In 
addition, in 2005/6, the proportional gain compared to the network and industry gains 
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was not as great as what occurred in the depeaking year. Thus it appears that US 
Airways’ depeaking in PHL perhaps caused a revenue loss. 
 
Table 4.39  RASM Year-Over-Year Changes for US Airways at PHL 
Measure 
2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 
Q4 Q2 ∆ % Q4 Q2 ∆ % Q4 Q2 ∆ % 
RASM for 
Depeaked Airport 
8.02 7.61 -0.41 -5% 7.24 7.08 -0.16 -2% 8.15 9.93 1.78 22% 
RASM for 
Airline Network 
12.37 12.64 0.27 2% 11.24 12.38 1.14 10% 7.84 11.82 3.98 51% 
RASM for 
Industry 
9.64 10.45 0.81 8% 10.09 11.41 1.32 13% 10.31 13.4 3.09 30% 
 
 
US Airways in the depeaking year at PHL saw a worsening in the average arrival and 
departure delay compared to the rest of the US Airways network and the industry. At the 
same time, it experienced an improvement in terms of the percentage of delayed arriving 
aircraft. When comparing these changes year-over-year, these changes do not appear to 
be notable, as seen in Table 4.40. For departure delay, as an example, the relative 
increase in the depeaking year in departure delay in relation to the comparative measures 











Table 4.40  Operations Year-Over-Year Changes for US Airways at PHL 
Measure 
2004 2005 2006 
Jan Mar ∆ % Jan Mar ∆ % Jan Mar ∆ % 
Dep. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
44.2 47.2 3 7% 53.8 53.4 -0.4 -1% 50.3 47.2 -3.1 -6% 
Dep. Delay Airline 
Network 
44.7 47.1 2.4 5% 51.8 49.5 -2.3 -4% 46.9 43.5 -3.4 -7% 
Dep. Delay  
Industry 
52.6 50.2 -2.4 -5% 53.7 52.7 -1 -2% 53.1 51.9 -1.2 -2% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Depeaked Airport 
27.4 24.5 -2.9 -11% 42.6 44.3 1.7 4% 24.5 20.9 -3.6 -15% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Airline Network 
14.1 11.9 -2.2 -16% 22.9 27.6 4.7 21% 14.3 13.6 -0.7 -5% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Industry 
17.8 14.2 -3.6 -20% 21.4 18.8 -2.6 -12% 17.6 20.4 2.8 16% 
Arr. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
47.8 45.3 -2.5 -5% 58.5 57.6 -0.9 -2% 56.3 43.9 -12.4 -22% 
Arr. Delay Airline 
Network 
44.3 43.7 -0.6 -1% 52 49.6 -2.4 -5% 44.7 40.4 -4.3 -10% 
Arr. Delay  
Industry 
50.6 47.7 -2.9 -6% 52.9 51.6 -1.3 -2% 51.9 51.3 -0.6 -1% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Depeaked Airport 
20.4 20.3 -0.1 0% 37.3 31.8 -5.5 -15% 26.6 18.5 -8.1 -30% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Airline Network 
18.5 15.1 -3.4 -18% 27.7 29.7 2 7% 17.4 16.9 -0.5 -3% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Industry 
22.8 17.5 -5.3 -23% 25.2 21.6 -3.6 -14% 19.7 22.8 3.1 16% 
 
 
US Airways’ schedule changes show evidence of a considerable cut in cost by spreading 
out the banks in the schedule. When compared to the years before and after, there is 
evidence that the changes in the supply measures were unique to depeaking. The changes 
appeared to affect revenue negatively, although there was no effect on connecting traffic. 
It appears that the shifts in supply could have likely caused shifts in revenue. 
Operationally, the evidence suggests that there was not a shift in operations that could be 





Of the six cases, only PHL was repeaked soon after depeaking of the hub’s operations 
occurred. It is reasonable to assume that repeaking indicated a dislike for the depeaked 
operations, as it occurred only seven months after depeaking. The date of repeaking was 
Friday September 16, 2005. Figure 4.47 shows the PHL’s repeaked schedule, which has 
seven arrival and departure peaks, the same number US Airways was operating in 
February of 2005 before depeaking. 
 
 
Figure 4.47  Repeaked schedule for US Airways at PHL.   
 
 
US Airways’ repeaked schedule, despite having the same number of banks throughout 
the day, is different from what they operated initially before depeaking. Table 4.41 lists 
the performance measures from the peaked schedule, from the peaked date of Tuesday 
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February 1, 2005, and the repeaked schedule, from the repeaked date of Tuesday 
September 20, 2005. Only performance measures which are not heavily affected by 
seasonality are reported for comparison. 
 
Table 4.41  Peaked and Repeaked US Airways Supply Measures at PHL 
Measure Peaked Repeaked 
Coefficient of variation in number of arr. flights 131.6 109.8 
Coefficient of variation in number of dep. flights 142.8 123.8 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 79.5% 61.6% 
Average connections per arriving flight 15.0 9.8 
 
 
Although US Airways did not retain its depeaked schedule, it did not peak as extremely 
when it repeaked. The coefficients of variation for arrivals and departures in the repeaked 
schedule are less than they were in the peaked schedule. The peak percentage dropped as 
well, so much so that it is lower than the comparable percentage for the depeaked 
schedule. The result was fewer connections per arriving flight in the repeaked schedule 
than in the peaked schedule. 
 
4.5.8 Summary 
US Airways did not find depeaking to be a successful endeavor, and repeaked the 
schedule soon after. US Airways’ depeaking strategy focused on winning routes from 
competition, and aggressively going after those markets. US Airways particularly seemed 
to want to win back market share from Southwest and traffic to other major airline hubs. 
These changes occurred where US Airways held a fare premium. Meanwhile, high 
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frequency routes saw reductions. Simultaneously, the airline needed to cut cost, and the 
result was a reduction in flight frequency overall and in operations in a given 15-minute 
period. These cuts resulted in a major loss of connectivity in the schedule. 
 The supply changes US Airways underwent hurt them both in operations and 
revenue. Operationally, PHL lagged behind the rest of the airline’s network and the 
industry in terms of delay and the percentage of delayed aircraft, but this change was 
similar to that seen in the years before and after. In terms of revenue, there was a negative 
effect, with the RASM for PHL flights lagging behind comparative measures for the 
same year and other years. Perhaps due to this poor performance, the schedule was 
repeaked to recapture revenue and improve operations. 
 Part of the reason that the PHL schedule repeaked was the merger of US Airways 
and America West in the summer of 2005. The poor performance of the experiment 
likely would lead new ownership to prefer the standard quo of the industry for hubs. In 
addition, with a new major hub in the network in Phoenix, there may have been issues of 
coordinating schedules which the new management preferred to have solved with a 
consistent schedule type across its hubs.  
 
4.6 United Airlines at Los Angeles (LAX) 
United declared bankruptcy in 2002, but it was not until 2004 that United would try 
depeaking at its hub airports. United depeaked ORD in February 2004, although this case 
had to be excluded from this study, with reasons described in 3.5.1.2.7. Over a year later, 
in June 2005, United depeaked Los Angeles, removing seven arrival and departures peaks 
from their schedule at the coastal hub. 
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 United Airlines filed for bankruptcy protection in December 2002, due to the 
downturn in passenger travel in the post-9/11 industry. Its staff cuts, cancelled routes, and 
fleet reductions all contributed to allowing United to restructure itself. United also 
dehubbed its MIA hub operations, and terminated and restructured contracts with its 
contractors, employees, and affiliate airlines. Later in 2005, United officially exited 
bankruptcy. The following winter, United depeaked SFO, with those changes happening 
slowly through January and February 2006. The slow pull-down of operations that SFO 
experienced is different than United’s strategy at LAX. 
 
4.6.1 Data Periods Used and Input Parameters 
United Airlines depeaked LAX on Tuesday June 7, 2005. The date used to represent the 
peak schedule is Tuesday, May 24, 2005. The date used to represent the depeaked 
schedule is Tuesday, June 14, 2005.  
 United depeaked LAX in the middle of the second quarter of 2005, so the 
representative peaked quarter is the first quarter of 2005. The representative depeaked 
quarter is the third quarter of 2005. The peaked month used for operational measures is 
May 2005; the depeaked month is July 2005. 
 For creating year-over-year measures, May 25, 2004, and June 15, 2004, were 
used as the supply comparison dates the year prior. May 23, 2006, and June 13, 2006, 
were used as the supply comparison dates for the year after depeaking. The first and third 
quarters of 2004 are used as the year prior demand comparison quarters, and the first and 
third quarters of 2006 are used for the year after. May 2004 and July 2004 are used for 
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the year prior operational comparison months, and May 2006 and July 2006 are used for 
the year after. 
 The distribution of actual connection times at LAX for passengers flying on 
United itineraries is shown in Figure 4.48. This distribution is from itineraries flown in 
June 2010. At that time, LAX was still operating under a depeaked schedule. The 5th and 
75th percentiles, indicating the MCT and MxCT, are denoted in the figure. For this case, 
the MCT is 35 minutes and MxCT is 119 minutes. 
 
 










4.6.2 Supply Results 
The following section describes the supply-side results for United’s depeaking of LAX, 
which include data derived from the On-Time database. Table 4.42 summarizes the 
supply measures representing peaked and depeaked schedules discussed in this section. 
 
Table 4.42  Summary of Supply Changes for United at LAX 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. in a 15-minute interval 15 8 
Max. number of flight operations in a 15-minute interval 19 13 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 453 462 
Total available seat miles flown into or out of hub 46,842,489 49,309,052 
Number of destinations served from hub 42 42 
Coefficient of variation in number of arr./dep. flights 119.8/144.0 76.8/82.3 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 59.2% 59.3% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 62.0% 44.6% 
Number of potential connections 4,774 4,152 
Average connections per arriving flight 21.1 18.0 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 21 23 
 
 
4.6.2.1 General Supply 
United Airlines’ reproduced peaked schedule at LAX is shown in Figure 4.49 and the 














The maximum number of operations in a 15-minute period drops greatly from the peaked 
to the depeaked schedule. In the peaked schedule, the maximum number of either arrivals 
or departures is 15, while in the depeaked schedule it is 8. The combined number of 
arrivals and departures in a 15-minute period in the peaked schedule is 19, while it drops 
to 13 in the depeaked schedule. 
 The distribution of United’s operations at LAX is more spread out throughout the 
day, as seen in the density function plot shown in Figure 4.51. In this plot, the 15-minute 
periods are ranked in order of frequency. The depeaked schedule is flatter as compared to 
the peaked schedule, which has a steep slope. United operated the depeaked schedule 
across more 15-minute periods than the peaked schedule, showing a greater use of airport 
facilities across the length of the day. With the depeaked schedule, there was a greater 
likelihood of passengers being in the terminal across more hours of the day, which is 





Figure 4.51  Density function plot of United operations at LAX. 
 
 
Although the activity is more spread out in the depeaked schedule, the total number of 
flights increased slightly from the peaked schedule. In the peaked daily schedule, in late 
May 2005, United operated 453 flights out of LAX. This increased to 462 flights by mid-
June. The airline retained the same number of destinations during this period. Due to the 
increased number of flights, daily ASMs increased as well, from just fewer than 47 
million to just over 49 million. 
 
4.6.2.2 Affiliate Airlines 
The percentage of flights operated by affiliate airlines stays near constant from the 
peaked to the depeaked schedule. This percentage is 59.2% for the affiliate airlines in the 
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peaked schedule and 59.3% in the depeaked schedule. This value is for affiliates that 
reported on-time statistics to the On-Time database, which in 2005 primarily included 
Skywest Airlines. As seen in Figure 4.52, the affiliate airlines primarily operate in the 
banks of the schedule, although the affiliate has a large number of flights outside the 
banks. In the depeaked schedule shown in Figure 4.53, the affiliate airlines operate at a 
consistent level throughout the day. 
 
 





Figure 4.53  Affiliate airlines in the depeaked schedule of United at LAX.   
 
 
4.6.2.3 Peak/Depeak Measures 
The coefficient of variation decreases from the peaked to the depeaked schedule, as the 
level of activity becomes more consistent across 15-minute periods. The arrivals in the 
peaked schedule have a coefficient of variation of 119.8, which drops to 76.8 in the 
depeaked schedule. The change for the departures goes from 144.0 to 82.3. 
 The peak and depeak percentage measures show a drop in the peaked nature of 
the schedule. In the peaked schedule, 62% of flights occur within the banks, highlighted 
in Figure 4.54. In the depeaked schedule, 45% of flights occur in the corresponding 
busiest periods of the depeaked schedule, as shown in Figure 4.55. This drop, combined 
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with the changes in the coefficient of variation, indicates a quantitative reduction in the 
peak level of the schedule. 
 
 









The number of connections decreased from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. The 
peak schedule has 4,774 potential connections from each arriving flight to departing 
flights within the MCT and MxCT for the given arriving flight. This value decreases to 
4,152 in the depeaked schedule. This drop occurs even as the number of flights increases 
overall. Because of the increasing number of flights and the drop in connections, the 
average number of connections per arriving flight operated is 21.1 in the peaked 
schedule, and drops to 18.0 per arriving flight in the depeaked schedule. 
 The market which had the maximum number of potential connections increased 
from 21 to 23 connections from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. In the peaked 
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schedule, 21 connections existed from San Francisco to San Diego (SAN). This same 
market in the depeaked schedule had 23 daily potential connections. These values are 
high because, during this period, there were around 20 flights per day from LAX to SAN. 
 
4.6.2.5 Validation of Supply-Demand Time Decision 
The peaked date (or depeaked date) supply data was verified as being similar to the 
schedule used in the peaked quarter (or depeaked quarter) for the analysis. Table 4.43 
shows the changes in supply over time for the quarter before the peaked date up until the 
peaked date. Table 4.44 shows the changes in supply for the quarter after the depeaked 
date from the depeaked date and after.  
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Table 4.43  Supply Measures Over Time for United’s Peaked Schedule at LAX 
Measure 1/11/05 1/25/05 2/8/05 3/1/05 3/22/05 4/5/05 4/19/05 5/10/05 5/24/05 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 14 16 15 16 15 14 14 15 15 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 17 19 18 19 18 16 16 19 19 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 426 444 443 460 453 456 455 454 453 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 43736 44118 44117 46818 46968 46088 45255 46146 46842 
Number of destinations served from hub 41 41 41 42 42 43 43 42 42 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 124.5/142.7123.6/143.5 122.5/144.9124.0/141.8 124.7/143.3118.3/137.7 118.6/136.5119.3/144.5 119.8/144.0 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 58.9% 59.9% 60.3% 59.8% 59.2% 59.2% 60.0% 59.5% 59.2% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 62.4% 61.0% 59.4% 56.5% 63.1% 58.3% 56.5% 60.8% 62.0% 
Number of potential connections 4217 4555 4568 4853 4712 4758 4745 4782 4774 
Average connections per arriving flight 20.2 20.7 20.9 21.4 20.9 21.0 21.1 21.3 21.1 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 19 21 21 27 25 26 26 24 21 
 
 
Table 4.44  Supply Measures Over Time for United’s Depeaked Schedule at LAX 
Measure 6/14/05 6/21/05 6/28/05 7/12/05 7/26/05 8/9/05 8/23/05 9/13/05 9/27/05 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 10 9 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 13 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 462 457 465 462 460 463 456 458 460 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 49309 49449 49658 49577 48297 48577 47136 46627 46269 
Number of destinations served from hub 42 42 42 41 41 41 41 40 40 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 76.8/82.3 78.4/82.3 76.6/81.8 77.0/83.0 77.0/82.5 78.0/85.5 78.7/85.6 77.5/87.4 77.0/85.9 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 59.3% 58.0% 58.7% 58.9% 58.7% 58.8% 59.2% 59.0% 58.7% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 44.6% 45.1% 44.3% 45.2% 45.0% 45.8% 45.8% 47.4% 47.2% 
Number of potential connections 4152 4043 4195 4161 4140 4201 4048 4225 4253 
Average connections per arriving flight 18.0 17.9 18.2 18.2 18.1 18.3 17.9 18.4 18.5 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 23 26 26 23 26 24 24 28 29 






4.6.3 Demand Results 
The changes in demand and related parameters before and after the depeaking of LAX 
are shown in Table 4.45. The data comes from the peaked and depeaked quarters. The 
values are the average daily values from across the quarter. Around 12.5 thousand 
average daily passengers traveled on United through LAX in the peaked schedule during 
the peaked quarter, and this increased to nearly 14 thousand during the depeaked quarter. 
Overall, the revenue increased from the first to the third quarter of 2005, from $2.6 
million to $3.1 million. More importantly, even though ASMs also increased along with 
revenue, the RASM increased from 5.51 cents per mile to 6.27 cents per mile. 
 
Table 4.45  Summary of Demand and Revenue Changes for United at LAX 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Total passengers 12,569 13,788 
Revenue ($) 2,581,075 3,093,691 
Revenue per available seat mile (RASM) (cents per mile) 5.51 6.27 
Percent connecting passengers 32.3% 27.7% 
 
 
On a per market basis, the number of markets in which gross revenue increased between 
the two quarters was 30, while 12 markets saw a decrease. RASM increased in 31 
markets and decreased in 11.  
 Across the spokes of LAX, there was an average decrease in connecting traffic 
from the spoke airports. 32.3% of passengers at LAX on United were connecting 
passengers under the peaked schedule, and 27.7% were connecting passengers under the 
depeaked schedule. At the spoke level, 20 spoke routes had an increase in the percentage 
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of passengers on flights between LAX and the spoke. 22 spoke routes saw an increase in 
the percentage of passengers whose trips were only non-stop flights between the spoke 
and LAX. Connecting traffic was likely reduced due to depeaking. 
 Comparing the change in RASM at LAX to the rest of the airline and the industry 
helps to see if depeaking was at the root of the increase in RASM. The 0.76 cents per 
mile increase from the peaked to the depeaked period is a slower increase than both the 
industry and the rest of United as a whole. Over this same time period, the entire United 
network saw a 1.17 cents per mile increase in RASM, including United’s other hubs in 
Chicago and San Francisco. The industry as a whole saw a 1.34 cents per mile increase 
between these two quarters. United’s revenue growth at LAX lagged behind the rest of 
United and the industry as a whole. It is thus possible that the depeaking of LAX could 
have influenced slower revenue growth. 
 
4.6.4 On-Time Results 
The operational effects of depeaking are shown in Table 4.46 using on-time statistics 
from before and after depeaking. Using these aggregated measures, it is seen that 
between the peaked and depeaked months there was a reduction in operational 
performance. There was an overall increase in average delay per aircraft for arrivals, and 
only a slight decrease for departures. There were, however, more delayed aircraft overall 
as a percentage of all aircraft. Total delay time increased for both departures and arrivals 




Table 4.46  Summary of Operational Changes for United at LAX 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Average departure delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 4.8 7.0 
Average departure delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 50 48.6 
Percentage of delayed departing aircraft  8.1% 12.5% 
Total delay for delayed departing aircraft (minutes) 27,950 42,328 
Average taxi-out time (minutes) 13.7 14.7 
Average arrival delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 6.6 8.3 
Average arrival delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 44.4 52.6 
Percentage of delayed arriving aircraft  11.9% 13.3% 
Total delay for delayed arriving aircraft (minutes) 36,426 48,678 
Average taxi-in time (minutes) 6.0 6.8 
*Early arriving and early departing aircraft were assigned zero delay 
 
Although the operations for United at LAX did not seen an improvement in on-time 
operations from the peaked to the depeaked period, the decline must be viewed in context 
with the rest of United’s network and the industry over the same period. 
 Departure delay for delayed aircraft at LAX slightly improved from the peaked to 
depeaked quarter, but the percentage of delayed aircraft increased by about 4.5 
percentage points. These changes, though, look good when compared to the rest of 
United’s network, which increased in departure delay by over 3.5 minutes for delayed 
aircraft, and there was a 6.5 percentage point increase in delayed aircraft, nearly doubling 
over the time period. The industry saw an even greater increase in delayed aircraft time, 
with 10 minutes longer on average for delayed departures and an 11 percentage point 
increase in delayed departures. In this context, LAX’s United operations performed well. 
 The change in arrival delay showed a decline in performance for United at LAX, 
but put into perspective with comparative measures, is not as troubling. In terms of 
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arrival delay per delayed aircraft, there was a greater decline at LAX compared to the rest 
of the airline, but an improvement compared to the industry overall during the same time 
period. The delay for arriving aircraft increased by 18% for the airline’s operations at 
LAX, while the airline overall had an increase in arrival delay by 12%. The industry, 
however, saw a 26% percent increase in arrival delay. In terms of number of aircraft 
affected, the percentage of delayed arriving aircraft increased 12% for United at LAX, 
but network-wide there was a 39% increase in this performance measure. The industry 
overall saw a 77% increase. 
 Although it initially appears that depeaking might have had a negative effect on 
operations at LAX for United, there was an improvement compared to the rest of the 
airline and the industry overall,. The decline in on-time operations were not as severe for 
the airline at the depeaked airport, indicating that depeaking might have prevented further 
declines in operations by spreading out the banks. 
 
4.6.5 Predicting Changes in Supply 
Employing the use of a regression model, analysis was performed on the LAX case study 
to assess the decision-making process American used in determining how to depeak their 
schedule. Analysis is done at the spoke level, such that all data is summarized for a spoke 
airport destination that was served by United during the depeaking period.  
 The dependent variable, defined as the change in the number of flights on the 
route between LAX and a spoke, was found to be well-predicted by the variables listed in 
Table 4.47. The variables include the number of potential connections for flights arriving 
from the spoke at the hub, the ASM of United’s competitors, the log of the average 
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United fare, and the number of direct passengers flying on the route. All of these 
variables are significant at the 95% confidence level. The adjusted R2 for the model is 
0.460. 
 
Table 4.47  Regression Model Results for Change in Flights at LAX 
Variable Coefficient t-stat p > |t| 
Intercept 5.2378 4.89 < 0.001 
Potential Connections from spoke at hub -0.0146 -4.39 < 0.001 
ASM of competitors 1.5414 E -7 3.54 0.001 
Log (average fare) -1.0170 -4.69 < 0.001 
Direct Passengers 0.0024 3.10 0.004 
Note: The SAN observation is removed for being an outlier. 
 
 
During the first run of this model, and before producing the results seen in Table 4.47, it 
the model did not pass the homoscedasticity assumption. Particularly, a large outlier in 
the dependent variable was skewing the data such that its standard error was minimized. 
This outlier was San Diego (SAN), which United served through high frequency shuttle 
service through its LAX hub. Frequency from LAX to SAN was already higher than any 
other route for United, and the addition of eight flights for this popular route made it 
much larger than any other change. The outlier effect misrepresented the cause of the 
changes to other spokes, so the SAN observation was removed.  
 After the SAN observation was removed, the model passed all three tests for the 
normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity assumptions. The normal probability plot in 
Figure 4.56 shows a straight line of residuals falling close to the diagonal line in the plot, 
indicating that the distribution is normal. The regression was still checked against a count 
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model and the direction of the variables were the same as those in the regression model, 
providing assurance that the fit was appropriate. 
 
 
Figure 4.56  Normal probability plot for LAX case. The plot is shown without the SAN observation. 
 
 
United Airlines’ strategy for depeaking LAX, as determined by the results of the 
regression model, showed a focus on routes with higher levels of direct passenger traffic, 
and less attention paid to building connections at the hub. There also was a focus on 
increasing flights on routes which had a larger number of competitor ASMs. Spoke 
airports which saw increases in frequency, with high levels of direct traffic and without 
an emphasis on potential connections, included Honolulu (HNL), Kahului, HI (OGG), 
New York JFK, and Portland (PDX). Spoke airports that saw decreases in frequencies 
were associated with lower numbers of direct passengers include Phoenix (PHX), Tucson 
(TUS), and Denver (DEN). HNL, JFK, and OGG all also have high levels of competitor 
ASMs, compared to PHX, TUS, and DEN. Based on the airports which saw increase and 
the factors involved in the decision, it appears United was looking to beat out the 
competition on longer flights with higher direct traffic. In addition, low fare flights also 
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received a boost from United, particularly spokes geographically close to LAX. These 
included Ontario, CA (ONT), Orange County, CA (SNA), and San Luis Obispo, CA 
(SBP). 
 United’s strategy at LAX can be described as focusing on long-haul routes that 
provided high levels of direct traffic. Part of this motivation likely came from trying to 
beat the competition on these routes. The concern did not lie with maximizing 
connections. Nearby airports in Southern California also received boosts, including the 
outlier of San Diego.  
 
4.6.6 Assessing Depeaking and Effects 
The changes in the supply and demand results that occurred during the depeaking period 
could have likely been due to depeaking. Year-over-year measures were calculated in 
order to better understand whether the changes that occurred were potentially due to 
depeaking as opposed to being a typical change for that time of the year. The percentage 
change between the peaked and depeaked dates is calculated, as well as for the year 
before and year after on similar dates. 
 For the LAX case, it is evident that many of the supply changes were due to 
depeaking. Table 4.48 shows schedule measures and reports a percentage change 
associated with each year. In the case of United, depeaking occurred in 2005. May 24, 
2005 was used as the representative Tuesday peaked schedule and June 14, 2005 was 
used as the representative Tuesday depeaked schedule. The percentage associated with 
the year 2005 shows the change in schedule measures between these two dates. The 
process is repeated for two dates each in the years 2004 and 2006, using representative 
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Tuesday dates closest to the year-over-year depeaking date. Note that the year before and 
year after changes are respectively for the same types of schedules: the 2004 change is 
between two peaked schedules and the 2006 change is between two depeaked schedules. 
Thus only the 2005 change is for changes that occurred between different schedule types. 
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Table 4.48  Supply Year-Over-Year Changes for United at LAX 
Measure 
 2004  2005  2006 
 5/25 6/15 ∆ %  5/24 6/14 ∆ %  5/23 6/13 ∆ % 
Max. number of flight arrs. or 
deps. in a 15-minute interval 
 
17 18 1 6%  15 8 -7 -47%  9 10 1 11% 
Max. number of flight operations 
in a 15-minute interval 
 
17 21 4 24%  19 13 -6 -32%  12 13 1 8% 
Number of flights flown into 
or out of hub 
 
459 449 -10 -2%  453 462 9 2%  465 475 10 2% 
Total available seat miles flown 
into or out of hub (000s) 
 
53130 54438 1308 2%  46843 49309 2467 5%  52018 54342 2325 4% 
Number of destinations served 
from hub 
 
41 43 2 5%  42 42 0 0%  44 45 1 2% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of arrivals 
 
139.7 116.1 -23.6 -17%  119.8 76.8 -43 -36%  81.5 78.3 -3.2 -4% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of departures 
 
149.4 144.7 -4.7 -3%  144 82.3 -61.7 -43%  94 87.8 -6.2 -7% 
Percentage of flights served 
by affiliate airline(s) 
 
54.5% 51.7% -2.8% -5%  59.2% 59.3% 0.1% 0%  58.1% 57.5% -0.6% -1% 
Percentage of flights served in 
peak period 
 
68.2% 63.0% -5.2% -8%  62.0% 44.6% -17.4% -28%  48.8% 45.0% -3.8% -8% 
Number of potential 
connections 
 
5114 4602 -512 -10%  4774 4152 -622 -13%  4320 4326 6 0% 
Average connections per 
arriving flight 
 
22.2 20.6 -1.6 -7%  21.1 18 -3.1 -15%  18.6 18.2 -0.4 -2% 
Maximum potential connections 
serving a market 
 
24 26 2 8%  21 23 2 10%  24 27 3 13% 
*Bold percentages are for measures identified to be likely due to depeaking 






Bolded percentages represent changes most evident by United’s depeaking. From the 
year-over-year data, it is evident that depeaking involved a reduction in the number of 
flights flown in a given period and the creation of a more even distribution of flights (as 
evidenced by the reduction in the coefficients of variation and reduction in peak 
percentage). These changes contributed to a drop in the number of potential connections 
per arriving flight, indicating that the spreading out of the operations led to lower 
likelihood for a passenger to have a useful connection. 
 The year-over-year measurements are also useful in comparing the demand and 
revenue changes. The time frame is longer in these cases, because the demand data is 
gathered for an entire quarter, but the results are still useful. The year-over-year changes 
for revenue and total passengers are not included because these values heavily depend on 
what is going on in the market, more so than the schedule. Thus RASM is used in 
comparison still with the RASM of the airline network and for the industry.  
 One measurement which is useful in terms of demand in measuring it year-over-
year is the percentage of connecting passengers. The percent of connecting passengers in 
2005, however, did not deviate from the change seen across the same time periods in 
2004 and 2006. In each year, between the two quarters sampled, connecting traffic 
dropped between 12% and 14%. Thus this change seems more tied to seasonality. 
 The change in RASM for United’s LAX schedule is on par in terms of percentage 
change for all three years examined. In the depeaking year, although the actual change in 
RASM lags behind the rest of United and the industry, in terms of percentage change it is 
the same. 2006 was very similar to 2005 in that the actual RASM growth value, of 0.55, 
was less than United overall, 1.12, and the industry, 0.83. But as seen in Table 4.49, the 
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percent change in RASM was on par or exceeded the industry and network growth in 
each of the three years. This indicates that the RASM underperformance for United at 
LAX was not more poor in the depeaking year than in other years. 
 
Table 4.49  RASM Year-Over-Year Changes for United at LAX 
Measure 
2004 2005 2006 
Q1 Q3 ∆ % Q1 Q3 ∆ % Q1 Q3 ∆ % 
RASM for 
Depeaked Airport 
4.99 5.77 0.78 16% 5.51 6.27 0.76 14% 6.00 6.55 0.55 9% 
RASM for 
Airline Network 
7.39 8.35 0.96 13% 8.6 9.77 1.17 14% 9.72 10.84 1.12 12% 
RASM for 
Industry 
8.64 9.07 0.43 5% 8.7 10.04 1.34 15% 9.87 10.7 0.83 8% 
 
 
Operationally, United’s operations at LAX saw notable changes year-over-year in the 
departure delay and the percentage of delayed departing aircraft, as shown in Table 4.50. 
Departure delay improved in the depeaking year for the depeaked airport, while it 
increased elsewhere. When compared year-over-year, the year before and year saw this 
measure be on par with or worsen when compared to the rest of United’s network and the 
industry. A similar situation exists with the percentage of delayed departing aircraft. In 
the depeaking year, this percentage increased less than United’s entire network and the 
industry, but in the year before and year after, it increased more than the comparative 
measures. This suggests that in the depeaking year there was a notable shift in the 
percentage of delayed departing aircraft. For arriving aircraft, there was no notable 




Table 4.50  Operations Year-Over-Year Changes for United at LAX 
Measure 
2004 2005 2006 
May Jul ∆ % May Jul ∆ % May Jul ∆ % 
Dep. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
54.4 51.1 -3.3 -6% 50.0 48.6 -1.4 -3% 47.1 55.0 7.9 17% 
Dep. Delay Airline 
Network 
67.4 62.1 -5.3 -8% 58.3 61.9 3.6 6% 60.9 65.9 5.0 8% 
Dep. Delay  
Industry 
57.7 55.4 -2.3 -4% 49.9 60.1 10.2 20% 51.8 58.0 6.2 12% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Depeaked Airport 
8.8 9.6 0.8 9% 8.1 12.5 4.4 54% 15.6 19.3 3.7 24% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Airline Network 
14.4 14.6 0.2 1% 13.7 20.2 6.5 47% 19.2 21.9 2.7 14% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Industry 
16.8 19.5 2.7 16% 13.3 24.4 11.1 83% 18.5 22.7 4.2 23% 
Arr. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
49.9 49.5 -0.4 -1% 44.4 52.6 8.2 18% 46.5 56.1 9.6 21% 
Arr. Delay Airline 
Network 
64.6 59.6 -5 -8% 55.7 62.4 6.7 12% 59.0 64.4 5.4 9% 
Arr. Delay  
Industry 
57.4 55.4 -2 -3% 48.6 61.3 12.7 26% 51.9 58.7 6.8 13% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Depeaked Airport 
13.9 12.7 -1.2 -9% 11.9 13.3 1.4 12% 19.6 21.0 1.4 7% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Airline Network 
19.4 18 -1.4 -7% 16.1 22.3 6.2 39% 22.7 24.2 1.5 7% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Industry 
20.8 22.6 1.8 9% 15.4 27.3 11.9 77% 20.6 24.8 4.2 20% 
 
 
In summary, the supply changes for United at LAX showed an observable difference 
from the surrounding years. Thus it appears depeaking had an effect on the number of 
potential connections in the schedule, and certainly altered the schedule itself in how it 
was structured. The changes in demand however were not different from what occurred 
over a longer period of time. Instead it appears the changes were more typical to what 
occurred during that point in history for United. For operations, the departing aircraft 
appear to have had a notable improvement in delay in the depeaking year, while arriving 




The changes to the schedule made at LAX by United during depeaking were 
considerable. There was a reduction in the number of flights flown as the airline created a 
more even distribution of flights across its schedule. The focus during this period was to 
increase frequency for long-haul routes that had high levels of direct traffic, in an attempt 
to beat out competition on these routes. Nearby airports in the larger region also saw 
increased frequency, reflecting United’s focus on providing strong west coast shuttle 
service. United did not focus on maximizing connections, and thus saw a drop in 
connections per arriving flights in the schedule. 
 The effects of depeaking showed a benefit for operations and no decline in 
revenue. Even though operations saw a decrease during this period, it was in fact an 
improvement over the rest of United and the industry. It is likely that depeaking 
prevented a further increase in delay. In terms of revenue, despite the drop in 
connections, RASM was on par with other changes occurring across United and the 
industry. Even looking year-over-year, it appears that RASM for United at LAX did not 
suffer. 
 
4.7 United Airlines at San Francisco (SFO) 
The final depeaking case in this study chronologically is United’s depeaking of San 
Francisco in the winter of 2006. SFO was the third airport United depeaked, with ORD 
and LAX previously getting depeaked in the previous two years. SFO’s depeaking, 
however, is unique among the cases in that it happened slowly; United transitioned away 
the peaks gradually over two months. This slow pull-down, with changes occurring on a 
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rolling basis is very different from the immediate transformation the airports in the other 
cases experienced. 
 United had left bankruptcy in June 2005, and began transitioning SFO to a 
depeaked schedule in January of 2006. Just prior to depeaking SFO, Delta and Northwest 
each declared bankruptcy, indicating the instability still existing in the industry. United 
was still running depeaked schedules at both ORD and LAX during this period. United 
removed SFO’s seven arrival and departure peaks, but not drastic changes like the other 
cases were depeaked. By late January, remnants of peaks still were present in the 
schedule, and it was not until the end of February that the SFO schedule was finished 
getting depeaked. 
 
4.7.1 Data Periods Used and Input Parameters 
United Airlines depeaked SFO initially on Monday January 9, 2006. As mentioned 
previously, this was not a drastic change, and the schedule retained some characteristics 
of banks. It was not until the end of February that the schedule was fully depeaked. Thus 
the peak and depeak schedule dates are over two months apart. The date used to represent 
the peak schedule is Tuesday December 20, 2005. The date used to represent the 
depeaked schedule is Tuesday February 28, 2006.  
 Because United depeaked SFO only nine days into the first quarter of 2006, it was 
decided that the first quarter could serve as the depeaked quarter for demand data. About 
one week of demand data being under the peaked schedule, with a slow transition to fully 
depeaked, was seen as less of an issue than looking ahead nearly three months to get 
demand data. In addition, it could be possible to describe how a slow transition to 
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depeaking potentially differed from a drastic change. The fourth quarter of 2005 is used 
as the peaked quarter for demand data. The peaked month used for operational measures 
is December 2005; the depeaked month is February 2012. 
 For creating year-over-year measures, December 14, 2004 and February 15, 2005 
were used as the supply comparison dates the year prior. December 19, 2006 and 
February 27, 2007 were used as the supply comparison dates for the year after depeaking. 
The fourth quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2005 are used as the year prior demand 
comparison quarters, and the fourth quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 2007 are used 
for the year after. December 2004 and February 2005 are used for the year prior 
operational comparison months, and December 2006 and February 2007 are used for the 
year after. 
 The distribution of actual connection times made at SFO for passengers flying on 
United itineraries is shown in Figure 4.57. This distribution is from itineraries flown in 
June 2010. At that time, SFO was still operating under a depeaked schedule. The 5th and 
75th percentiles, indicating the MCT and MxCT are denoted in the figure. For this case, 





Figure 4.57  Connection time distribution for UA at SFO. MCT and MxCT are denoted. 
 
 
4.7.2 Supply Results 
The following section describes the supply-side results for United’s depeaking of SFO, 
which includes data which is calculable using the On-Time database. Table 4.51 
summarizes the supply measures representing peaked and depeaked schedules that are 









Table 4.51  Summary of Supply Changes for United at SFO 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. in a 15-minute interval 14 11 
Max. number of flight operations in a 15-minute interval 17 16 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 445 440 
Total available seat miles flown into or out of hub 57,228,077 55,062,705 
Number of destinations served from hub 46 48 
Coefficient of variation in number of arr./dep. flights 101.7/128.2 87/101.9 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 42.7% 45.5% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 68.5% 65.7% 
Number of potential connections 4,066 3,621 
Average connections per arriving flight 18.3 16.8 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 16 13 
 
 
4.7.2.1 General Supply 
United Airlines’ reproduced peaked schedule at SFO is shown in Figure 4.58 and the 














The maximum number of operations in a 15-minute period drops from the peaked to the 
depeaked schedule. In the peaked schedule, the maximum number of either arrivals or 
departures is 14, while in the depeaked schedule it is 11. The combined number of 
arrivals and departures in a 15-minute period in the peaked schedule is 17, while it drops 
to 16 in the depeaked schedule. United’s SFO schedule retains some busier periods of 
activity, even without the banks. 
 The distribution of United’s operations at SFO between the peaked and depeaked 
periods is similar throughout the day, as seen in the density function plot shown in Figure 
4.60. In this plot, the 15-minute periods are ranked in order of frequency. Although the 
maximum number of operations in arrivals and departures is decreased moving to the 
depeaked schedule, the rest of the curves are similar. The depeaked departures get  
slightly more spread out compared to the peaked schedule than the depeaked arrivals as 





Figure 4.60  Density function plot of United operations at SFO. 
 
 
Although the activity is slightly more spread out in the depeaked schedule, the total 
number of flights stays almost the same from the peaked schedule. In the peaked daily 
schedule in late December of 2005 United operated 445 flights out of San Francisco, and 
this decreased to 440 flights by late February. United added two destinations to their 
network under the depeaked schedule: Boise and Palm Springs, CA. Partially due to the 
decreased number of flights, daily ASMs decreased as well, from just over 57 million to 






4.7.2.2 Affiliate Airlines 
The percentage of flights operated by affiliate airlines rises slightly from the peaked to 
the depeaked schedule. This percentage is 42.7% for the affiliate airlines in the peaked 
schedule and 45.5% in the depeaked schedule. This value is for affiliates that reported on-
time statistics to the On-Time database, which in late 2005 and early 2006 primarily 
included Skywest Airlines. As seen in Figure 4.61, the affiliate airlines mostly operate in 
the banks of the schedule, although the affiliate certainly has a large number of flights 
outside the banks. In the depeaked schedule shown in Figure 4.62, the affiliate airlines 
operate at a consistent level throughout the day, with more in the busiest periods. 
 
 





Figure 4.62  Affiliate airlines in the depeaked schedule of United at SFO.   
 
 
4.7.2.3 Peak/Depeak Measures 
The coefficient of variation decreases from the peaked to the depeaked schedule, as the 
level of activity becomes more consistent across 15-minute periods. The arrivals in the 
peaked schedule have a coefficient of variation of 101.68, which drops to 87.0 in the 
depeaked schedule. The change for the departures goes from 128.2 to 101.9. 
 The peak and depeak percentage measures show a slight drop in the peaked nature 
of the schedule. In the peaked schedule, 69% of flights occur within the banks, 
highlighted in Figure 4.63. In the depeaked schedule, 66% of flights occur in the 
corresponding busiest periods of the depeaked schedule, as shown in Figure 4.64. This 
drop, combined with the changes in the coefficient of variation, both indicate that SFO 
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was depeaked less than the other cases. The change overall, even after the transition 
period, was not very large. The banks certainly disappear, but periods of activity in the 
depeaked schedule, particularly in the departures, show that it was not as much of a 
depeaking as previous instances. 
 
 









The number of connections decreased from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. The 
peak schedule has 4,066 potential connections from each arriving flight to departing 
flights within the MCT and MxCT for the given arriving flight. This value decreases to 
3,621 in the depeaked schedule. This reduction, even with the drop in number of flights, 
decreases the average number of connections per arriving flight operated from 18.3 in the 
peaked schedule to 16.8 per arriving flight in the depeaked schedule. 
 The market which had the maximum number of potential connections decreased 
from 16 to 13 connections from the peaked to the depeaked schedule. In the peaked 
schedule, 16 connections existed from Sacramento (SMF) to LAX. In the depeaked 




4.7.2.5 Validation of Supply-Demand Time Decision 
The schedule on the peaked date (or depeaked date) supply data was verified as being 
similar to the schedule used in the peaked quarter (or depeaked quarter) for the analysis. 
Table 4.52 shows the changes in supply over time for the quarter before the peaked date 
up until the peaked date. Table 4.53 shows the changes in supply for the quarter after the 




Table 4.52  Supply Measures Over Time for United’s Peaked Schedule at SFO 
Measure 10/4/05 10/18/05 11/1/05 11/15/05 11/29/05 12/6/05 12/13/05 12/20/05 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 15 15 14 14 13 14 14 14 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 17 17 18 18 16 17 18 17 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 449 447 446 439 427 439 443 445 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 54469 54101 53779 52962 53410 53347 54163 57228 
Number of destinations served from hub 46 46 47 47 47 47 47 46 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 113.8/142.9 113.7/143.1112.1/135.9 111.0/137.7110.0/135.3 110.5/139.5111.6/136.7 101.7/128.2
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 43.2% 43.9% 44.8% 45.1% 41.5% 44.0% 43.6% 42.7% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 75.3% 74.1% 71.8% 70.8% 72.4% 69.9% 71.8% 68.5% 
Number of potential connections 4279 4243 4342 4225 3914 4164 4277 4066 
Average connections per arriving flight 19.1 19.0 19.6 19.2 18.3 19.0 19.3 18.3 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 12 12 16 16 16 15 16 16 
 
 
Table 4.53  Supply Measures Over Time for United’s Depeaked Schedule at SFO 
Measure 2/28/06 3/7/06 3/21/06 4/11/06 4/25/06 5/9/06 5/23/06 6/6/06 6/20/06 
Max. # of flight arrs. or deps. in 15-min. interval 11 12 12 12 13 13 13 14 11 
Max. # of flight operations in 15-min. interval 16 17 18 18 19 16 16 17 14 
Number of flights flown into or out of hub 440 452 458 425 468 452 441 457 457 
Total avail. seat mi. flown into or out of hub (000s) 55063 53886 56448 56671 56131 54509 54864 54175 59632 
Number of destinations served from hub 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 49 
Coefficient of variation in # of arr./dep. flights 87/101.9 83.4/102.0 84.4/100.8 93.2/102.4 87.0/97.4 87.6/98.6 87.4/99.1 88.4/99.8 88.0/94.3 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s) 45.5% 47.6% 46.9% 40.9% 46.2% 45.8% 44.4% 46.2% 43.8% 
Percentage of flights served in peak period 65.7% 63.7% 63.8% 65.7% 63.0% 64.4% 64.2% 63.7% 61.9% 
Number of potential connections 4191 3846 3947 3521 4082 3749 3593 3864 3789 
Average connections per arriving flight 19.4 17.0 17.2 16.5 17.4 16.6 16.4 16.9 16.5 
Maximum potential connections serving a market 14 13 12 15 14 12 11 12 14 






4.7.3 Demand Results 
The changes in demand and related parameters before and after the depeaking of SFO are 
shown in Table 4.54. The data comes from the peaked and depeaked quarters. The values 
are the average daily values from across the quarter. Just over 18 thousand average daily 
passengers traveled on United through SFO in the peaked schedule during the peaked 
quarter, and this decreased to around 16 thousand during the depeaked quarter. Overall 
revenue decreased from the fourth quarter of 2005 to the first quarter of 2006, from $3.8 
million to $3.6 million. Along with the revenue, ASMs also decreased, but the revenue 
drop was considerable enough that RASM decreased from 6.68 cents per mile to 6.62 
cents per mile. 
 
Table 4.54  Summary of Demand and Revenue Changes for United at SFO 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Total passengers 18,300 16,105 
Revenue ($) 3,821,204 3,647,050 
Revenue per available seat mile (RASM) (cents per mile) 6.68 6.62 
Percent connecting passengers 30.1% 30.5% 
 
 
On a per market basis, the number of markets in which gross revenue increased between 
the two quarters was 14, while 34 markets saw a decrease. RASM increased in 23 
markets, and decreased in 25.  
 Across the spokes of SFO there was an average increase in connecting traffic 
from the spoke airports. 30.1% of passengers at SFO on United were connecting 
passengers under the peaked schedule, and 30.5% were connecting passengers under the 
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depeaked schedule. At the spoke level, 25 spoke routes had an increase in the percentage 
of passengers on flights between SFO and the spoke that made connections. 23 spoke 
routes saw an increase in the percentage of passengers whose trips were only non-stop 
flights between the spoke and SFO. Connecting traffic appears to have risen slightly 
overall. 
 The change in revenue is compared to the rest of United’s network and the 
industry as a whole to determine if the slight decrease in RASM at SFO was perhaps due 
to depeaking, or rather on trend with the changes at the time elsewhere. The 0.06 cents 
per mile decrease from the peaked to the depeaked period is thus considered in terms of 
these other measures. Over this same time the entire United network saw a 1.04 cents per 
mile increase in RASM, including United’s other hubs in Los Angeles and Chicago. The 
industry as a whole saw a 0.81 cents per mile increase between these two quarters. 
United’s revenue decreased at SFO occurred while the rest of United and the industry as 
a whole increased. It is thus possible that the depeaking of SFO could have influenced 
slower revenue growth. 
 
4.7.4 On-Time Results 
The operational effects of depeaking are shown in Table 4.55 using on-time statistics 
from before and after depeaking. Using these aggregated measures, it is seen that 
between the peaked and depeaked months there was a large improvement in operations. 
There was an overall decrease in average delay per aircraft, both for departing and 
arriving aircraft, and there was less delayed aircraft overall as a percentage of all aircraft. 
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Total delay decreased for both departures and arrivals over this period, although taxi-out 
and taxi-in times did not deviate greatly. 
 
Table 4.55  Summary of Operational Changes for United at SFO 
Measure Peaked Depeaked 
Average departure delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 24.6 16.8 
Average departure delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 72 53.7 
Percentage of delayed departing aircraft  32.4% 28.6% 
Total delay for delayed departing aircraft (minutes) 154,822 94,159 
Average taxi-out time (minutes) 16 15.2 
Average arrival delay for all aircraft (minutes)* 31.8 18.1 
Average arrival delay for delayed aircraft (minutes) 78.1 54.9 
Percentage of delayed arriving aircraft  39.1% 30.3% 
Total delay for delayed arriving aircraft (minutes) 201,415 101,612 
Average taxi-in time (minutes) 6 6.1 
*Early arriving and early departing aircraft were assigned zero delay 
 
The improvements in operations at SFO for United are taken in context with what was 
occurring for the rest of United during this time, and what occurred industry-wide. 
 The departure delay throughout United decreased along with the SFO operations, 
while the industry slightly increased in delay. The SFO operational improvement, 
however, was much larger in terms of departure delay for delayed aircraft. This 
parameter was reduced by 25%, as compared to 8% for the rest of United. The industry 
had a 0.3% increase in departure delay. In terms of percentage of delayed departing 
aircraft, though, United’s SFO operations lagged behind the rest of United and the 




 Arrival delay saw a more consistent change for SFO. Both the arrival delay for 
delayed aircraft and the percentage of delayed aircraft decreased, and these decreases 
outperformed the rest of United and the industry. Arrival delay for United at SFO 
decreased 24 minutes, a 30% overall decrease. United as a whole decreased about 7 
minutes in average arrival delay, while the industry just 1 minute. The reduction in 
delayed aircraft was about a 9 percentage point decrease for United at SFO, which was a 
22.5% reduction. The rest of United reduced this value similarly, a 6.5 percentage point 
reduction which was a 21% drop. Meanwhile the industry reduced the delayed aircraft 
percentage by less than 5 percentage points, a 17% drop. 
 United’s operations at SFO improved from the peaked to the depeaked month, 
and in most measures, this improvement outpaced the improvements across United’s 
network and the industry. These larger improvements relative to the normalizing 
measures indicate that depeaking could have had some beneficial effect on delay. 
 
4.7.5 Predicting Changes in Supply 
Although many regression models were attempted for the SFO case study, none showed 
significant results that provided intuitive results. The main likely reason for this 
insignificance is the lesser degree to which SFO was depeaked and its more continuous 
method of depeaking. As noted earlier, the changes in the depeaking measures 
(coefficients of variation and the peak percentage) were smaller than the other cases. The 
schedule was depeaked over two months, which also likely had an effect on the factors 




4.7.6 Assessing Depeaking and Effects 
The supply and demand results over the depeaking period show changes that likely could 
have been due to depeaking. To get a better understanding as to whether the changes that 
occurred were likely due to depeaking as opposed to being a typical change for that time 
of the year, year-over-year measures were calculated. The percentage change between the 
peaked and depeaked dates is calculated, and also for the year before and year after on 
similar dates. 
 For the SFO case, there is little evidence for the supply changes to show that the 
changes were due to depeaking. Table 4.56 shows schedule measures and reports a 
percentage change associated with each year. In the case of United, depeaking occurred 
in early January 2006. December 20, 2005 was used as the representative Tuesday 
peaked schedule and February 28, 2006 was used as the representative Tuesday depeaked 
schedule. The percentage associated with the year 2005/6 shows the change in schedule 
measures between these two dates. The table shows the results listed for 2004/5, 2005/6, 
and 2006/7, because the time period is split over two years due to SFO’s depeaking 
occurring close to the turn of the calendar year. The process is repeated for two dates 
each in the years 2004/5 and 2006/7, using representative Tuesday dates closest to the 
year-over-year depeaking date. Note that the year before and year after changes are 
respectively for the same types of schedules: the 2004/5 change is between two peaked 
schedules and the 2006/7 change is between two depeaked schedules. Thus only the 




Table 4.56  Supply Year-Over-Year Changes for United at SFO 
Measure 
 2004/5  2005/6  2006/7 
 12/14 2/15 ∆ %  12/20 2/28 ∆ %  12/19 2/27 ∆ % 
Max. number of flight arrs. or 
deps. in a 15-minute interval 
 
14 12 -2 -14%  14 11 -3 -21%  13 13 0 0% 
Max. number of flight operations 
in a 15-minute interval 
 
19 14 -5 -26%  17 16 -1 -6%  18 17 -1 -6% 
Number of flights flown into 
or out of hub 
 
398 409 11 3%  445 440 -5 -1%  454 433 -21 -5% 
Total available seat miles flown 
into or out of hub (000s) 
 
51350 52590 1241 2%  57228 55063 -2165 -4%  58077 56735 -1342 -2% 
Number of destinations served 
from hub 
 
42 44 2 5%  46 48 2 4%  48 48 0 0% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of arrivals 
 
131.4 121.3 -10.1 -8%  101.7 87 -14.7 -14%  88.1 90.2 2.1 2% 
Coefficient of variation in 
number of departures 
 
129.9 141.5 11.6 9%  128.2 101.9 -26.3 -21%  112.8 112.3 -0.5 0% 
Percentage of flights served 
by affiliate airline(s) 
 
40.5% 44.0% 3.5% 9%  42.7% 45.5% 2.8% 7%  45.2% 41.1% -4.1% -9% 
Percentage of flights served in 
peak period 
 
75.4% 71.6% -3.8% -5%  68.5% 65.7% -2.8% -4%  64.8% 65.8% 1.0% 2% 
Number of potential 
Connections 
 
3508 3742 234 7%  4066 3621 -445 -11%  3802 3493 -309 -8% 
Average connections per 
arriving flight 
 
17.5 18.4 0.9 5%  18.3 16.8 -1.5 -8%  16.7 16.2 -0.6 -3% 
Maximum potential connections 
serving a market 
 
14 11 -3 -21%  16 13 -3 -19%  14 17 3 21% 
*Bold percentages are for measures identified to be likely due to depeaking 






Bolded percentages represent changes most evident by United’s depeaking. Compared to 
other cases, the SFO case has less evidence to show that depeaking occurred. The most 
important change was the reduction in the coefficients of variation. Although there was a 
reduction in the number of flights and ASMs for the depeaking year, the years before and 
after also showed changes that were similar. Even the peak percentage which dropped 4% 
overall, did not have as substantial a drop as the year prior, a drop of 5%. It appears 
United was continually adjusting SFO’s schedule, and thus the depeaking which occurred 
is hard to pick out in the supply measures. The coefficients of variation’s drop, however, 
do provide good evidence that a shift occurred. The depeaking potentially led to drop in 
potential connections per arriving flight. 
 The year-over-year measurements are also useful in comparing the demand and 
revenue changes. The time frame is longer in these cases, because the demand data is 
gathered for an entire quarter, but the results are still useful. The year-over-year changes 
for revenue and total passengers are not included because these values heavily depend on 
what is going on in the market, more so than the schedule. Thus RASM is used in 
comparison still with the RASM of the airline network and for the industry.  
 One measurement which is useful in terms of demand in measuring it year-over-
year is the percentage of connecting passengers. The percent of connecting passengers in 
2005/6, had a lower increase than what occurred in 2004/5 and 2006/7. There was a 
change of 1% in the depeaking year, while the years before and after had changes of 7% 
and 8%, respectively. It is possible that connecting traffic was inhibited by the depeaking 
schedule change which reduced potential connections. 
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 The change in RASM for United’s SFO schedule slightly exceeded the RASM 
changes across the rest of United and the industry in the depeaking year as compared to 
the years before and after, as shown in Table 4.57. The one percent decrease in RASM 
over the depeaking period was behind the growth of the network and the industry by a 
smaller margin than the losses that occurred in the surrounding years. The gross change 
differences are nearly the same across the three years, ranging from 0.87 to 1.59. So 
although the depeaking year saw a slight improvement compared to other years, it seems 
more on par and not enough to say depeaking improved the revenue situation for United. 
 
Table 4.57  RASM Year-Over-Year Changes for United at SFO 
Measure 
2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 
Q4 Q1 ∆ % Q4 Q1 ∆ % Q4 Q1 ∆ % 
RASM for 
Depeaked Airport 
6.49 5.84 -0.65 -10% 6.68 6.62 -0.06 -1% 6.98 6.44 -0.54 -8% 
RASM for 
Airline Network 
8.76 9.7 0.94 11% 10.02 11.06 1.04 10% 10.6 11.1 0.50 5% 
RASM for 
Industry 
9.04 9.72 0.68 8% 10.5 11.31 0.81 8% 10.4 11.1 0.70 7% 
 
 
Operations at SFO were seen in the depeaking year to generally improve relative to the 
rest of United’s network and the industry. Only the percentage of departing delayed 
aircraft worsened when using a difference-in-difference method of comparison. When 
looking year-over-year, however, not all of these changes still were unique to the 
depeaking year, as shown in Table 4.58. Departure delay still stood out as an 
improvement unique to the depeaking year as the year before and year after had a 
departure delay changed at SFO on par with the comparative measures. Arrival delay was 
similar, with the depeaking year change showing a notable reduction in delay in relation 
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to the comparative measures and the change in the year before and year after being on par 
with their respective comparative measures. The percentage of delayed departing aircraft 
at SFO did not improve as much as United’s network and the industry in the depeaking 
year, but it had been on par in the year before and year, and thus this change was still 
notably poor for United. The percentage of delayed arriving aircraft, however, which saw 
a slight improvement over the comparative measures in the depeaking year, did not stand 
out when compared year-over-year. In both the year before and year after this measure 
changed similarly in relation to the United network and the industry as it did in the 
depeaking year. 
 
Table 4.58  Operations Year-Over-Year Changes for United at SFO 
Measure 
2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 
Dec Feb ∆ % Dec Feb ∆ % Dec Feb ∆ % 
Dep. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
53 50.1 -2.9 -5% 72 53.7 -18.3 -25% 54.7 58.4 3.7 7% 
Dep. Delay Airline 
Network 
55.5 55.8 0.3 1% 62.8 57.7 -5.1 -8% 57.3 60.3 3 5% 
Dep. Delay  
Industry 
54.2 50.4 -3.8 -7% 50.8 51 0.2 0% 56 56.8 0.8 1% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Depeaked Airport 
24.9 17.9 -7 -28% 32.4 28.6 -3.8 -12% 29.4 28.7 -0.7 -2% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Airline Network 
22.6 16.3 -6.3 -28% 28.3 21 -7.3 -26% 25 26.7 1.7 7% 
% Delayed Dep. 
Industry 
23.3 17.4 -5.9 -25% 24.3 19.8 -4.5 -19% 24.4 25.5 1.1 5% 
Arr. Delay 
Depeaked Airport 
57.2 53.5 -3.7 -6% 78.1 54.9 -23.2 -30% 59.4 61.2 1.8 3% 
Arr. Delay Airline 
Network 
53.6 52.1 -1.5 -3% 62.1 55.2 -6.9 -11% 55.9 58 2.1 4% 
Arr. Delay  
Industry 
53.3 48.7 -4.6 -9% 50.6 49.7 -0.9 -2% 55.1 55.7 0.6 1% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Depeaked Airport 
30.3 22.8 -7.5 -25% 39.1 30.3 -8.8 -23% 30.6 36.1 5.5 18% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Airline Network 
24.7 19.1 -5.6 -23% 30.9 24.4 -6.5 -21% 26.8 31.9 5.1 19% 
% Delayed Arr. 
Industry 
26.1 20.9 -5.2 -20% 27.5 22.9 -4.6 -17% 27.9 29.4 1.5 5% 
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In summary, the supply changes for United at SFO did not change drastically as 
compared to other cases. The year-over-year measurements do not show consistency, 
however, but rather a range of changes occurring over time. United seemed to be 
experimenting with the schedule, and depeaking was one such experiment. RASM did 
not drop from depeaking, and saw a slight improvement, but since the schedule measures 
were not drastic, it is hard to say if depeaking helped boost RASM. The changes in 
operations experienced by United for the most part were notable even when compared 




The SFO case is unique because of the longer time period over which United depeaked 
the hub’s operations. In addition, the hub was the least depeaked of all the cases, and 
most of the supply measures did not have noteworthy changes when compared year-over-
year. The most telling statistic was the coefficients of variation which showed that United 
did create a more even schedule. The small change resulted in a drop in potential 
connections for United per arriving flight, which likely led to the connecting passenger 
percentage which lagged behind other years. 
 Operationally, United saw an improvement in operations at SFO after depeaking. 
In addition, RASM saw a slight improvement. It is difficult to say whether these changes 





4.8 Passenger Dwell Time and Revenue 
Depeaking has been shown in previous studies to be associated with extended transfer 
times in the terminal for connecting traffic (Bogusch, 2003; Jiang, 2006; Luethi et al., 
2009; Mecham, 2004). Because the tight banks no longer exist, passenger connection 
times become longer. Thus passengers are in the terminal space for a longer period of 
time and have a greater opportunity to purchase food and beverages as well as shop for 
retail items. 
 As was seen earlier, depeaked schedules operate across more 15-minute periods 
than peaked schedules. As a result, passengers arrive at the terminal at a more constant 
rate across the day. This is beneficial for concessionaries because it means that they have 
extended periods of business and do not need to staff for peak customer arrival times. 
Extended connection times and a steadier customer arrival rate may also induce more 
shopping as there are lower congestion levels in shops. These factors all play a role in 
increasing revenue for the airport. 
 The following results make use of the PANYNJ air traffic report from 2004 to 
2011, as described in the Methodology chapter. 
 
4.8.1 Significant Factors Affecting Purchasing 
Simple linear regression models are used to quantify relationships between transfer time 
in a terminal and airport revenue. Table 4.59 shows the results of nine simple regression 
models that examine the relationship between dwell time variables and various 
breakdowns of retail revenue. The table shows the adjusted R2 model fit statistics 
(coefficient of determination) for the nine simple regression models, the intercept and 
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parameter coefficient associated with the dwell time measure, and the significance of the 
dwell time coefficient. Total spending is the summation of food and beverage spending 
and retail spending. 
 
Table 4.59  Results for Nine Simple Regression Models Predicting Terminal Spending as a Function 











Average 6.456 + 0.055 
(0.267)* 
-4.425 + 0.258 
(0.313)** 
2.031 + 0.314 
(0.329)** 
Local 6.761 + 0.059 
(0.115) 
-4.204 + 0.285 
(0.155)* 
2.557 + 0.344 
(0.161)* 
Connecting 7.537 + 0.038 
(0.379)*** 
-1.843 + 0.192 
(0.534)*** 
5.694 + 0.229 
(0.543)*** 
Table reports intercept term + dwell time coefficient (adjusted R2) and significance levels of the dwell 
time coefficient:  
*0.05 significance level **0.005 significance level ***0.0005 significance level 
 
The simple regression that fits the data best is that between connecting passengers’ 
average dwell time and the total terminal spending. The coefficient indicates that for 
every additional minute in connecting passenger traffic’s dwell time, total spending on 
retail, food, and beverages increases about 23 cents. This relationship is displayed along 





Figure 4.65  Relationship between connecting dwell time and passenger spending. 
 
 
Three other simple regressions were used to explore the relationship between terminal 
spending and the percentage of connecting passengers traveling through the airport. The 
results of these regressions are shown in Table 4.60. 
 
Table 4.60  Results for Three  Simple Regression Models Predicting Terminal Spending as a 
Function of the Percentage of Connecting Passengers 
 Terminal Spending 








11.228 + 9.301 
(0.183)* 
17.964 + 43.377 
(0.216)* 
29.192 + 52.678 
(0.228)* 
Table reports intercept term + percent connecting coefficient (adjusted R2) and significance level of the 
percent connecting coefficient:  





The model that predicts total terminal spending as a function of the percent of connecting 
passengers has the highest R2 value. For every one percent increase in the percentage of 
connecting passengers, total terminal spending increases about 53 cents. This relationship 
is shown graphically with a best-fit line in Figure 4.66. 
 
 
Figure 4.66  Relationship between the connecting passenger percentage and passenger spending. 
 
 
The difference between the dwell time for local passengers and connecting passengers 
was also compared to passenger spending. For most years at each airport the difference 
was positive, reflecting that connecting passengers have longer dwell times at the airport, 
although one year at LGA had negative difference. The result of the simple regression 
between this difference and passenger spending is shown in Table 4.61.  
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 Similar to the previous regressions, the most significant relationship with the 
highest coefficient of determination was between all spending and percent connecting 
passengers. For every minute difference in the average dwell time between the 
connecting passengers and the local passengers, total terminal spending increases about 
34 cents. 
 
Table 4.61  Results for Three  Simple Regression Models Predicting Terminal Spending as a 
Function of the Average Dwell Time Difference 
 Terminal Spending 






Average dwell time for 
connecting passengers 
– average dwell time 
for local passengers 
11.115 + 0.054 
(0.415)** 
16.222 + 0.281 
(0.603)*** 
27.336 + 0.335 
(0.609)*** 
Table reports intercept term + dwell time difference coefficient (adjusted R2) and significance level of 
independent parameter:  
*0.05 significance level **0.005 significance level ***0.0005 significance level 
 
 
4.8.2 Spending in Terminals and Income 
Income was assessed to see its effect on passenger spending in terminals. Income is 
reported as the average passenger income at each airport for a given year. 
 It was hypothesized that an increase in the average income of the passenger base 
would increase spending on food, beverages, and retail. The issue that arose in relating 
spending to passenger income was the directionality of the relationship. An inverse, but 
well correlated, relationship was discovered between spending and income, indicating 
that as passenger income increased passenger spending decreased.  
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 This relationship is the opposite of what one would expect for spending in relation 
to income. The reason for the relationship may be that higher income passengers are 
more likely to be frequent flyers, and thus spend time in airline clubs and less time in the 
terminal. Thus, these higher income passengers do not spend as much in the terminal 
because of free food and drink in the clubs. In addition, frequent flyers are probably less 
likely to buy retail items because they are less likely to forget a travel essential or make 
an impulse buy.  
 Because it is an average income across all passengers that is being worked with, it 
is not surprising that it may not provide the expected results. In addition to the reason 
describe above, average incomes often are difficult to work with because the distribution 
behind the average could be shifting in ways that better reflect the movement of the 
response variable. 
 
4.9 Case Comparison 
The six case studies evaluated in this study have some similarities, but share a number of 
differences as well. Broadly, most cases saw the same types of supply changes, but they 
varied on how operations and revenue were affected. Even with the supply changes, there 
was a wide range in the degree of depeaking, from a large percentage drop in peak 
measures, such as at DFW, to a small percentage drop in peak measures, such as at SFO. 
Table 4.62 summarizes the noteworthy changes for each case, so that they can be easily 
compared across several categories. The notable changes are reported for their directional 
change, as the magnitude of the change is not comparable due to the unique situations at 
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Table 4.62  Notable Measure Changes Across Cases 
 Measure ORD DFW ATL PHL LAX SFO 
Supply 
Max. number of flight arrs. or deps. in a 15-minute interval –   – – – –  
Max. number of flight operations in a 15-minute interval  – – – –  
Number of flights flown into or out of hub + – + –   
Total available seat miles flown into or out of hub +  +    
Number of destinations served from hub    –   
Coefficient of variation in number of arrivals – – – – – – 
Coefficient of variation in number of departures – – – – – – 
Percentage of flights served by affiliate airline(s)       
Percentage of flights served in peak period – – – – –  
Number of potential connections + – – –   
Average connections per arriving flight  – – – – – 
Maximum potential connections serving a market   + +   
Demand 
Proportion of Connecting Passengers –     – 
RASM for Depeaked Airline at Depeaked Airport –  – –   
Operations 
Departure Delay – –   – – 
Percent Delayed Departing Aircraft – –   – + 
Arrival Delay –     – 
Percent Delayed Arriving Aircraft –      
Note: +/- indicates a change through difference-in-difference in the depeaking year analysis that is notable year-over-year. Green and red indicates a 
change which is objectively good or bad for the airline, respectively.






each airport at different points in time. Changes which are objective good or bad for the 
airline are noted in green and red, respectively. 
 
4.9.1 Supply Changes 
As seen in the previous table, nearly all the cases saw a decrease in the maximum number 
of flights in a 15-minute period. This is the biggest cost-cutting measure for an airline as 
it reduces the high levels of staffing needed to operate all those flights. All of the cases 
exhibited reductions in the coefficient of variation for arrivals and for departures. This 
reduction occurs for all cases because there is no longer as big a difference between the 
busiest and least busiest 15-minute periods. The periods are more consistent with activity, 
and thus the standard deviation decreases, and thereby decreases the coefficient of 
variation. Similarly, the peak percentage decreases for all cases except SFO. This shows 
that typically depeaking is verifiable using the peak and depeak measurements which 
were created for this study. The measurements are able to identify the spreading out of 
the busiest periods. 
 Depeaking does not necessarily require an airline to change its flight frequency. 
In two cases there is a certain decrease in the number of flights when depeaking occurred, 
while two cases saw an increase in flights (and in ASMs as well). For two cases there was 
not enough evidence to show a change occurred compared year-over-year. In addition, 
depeaking does not seem to be associated with having to reduce or increase the number 
of destinations served from the hub, and service can be maintained through the network. 
 The major issue with depeaking is the inevitable reduction in potential 
connections. Most cases saw a decrease in the gross number of potential connections, and 
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even more telling is that five of the six cases saw a decrease per arriving flight. This 
shows that banks are important in maximizing potential markets for passengers to fly, and 
depeaking causes a reduction in this potential. Although the ORD case saw an increase in 
the gross number of connections, it also had an increase in the number of flights. It did 
not have a corresponding positive increase in potential connections per arriving flight, so 
the gross increase is due to the increase in flights, not the depeaking strategy. 
 
4.9.2 Demand Changes 
Although all cases exhibited a drop in revenue over the depeaking period in relation to 
their respective airline networks and the industry, only three cases had changes which 
were noteworthy year-over-year. In the other three cases, revenue always lagged behind 
the rest of the airline and the industry year-over-year. It is gathered from these data that 
depeaking has the risk of being revenue negative, and does not appear to be able to 
increase revenue compared to a typical year. This is most likely due to the severing of 
potential connections which was seen to consistently occur in the supply changes. 
 Despite the drop in potential connections in the schedule, there does not appear to 
be an overwhelming indication that depeaking hurts connecting traffic. In the two cases 
where connecting traffic decreases, ORD and SFO, the former was described earlier as 
having a relatively low connecting traffic rate already for an airport of its type, and the 
latter had the unique depeaking case where changes happened slowly over time. Across 





4.9.3 Operations Changes 
From the results, depeaking appears to improve operations in most cases. Four of the six 
cases saw improvements in at least two of the four measures examined against the rest of 
the airline’s network and the industry. This gives indication that depeaking aids in 
reducing congestion for the runway and gate area allowing aircraft to have both a lower 
likelihood of being delayed and a lower amount of delay if it does so.  
 The two cases in which operations did not improve, ATL and PHL, stand out as 
different among the rest of the cases. There does not appear to a unique shared change in 
a supply measure between these two cases that would indicate a shared lack of a positive 
shift in operational performance. It is possible that these airports have other reasons why 
operations stayed the same after depeaking. These reasons could be hard to overcome, 
and thus why US Airways decided to repeak PHL. Overall, though, it seems that 
depeaking is more than likely to improve operations for the hub airline. 
 
4.10 Current Status of Cases 
As of March 2012, four of the six cases were still depeaked. American has maintained 
depeaking even through its 2011 bankruptcy at both its ORD and DFW hubs. United has 
also maintained a depeaked schedule at its LAX and SFO hubs. Delta repeaked its 
schedule and currently operates twelve daily arrival and departure banks out of ATL. US 
Airways kept a repeaked schedule from 2005 onward and PHL currently has eight arrival 
and departure banks.  
 The current status of the cases sheds light on what could be most critical for an 
airline when deciding to retain a depeaked schedule. The two cases which have since 
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been repeaked were the two cases which saw a negative effect on their operations: US 
Airways and Delta. It is possible that if a depeaking schedule does not work operationally 







The depeaking that occurred during the first part of the 2000s at U.S. hub airports 
appeared to have a mix of results. There is evidence that each airline had a unique 
strategy for changing the flight frequencies to its spoke network. This wide range of 
decision processes prohibits the creation of a comprehensive answer as to how to 
effectively depeak, but provides the potential knowledge that any airline considering 
depeaking should be careful to assess its revenue strengths and connection possibilities 
before shifting frequency between markets. The notable results of depeaking, though, 
suggest the basis for conclusions to be drawn regarding if and how schedules should be 
depeaked. 
 This chapter describes the key findings of this study, the conclusions which can 
be drawn from the results, and recommendations for practice. In addition, it provides 
perspective as to what is contributed to the field by this research. Lastly, it acknowledges 
the study’s limitations and provides suggestions for future research extending from this 
work. 
 
5.2 Key Findings and Conclusions 
The findings of this study and the conclusions which are able to be drawn from them can 
be broken into two types: those pertaining to airlines and those to airports. The following 
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two subsections discuss what can be gathered from this research project. A summary 
table is provided in Table 5.1 outlining the key takeaways from this study. 
 
Table 5.1  Key Takeaways from Study 
Key Takeaways 
Airline-pertinent 
• Depeaking is not seen as revenue positive. 
• Potential connections likely will reduce after depeaking. 
• Operations tend to improve from depeaking, but at the risk of a decreased 
ability to recover from bad weather. 
• Spoke level depeaking decisions are different for each situation, suggestive that 
depeaking does not happen in a vacuum. 
• Common components of depeaking include reducing high frequency flights 
and considering competitive factors. 
• When a strong competitive threat is present, there is potentially a greater 
chance that RASM will decrease. 
• Combination of losses in RASM and increases in operational delay likely leads 
to repeaking. 
Airport-pertinent 
• Operational improvements can occur for all airlines at the airport, and could 
potentially make the airport more attractive for service. 
• Evidence that airport revenue can increase with depeaking due to longer 
passenger connection times in the terminal. 
• Depeaking is particularly helpful for capacity-constrained airports. 




5.2.1 Airline-pertinent Conclusions 
Despite being a cost-cutting tool for airlines, depeaking has many risks that could 
ultimately make the schedule change a bad decision for airlines. The key concerns for 
airlines is that the research suggests that depeaking is revenue negative due primarily to 
the loss of connections in the schedule, and that the improvement in operations comes at 
a the risk of being less responsive to extreme delay cases (such as bad weather). Despite 
the variety of strategies that have been implemented in putting together a depeaked 
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schedule, there has not been a consistent method that has prevented an airline from 
falling behind in revenue. 
 As predicted in the literature, and found consistent with suggestive evidence in 
this study, depeaking an airline schedule negatively affects revenue. Across the six case 
study airports discussed in this research, all lagged behind the rest of the respective 
airlines and the industry as a whole when compared through a difference-in-difference 
comparison. More importantly, when examining the cases year-over-year, three of the 
cases had even larger degrees of lagging in the depeaking year as compared to the years 
before and after. The drop in RASM seen in these three cases indicates a probable daily 
revenue loss of between $300 thousand and $600 thousand, depending on the size of the 
RASM drop and the number of ASMs. There is a potential relationship between the 
revenue lag and the drop in the number of potential connections in the schedule. As seen 
in the results, there is evidence that the number of connections per arriving aircraft drops 
after depeaking. With less potential connections between arriving and departing flights, 
potential passengers may not be able to fly their desired itinerary on the depeaking 
airline.  
 This decrease in revenue leads to the conclusion that depeaking is a risk for 
airlines because it has the potential to reduce profit, depending on how much cost is 
actually cut by the airline. The airline would need to balance depeaking and cutting costs 
with revenue loss incurred from increasing connection times, and should strive to 
maintain short connection times for its most valuable connections to reduce lost revenue 
in these most profitable markets. 
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 Depeaking also poses operational benefits as well as operational risks. As seen in 
the results of this study, there is potential for depeaking to benefit operations by reducing 
delay and the percentage of delayed aircraft. By operating fewer flights per unit of time, 
there is less runway and gate area congestion. In addition, without tightly packed banks 
and short connection times, passengers have a better opportunity to make connections, 
and aircraft have less of a need to wait on passengers. This benefit, however, must be 
balanced out with the built in recovery time that banks provided. When bad weather 
causes aircraft to become delayed, the banked schedule allows for time in the schedule to 
recover as there are breaks in the day when relatively few aircraft arrived and departed. 
Depeaking removes these natural recovery periods, and thus delays can cascade through 
the day as there is less room for error (Jenkins et al., 2012).  
 Thus during good weather, there is evidence that suggests depeaking can 
eliminate common delays through decreased congestion and the spreading of activity. 
During bad weather, the airline has less of a chance to recover its schedule when aircraft 
start getting delayed. This leads to the conclusion that depeaking would be less successful 
at airports that are prone to weather delays. An airline must decide if the risk of having 
extreme delays during bad weather is worth the trade-off of having fewer delays on 
average. The former could have much more serious consequences, especially in the 
modern day with the U.S. government becoming stricter about long tarmac delays. 
 The decision-making process for depeaking is unique to each airline-airport 
combination. Even when examining the two American cases with which there was a 
regression model developed, there was not a similar strategy. This is suggestive of each 
depeaking airline having a unique range of factors it chose to rearrange its schedule. It 
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also suggests that depeaking does not happen in a vacuum but occurs within the 
competitive context. Among these different depeaking strategies, there is not a consistent 
method that caused larger revenue losses. 
 The situation of unique depeaking circumstances meant that a comprehensive 
model of spoke level decisions for depeaking was not able to be constructed. Within 
these differences, however, there was some consistency that a future airline considering 
depeaking could make use of in developing its own strategy. First, each of the cases 
focused on increasing either nonstop passenger traffic (PHL and LAX) or increasing 
connecting passenger traffic (ORD, DFW, and ATL). Thus an airline considering 
depeaking may need to decide which type of passenger they would like to target in 
increasing or decreasing frequency to spokes. Second, three of the five regression models 
showed an airline decision to decrease high frequency routes, indicating an airline 
preference to accomplish depeaking by removing flights where there was high activity. 
This likely occurred because as flights get spread out from the banks, it is likely that two 
flights to the same spoke may become closer together and make one of the flights 
redundant. Third, most of the cases had a competition component in consideration when 
depeaking. There were a variety of strategies, but most appear to go after competitors’ 
traffic in some way (e.g. increasing flights to other airlines’ hubs, taking attention away 
from routes where they were already “winning”, adding flights to where the depeaking 
airline held a fare premium). In summary, the most important factors to depeaking 
airlines appeared to be focusing on a single passenger type, decreasing flights on high 
frequency routes, and having a competitive component to the decision. 
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 Although revenue considerations played a role in all depeaking decisions, 
regression results suggest that airlines approached these revenue considerations 
differently. Four of the five cases considered ticket fares, but not in a consistent manner. 
Two of the cases increased frequency on higher fare routes, while one case decreased 
these same types of routes. The fourth case increased frequency on routes in which it had 
a fare premium over competitors. It was also notable that one case appeared to consider 
RASM. Thus, while revenue (in addition to competitor) factors influenced depeaking, the 
relative influence of revenue components varied by case. 
 One aspect of an airline’s schedule which does not get altered during depeaking is 
the depeaking airline’s relationship with its affiliates. As seen in all of the cases, the 
percentage of flights operated by affiliate airlines stayed near constant. The likely reason 
is that the affiliate airlines have capacity purchase agreements with the parent airline and 
this is still honored through the depeaking process. The most important change for 
affiliate airlines is that their operations which in the peaked schedule were concentrated 
in the banks are now more spread out along with the depeaking airline’s flights. The 
affiliate airline thus also experiences lower staff needs, and may have to cut staff in 
response to the parent airline’s depeaking. 
 A strong competitive threat at a depeaking airport appears linked to the potential 
to lose RASM during depeaking. The ORD, ATL, and PHL cases are characterized by a 
competitive threat, with United having a large hub alongside American at ORD, AirTran 
having a medium size alongside Delta at ATL, and Southwest strongly pursuing traffic 
out of PHL. All three of these depeaking cases saw a relative decrease in RASM when 
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compared year-over-year. As a comparison, Delta operated a small hub out DFW 
alongside American, and the DFW case did not see such a RASM decrease. 
 An airline’s decision to repeak seems tied to a worsening of operations and losses 
in RASM. The two cases examined in this study which have been repeaked are ATL and 
PHL, the only two cases of the six which experienced worse operations and lower RASM 
after depeaking. The drop in RASM could have been due to the competition threat, but 
poorer operations appears to be the breaking point for an airline to forego the cost savings 
of depeaking. 
 Meanwhile, the other case to lose RASM, ORD, improved in operations after 
depeaking. This improvement in operations could have offset the loss of RASM for 
American. In addition, RASM for American at ORD is likely not as important because of 
the high percentage of originating passengers and the overlapping networks of American 
and United. There is a greater need for American to drop fares across the network out of 
ORD in order to compete with United in garnering the large number of originating 
passengers, without which RASM would suffer even more. 
 
5.2.2 Airport-pertinent Conclusions 
The results of this research suggest that airports are likely to benefit from depeaking. 
There are potential gains to be made from both an improvement in operations and in the 
area of non-aeronautical revenue. In addition, as the depeaking airline reduces its gates to 
cut cost, opportunities for new airlines to enter a congested airport become available.  
When an airport is capacity constrained, its operations suffer for all airlines and 
its tendency for delay increases. This leaves the potential for negative effects for the 
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airport as airlines with flexibility may choose to fly to a secondary airport or not fly to the 
city at all, if an airline considers the risk to its network operations too high because of the 
potential of delay at the airport. In addition, for passengers who perceive the airport as a 
congested airport, there is the potential for passengers to choose another airline hub to fly 
through, resulting in less passengers facility charges collected by the airport.  
The benefit the airport could get from depeaking is overall improved operations. 
Not only the depeaking airline experiences an improvement in operations when it 
depeaks. As seen in the American/United at ORD case, American improved its operations 
with depeaking, but United also saw a large benefit, albeit not as great. Thus with 
competitors seeing a benefit in operations, the airport experiences less congestion on its 
runways, apron, and within the terminal. This is beneficial when trying to attract new 
entrants into the airport, or when competing against other airports in a multi-airport city. 
Although bad weather delays may cause the depeaking airline to not recover as well in 
terms of its hub operations, the airport as a whole has freed capacity that allows it to 
manage all airlines (non-hubbing competitors do not need to recover as substantially as 
the hub airline) during bad weather. 
Another reason for airports to prefer depeaking is the potential for increased non-
aeronautical revenue. As discussed in the literature review, often a very large portion of 
airport revenue is from concession sales, and depeaking only serves to improve this. The 
longer connection times that occur due to depeaking leave passengers dwelling in the 
terminal. As was seen in this study, dwell time increases are indicative of the potential for 
increases in food, beverage, and retail spending. These sales would directly benefit the 
airport. In addition, passengers not only dwell for longer, but are under less stress in a 
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less congested terminal. This decreased stress aids in inducing spending. Depeaking is 
thus very beneficial for airport revenue streams. In the unique case where the airline also 
owns the terminal and shares in the revenue from concessions, depeaking could also 
bring in some revenue for the airline. 
Airports also would serve to gain from depeaking because of the reduced gate 
needs of the depeaking hub airline. As the airline cuts its banks, it needs fewer gates to 
perform its operations. If the depeaking airline who had been using the gates relinquishes 
the lease on them (perhaps not immediately but over time), the airport would have gates it 
could offer to new entrants. This additional capacity can be used to open up new markets, 
increase competition on current routes, and allow the airport to market itself better to 
passengers. 
Because the results of this study lend credence to depeaking being beneficial for 
airports, airports may pursue a depeaking strategy and suggest a hub airline depeak. 
Particularly for capacity-constrained airports, depeaking may be a very attractive strategy 
because building additional airport capacity – such as new runways, taxiways, or terminal 
expansions – is very expensive, and requires substantial investment on the part of the 
airport authority. Although constructing capacity allows an airport to take in a greater 
number of flights per hour, it requires long term planning and may not be possible. 







5.2.3 Synthesis of Conclusions 
By putting together all that has been gathered from the produced results and the compiled 
conclusions, an overall statement on depeaking can be constructed. Putting aside the SFO 
case which had a number of issues, there are five remaining cases. These five cases and 
the important factors which are indicative of the potential for the success in depeaking are 
listed in Table 5.2. The regression models that shed light on the manner in which 
depeaking occurred at these airports indicated that depeaking does not happen in a 
vacuum. It appears depeaking was done with consideration given to the competitive 
context of the airport. Those airlines at airports with the largest competitive threats lost 
RASM.  
 








ORD Yes Down Improved 39% No 
DFW No Consistent Improved 47% No 
ATL Yes Down Consistent 54% Yes 
PHL Yes Down Consistent 32% Yes 
LAX No Consistent Improved 32% No 
 
 
A loss in RASM alone does not indicate a depeaking failure. If repeaking is considered to 
be an airline admitting a dislike of depeaking, two cases (ATL and PHL) would be 
considered to have had poor depeaking. The factor which these two cases have in 
common is they both experienced a drop in RASM when compared year-over-year and a 
worsening of operations. Meanwhile, ORD also lost RASM, but saw an improvement in 
operations that may have offset the RASM loss for American. In addition, because ORD 
338 
 
has a low connecting passenger percentage in relation to the other non-coastal hubs (ATL 
and DFW), it is very focused on capturing the originating traffic. This is accentuated by 
United also hubbing out of ORD, making capturing the originating traffic more important 
and reducing the focus on RASM.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
The following section includes recommendations from the author based on the key 
findings and conclusions that were discussed in the previous section. The 
recommendations are based on lessons learned in the literature, the results of the study, 
and the author’s experience with the topic. 
This research project is extendable for industry use. The compilation of domestic 
depeaking occurrences, the resulting changes which occurred in each case, and an 
analysis on how the airline was affected in terms of revenue and operations are 
informative to an airline debating changing its schedule. Airlines could use the results of 
the project to aid in determining the risks of depeaking at a given airport. The study 
provides one of the first assessments of how depeaking affects revenue and these insights 
can be used by airlines to compare revenue losses to their savings predictions. It is 
recommended that an airline assess which case study best fits their profile in terms of 
supply and competition, and learn from how the previous airline depeaked. 
 Despite the usefulness of the results derived from this study and the regression 
models developed, airlines should be hesitant to depeak. A motivation to cut cost is not 
enough to make depeaking a worthwhile decision because of the risk to revenue and 
operations. In addition, although depeaking can cut costs for the airline, it sacrifices their 
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strong network of connections on which the hub was built, and only if the airline is 
capacity constrained should depeaking be an option. A good starting point for the 
decision is if the airport is close to the FAA operations benchmark capacity, a suggestion 
from Jenkins et al. (2012). If capacity is available and the ability to add flights to banks 
exists, this should be done if possible.  
 If capacity is not available, airlines face an uphill battle getting an airport to build 
them additional capacity, such as a new runway or a terminal expansion, so that they can 
increase the number of flights in a bank. Capacity increases also take a long time to 
develop and build. Because adding to the sides of banks lengthens connection time at no 
savings in cost, depeaking becomes a viable option: the airline saves cost at the expense 
of increasing connection time and breaking some connections. Further, depeaking can be 
done quickly on an airline’s own timeline. Thus if an airline is reaching capacity in its 
banks, depeaking is an immediate solution that allows them to increase the number of 
flights in the schedule. 
 It is recommended that depeaking is best performed at large airport hubs with a 
low percentage of international flights, and airports that do not meet these conditions 
should not be depeaked. Large airport hubs, such as ORD, DFW, and ATL, have a large 
number of flights to work with when depeaking. With more flights, there is more 
flexibility in reducing the peak percentage of the schedule, and the airline has more 
options to move flights around and retain valuable connections. In addition, when a large 
hub is depeaked, the depeaked schedule still has a high number of operations per 15-
minute period, and thus connections are inevitable. A medium-sized hub is at a greater 
risk of losing a great number of its connections. With fewer banks in the schedule and a 
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lower number of flights, even a slight reduction in the peak percentage can break a 
substantial number of connections. Thus a large hub is better suited for depeaking.  
 A lower percentage of international flights is also recommended. Airline hubs 
with a large number of long-haul routes have many wide-body jets with high seating 
capacities that need to be filled. To fill these seats, a flight bank is very useful because 
many spoke cities can connect to the long-haul flight. These connections are reduced in a 
depeaked schedule, and make it more difficult for a wide-body jet to fill seats. The more 
an airport serves international destination, the greater the need for flight banking. 
 The spoke level regression model is recommended for airports to use in 
determining what an airline may do if it considers depeaking. If an airport believes that 
its hub airline is considering depeaking, it can make predictions as to what its available 
service will be for local passengers in the future. By being able to predict where 
frequency may be added or decreased, it can begin to prepare to attract other airlines to 
serve that market. 
 Depeaking is recommended for airports to suggest to their hub airline as a way of 
helping an airline avoid bankruptcy. Depeaking is beneficial for an airline, and helps the 
hub city avoid paying what Hanlon (1996) calls a “hubsidy”, where the city pays to help 
the airline avoid bankruptcy. Depeaking is a better option for the airport, airline, and city 
in this case. 
 Based on these recommendations and the conclusions described earlier, there is 
the basis for a recipe for success that describes what a good hub for an airline to depeak 
would look like. This recipe would include an airport which is capacity constrained, has a 
low international mix, is a large mid-continental hub, and lacks a strong competitive 
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threat. Consistent with the evidence shown in this study, these factors indicate the 
potential for a revenue risk reduction. 
 
5.4 Contributions 
This study makes many contributions to the body of knowledge on the airline industry, 
and certainly to what is known about depeaking. 
 Most important of the contributions is that this study lays out a road map for 
future depeaking studies. Although this study was limited by the use of publicly available 
data, how to conduct a study of depeaking has been outlined. Future studies can take this 
research project and learn how to approach examining depeaking if one has full schedule 
data from OAG, in order to analyze the revenue effects. It also provides indicators on 
what the factors of success are for depeaking, so they can be tested to further detail in the 
future. 
 At a basic level, this study contributes to the literature by identifying those 
airlines and airports that depeaked from 2000-2010, a list which is not found elsewhere. 
For those airlines which were carried through case studies, the context under which each 
airline depeaked is determined. By having several depeaking case studies examined 
simultaneously, it is possible to compare and contrast strategies and results for the first 
time. 
 Methodologically, this study develops data cleaning methodologies for public 
data, and develops a technique to combine On-Time and DB1B data despite their 
different time periods. In addition, a new methodology is developed to heuristically 
identify peaks within a peaked schedule, and schedule measures to capture peaked and 
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depeaked schedules were developed. Airlines, with greater access to industry data, can 
use the peak percentage and coefficient of variation measures to identify additional 
depeaking cases and compare peaked and depeaked schedules. Lastly, a methodology is 
developed for recreating historic schedules flown by parent and their affiliate carriers. 
 Most importantly, this is the first study to evaluate the revenue impacts of 
depeaking. In addition, it is the first to contribute to an understanding of the depeaking 
decision-making process so that in the future airlines can compare their current situation 
to past cases and assess their best course of action. It also is suggestive that depeaking 
does not happen in a vacuum, and that the competitive context matters. Finally this study 
quantifies relationships between passenger connection times and airport revenue. 
 Summarizing, the three most important contributions that this study provides are: 
1) it uses revenue and competitors’ system changes to assess the performance of 
depeaking, which has yet to be done in the literature; 2) it compiles six occurrences of 
depeaking domestically, allowing a comparison of what the different depeaking strategies 
are; and 3) it provides insights into factors associated with successful depeaking. 
 
5.5 Study Limitations 
This research project has several shortcomings that could not be overcome. At the base of 
many of these shortcomings is the inability to reproduce a full schedule due to the 
restrictions of using the data that was used. In addition, the data did not include the ability 





5.5.1 Not a Full Schedule 
This study uses the On-Time Performance Database to recreate historical airline 
schedules. This database is good for this purpose because it is publicly-available and has 
a data records for flights that includes departure and arrival times, origin and destination 
airports, and tail numbers. The On-Time database, however, does not provide for the 
ability to fully reproduce a schedule due to two main limitations. 
 First, the On-Time database does not include international flights. This is an issue 
because the depeaking hubs analyzed in this study are all primary connection points for 
international travel in their respective airlines’ networks, as well as in cities with strong 
global ties and thus considerable originating international traffic. Thus each case study is 
missing a proportion of their scheduled operations in the reproduced schedules because 
the international arrivals and departures are not accounted for. International trips are 
typically very important for an airline to capture, and the schedule must be arranged 
carefully around them in order to fill the seats in wide-body jets. Thus, it was not possible 
to make a formal conclusion in regards to how international flights are handled in 
depeaking, and how airlines should consider international traffic. 
 The second limitation to the On-Time database is it does not have all flights flown 
domestically, as many affiliate airlines are not required to report their on-time statistics. 
The only airlines that must report are those that have contributed at least one percent to 
scheduled domestic revenue, and thus many of the smaller affiliate airlines are left out. 
This effect is greatest in the early 2000s, before affiliate airlines became so prominent in 
the U.S. industry. Many flights that were scheduled by the parent airline are not reported 
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by the affiliate airline. Without these affiliate airline’s flights, a depeaking airline’s hub 
schedule cannot be fully reproduced. 
Public data can be used to gain a good picture of the schedule and the changes 
that occurred, but the dataset has the limitation of missing international and low-revenue 
affiliate airlines’ flights. Some of the airline’s depeaking changes could not be 
determined because this data gap was too large to definitively determine whether 
depeaking had actually occurred. Thus, many cases which could have been suitable for 
analysis had to be excluded (but could be examined by airlines who have more complete 
historic schedule data). In addition, in many situations, the affiliate percentage deviates 
from what the true value was, because smaller affiliate carriers were not represented. 
 
5.5.2 No Passenger Connection Times 
Because the DB1B data does not include passengers’ itineraries, only the airports through 
which they flew, it was not possible to make measurements on the change in connection 
times at a depeaked airport.  
 As discussed in much of the literature, a downside of depeaking is the elongating 
of dwell time for passengers at airports. This, combined with the loss of potential 
connections, is what drives passengers to fly through another hub in the network and 
cause a loss of revenue for the depeaking airline. Connection times could not be 
calculated using publicly-available data, however, so the conclusion of the literature 
could not be independently verified nor evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
 Without the ability to calculate dwell times, one of the key results of this study 
could not be used to its full potential. The result of the direct relationship between dwell 
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time and passenger spending could not be used to make predictions for each case. Doing 
so would have tied together these two portions of the study. 
 
5.6 Extensions for Future Work 
Based on the findings of this research, and the limitations within it was conducted, there 
are several recommendations for future research.  
Using historic OAG schedule data instead of On-Time Performance data should 
be a primary goal of any airline or researcher pursuing future work in depeaking. The 
OAG schedule data would provide a full list of affiliates and international flights which 
the lack of limited the conclusions of this study. With a full historical schedule, the cases 
which could not be confirmed for depeaking because of missing affiliates can be verified 
and analyzed with the same methods used in this report. Having more cases would allow 
a more full picture of depeaking to be painted, and there would be more data to check the 
conclusions of this study. 
With the inclusion of international flights, the location of where international 
flights are located in the flight banks of the peaked schedule and how they are shifted and 
handled in the depeaked schedule can be identified. This inclusion can provide answers 
as to how international flights are handled in the depeaking decision-making process, and 
what level of international flights is too much for a schedule to be depeaked. 
Another extension for future research would be to quantify the cost of a 
depeaking airline in both the peaked and depeaked schedule to a point where it could be 
compared to the revenue. If precise cost figures were available (if an airline was willing 
to share precise figures) a model could be developed to determine if the saved cost of 
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depeaking would outweigh lost revenue. Once these precise figures of cost are tied to 
revenue, an airline’s profit changes could be assessed. 
Developing a full-blown simulation that could simulate a depeaking event and 
predict its effects is another extension of this work. Simply, using cost data (as described 
as a need in the last paragraph) and this study’s revenue data, a simulation tool could 
make predictions given depeaking inputs, such as the airline’s goals in depeaking, peak 
percentage desired, and the capacity of the airport. Using this simulation tool, the 
viability of depeaking in the future could be examined. 
As described in the study limitations, calculating connection times would be 
useful in bolstering the findings of this study. Airlines can use their internal data to 
determine average connection times at the airport, and use this data to make predictions 
on airport concession revenue. 
Another suggestion for future work would be to look into gate usage before and 
after depeaking. Determining a source for this data would be the first step. This would 
also involve looking into how airlines structure their gate leases, and the types of 
contracts set up with the airports. If this data was available, an assessment into the exact 
gate needs of an airline before and after depeaking would be an additional evaluation 
criteria on the degree to which a schedule was depeaked. 
The addition of a game-theoretic approach would be useful for examining the 
cases in which there was either two hubbing airlines at an airport, or a strong competitive 
threat. With two major players, there could be a capacity constraint on the airport where 
neither airline has the ability to grow their network. However, there is the potential that 
an individual decision to depeak could be unilaterally poor for the airline which decides 
347 
 
to do so. Meanwhile, through cooperation, both airlines could potentially benefit – 
similar to putting slot controls on an airport. Through assessing such a situation through 
game theory, the benefits or risks of singularly depeaking can be determined. For 
example, the application of anti-trust immunity on scheduling decisions alone could be 
tested to see how airlines would use this to their advantage, with the potential of reducing 
delay in the system. 
The issue of diversion of passengers from a hub airport to other airline hub 
routings due to depeaking needs to be further explored. The existing data allows for the 
exploration of this issue because DB1B provides data on a passenger’s routing. By 
comparing the market share of hub airports for passengers flying between a given OD 
pair before and after depeaking, the potential exists to see if significant changes occurred 
in the routings. This analysis needs to be related to the shifts in frequency, potential 
connections, and ASMs over the same time periods at each of the hub airports being 
analyzed, to assess what factors controlled for any shifts in the network in an attempt to 
isolate the effect of the depeaking change. 
Lastly, a final extension would be to explore the shifts in RASM in cases where 
repeaking occurred. The RASM change that occurs from a depeaked to peaked schedule 
could be explored to see if RASM would have returned to what it would have been had 
the schedule never been depeaked. Assessing this requires being able to predict what 
would have changed in revenue streams had depeaking never occurred, and a method to 






16 PSA Airlines 
17 Piedmont Airlines 
AA American Airlines 
AS Alaska Airlines 
AX Trans States Airlines 
B6 JetBlue Airways 
CO Continental Airlines 
DH Atlantic Coast Airlines 
DL Delta Airlines 
EV Atlantic Southeast Airlines 
F9 Frontier Airlines 
FL AirTran Airways 
HP America West Airlines 
MQ American Eagle Airlines 
NW Northwest Airlines 
OH Comair 
OO SkyWest Airlines 
RP Chautauqua Airlines 
RU ExpressJet Airlines (until 8/31/2006) 
QX Horizon Air Industries 
TZ America Trans Air Airlines 
UA United Airlines 
US US Airways 
WN Southwest Airlines 
YV Mesa Airlines 
YX Republic Airlines 













ABE Lehigh Valley International Airport (Allentown, PA) 
ABI Abilene Regional Airport (Abilene, TX) 
ABQ Albuquerque International Sunport 
ABY Southwest Georgia Regional Airport (Albany, GA) 
ACT Waco Regional Airport 
ACV Arcata/Eureka Airport (Arcata, CA) 
AEX Alexandria International Airport (Alexandria, LA) 
AGS Augusta Regional Airport (Augusta, GA) 
ALB Albany Regional Airport 
AMA Rick Husband Amarillo International Airport 
APF Naples Municipal Airport (Naples, FL) 
ASE Aspen-Pitkin County Airport (Aspen, CO) 
ATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport 
ATW Outagamie County Regional Airport (Outagamie, WI) 
AUS Austin-Bergstrom International Airport 
AVL Asheville Regional Airport (Asheville, NC) 
AVP Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport 
AZO Kalamazoo/Battle Creek International Airport 
BDL Bradley International Airport (Hartford) 
BFL Meadows Field Airport (Oildale, CA) 
BGM Greater Binghamton Airport (Binghamton, NY) 
BGR Bangor International Airport (Bangor, ME) 
BHM Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport 
BMI Central Illinois Regional Airport (Bloomington, IL) 
BNA Nashville International Airport 
BOI Boise Airport 
BOS Logan International Airport (Boston) 
BPT Jack Brooks Regional Airport (Beaumont, TX) 
BQK Brunswick Golden Isles Airport (Brunswick, GA) 
BTR Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport 
BTV Burlington International Airport (Burlington, VT) 
BUF Buffalo Niagara International Airport 
BUR Bob Hope Airport (Burbank, CA) 
BWI Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport 
CAE Columbia Metropolitan Airport (Columbia, SC) 
CAK Akron-Canton Airport 
CEC Del Norte County Airport (Crescent City, CA) 
CHA Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport 
CHO Charlottesville-Albemarle Airport (Charlottesville, VA) 
CHS Charleston International Airport (Charleston, SC) 
CIC Chico Municipal Airport (Chico, CA) 
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CID The Eastern Iowa Airport (Cedar Rapids, IA) 
CLD McClellan-Palomar Airport (Carlsbad, CA) 
CLE Cleveland Hopkins International Airport 
CLL Easterwood Airport (College Station, TX) 
CLT Charlotte/Douglas International Airport 
CMH Port Columbus International Airport (Columbus, OH) 
CMI University of Illinois Willard Airport (Urbana-Champaign, IL) 
COS Colorado Springs Airport 
CRP Corpus Christi International Airport 
CRW Yeager Airport (Charleston, WV) 
CSG Columbus Airport (Columbus, GA) 
CVG Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport 
DAB Daytona Beach International Airport 
DAY Dayton International Airport (Dayton, OH) 
DBQ Dubuque Regional Airport (Dubuque, IA) 
DCA Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport 
DEN Denver International Airport 
DFW Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 
DHN Dothan Regional Airport (Dothan, AL) 
DLH Duluth International Airport (Duluth, MN) 
DRO Durango-La Plata County Airport (Durango, CO) 
DSM Des Moines International Airport 
DTW Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport 
ELM Elmira/Corning Regional Airport (Elmira, NY) 
ERI Erie International Airport (Erie, PA) 
EUG Eugene Airport (Eugene, OR) 
EVV Evansville Regional Airport (Evansville, IN) 
EWN Coastal Carolina Regional Airport (New Bern, NC) 
EWR Newark Liberty International Airport 
EYW Key West International Airport 
FAT Fresno Yosemite International Airport 
FAY Fayetteville Regional Airport (Fayetteville, NC) 
FLL Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport 
FLO Florence Regional Airport (Florence, SC) 
FNT Bishop International Airport (Flint, MI) 
FSM Fort Smith Regional Airport (Fort Smith, AR) 
FWA Fort Wayne International Airport (Fort Wayne, IN) 
GGG East Texas Regional Airport (Longview, TX) 
GNV Gainesville Regional Airport (Gainesville, FL) 
GPT Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport 
GRB Austin Straubel International Airport (Green Bay, WI) 
GRR Gerald R. Ford International Airport (Grand Rapids) 
GSO Piedmont Triad International Airport (Greensboro, NC) 
GSP Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport 
GTR Golden Triangle Regional Airport (Golden Triangle, MS) 
HKY Hickory Regional Airport (Hickory, NC) 
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HNL Honolulu International Airport 
HOU William P. Hobby Airport (Houston) 
HPN Westchester Country Airport (White Plains, NY) 
HSV Huntsville International Airport (Huntsville, AL) 
HVN Tweed New Haven Regional Airport (New Haven, CT) 
IAD Washington Dulles International Airport 
IAH George Bush Intercontinental Airport (Houston) 
ICT Wichita Mid-Continent Airport 
ILE Grosse Ile Municipal Airport (Grosse Ile, MI) 
ILM Wilmington International Airport (Wilmington, NC) 
IND Indianapolis International Airport 
IPL Imperial County Airport (Imperial, CA) 
IPT Williamsport Regional Airport (Williamsport, PA) 
ISP Long Island MacArthur Airport (Islip, NY) 
ITH Ithaca Tompkins Regional Airport (Ithaca, NY) 
IYK Inyokern Airport (Inyokern, CA) 
JAN Jackson-Evers International Airport (Jackson, MS) 
JAX Jacksonville International Airport 
JFK John F. Kennedy International Airport (New York City) 
LAW Lawton-Fort Sill Regional Airport (Lawton, OK) 
LAX Los Angeles International Airport 
LBB Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport 
LEX Blue Grass Airport (Lexington, KY) 
LFT Lafayette Regional Airport (Lafayette, LA) 
LGA LaGuardia Airport (New York City) 
LIT Little Rock National Airport 
LRD Laredo International Airport (Laredo, TX) 
LSE La Crosse Municipal Airport (La Crosse, WI) 
LWB Greenbrier Valley Airport (Lewisburg, WV) 
LYH Lynchburg Regional Airport (Lynchburg, VA) 
MAF Midland International Airport (Midland, TX) 
MCI Kansas City International Airport 
MCN Middle Georgia Regional Airport (Macon, GA) 
MCO Orlando International Airport 
MDT Harrisburg International Airport (Harrisburg, PA) 
MEI Meridian Regional Airport (Meridian, MS) 
MEM Memphis International Airport 
MFR Rogue Valley International-Medford Airport (Medford, OR) 
MGM Montgomery Regional Airport (Montgomery, AL) 
MHT Manchester-Boston Regional Airport (Manchester, NH) 
MIA Miami International Airport 
MKE General Mitchell International Airport (Milwaukee) 
MLB Melbourne International Airport (Melbourne, FL) 
MLU Monroe Regional Airport (Monroe, LA) 
MOB Mobile Regional Airport  
MOD Modesto City-County Airport (Modesto, CA) 
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MQT Sawyer International Airport (Marquette, MI) 
MRY Monterey Regional Airport (Monterey, CA) 
MSN Dane County Regional Airport (Madison, WI) 
MSP Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport 
MSY Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport 
MTJ Montrose Regional Airport (Montrose, CO) 
MYR Myrtle Beach International Airport  
OAK Oakland International Airport 
OGG Kahului Airport (Kahului, HI) 
OKC Will Rogers World Airport (Oklahoma City) 
OMA Eppley Airfield (Omaha) 
ONT LA/Ontario International Airport (Ontario, CA) 
ORD Chicago O’Hare International Airport 
ORF Norfolk International Airport 
ORH Worcester Regional Airport (Worcester, MA) 
OXR Oxnard Airport (Oxnard, CA) 
PDX Portland International Airport 
PFN Panama City-Bay County International Airport (Panama City, FL) 
PHF Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport 
PHL Philadelphia International Airport 
PHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport 
PIA General Wayne A. Downing Peoria International Airport 
PIT Pittsburgh International Airport 
PNS Pensacola International Airport 
PSP Palm Springs International Airport (Palm Springs, CA) 
PVD T.F. Green Airport (Providence) 
PWM Portland International Jetport (Portland, ME) 
RDD Redding Municipal Airport (Redding CA) 
RDM Roberts Field (Redmond, OR) 
RDU Raleigh-Durham International Airport 
RIC Richmond International Airport 
RNO Reno-Tahoe International Airport 
ROA Roanoke Regional Airport (Roanoke, VA) 
ROC Greater Rochester International Airport (Rochester, NY) 
RSW Southwest Florida International Airport (Fort Myers, FL) 
SAN San Diego International Airport 
SAT San Antonio International Airport 
SAV Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport (Savannah, GA) 
SBA Santa Barbra Municipal Airport (Santa Barbra, CA) 
SBN South Bend Regional Airport (South Bend, IN) 
SBP San Luis Obispo (San Luis Obispo, CA) 
SBY Salisbury-Ocean City Wicomico Regional Airport (Salisbury, MD) 
SCE University Park Airport (State College, PA) 
SDF Louisville International Airport 
SEA Seattle-Tacoma International Airport 
SFO San Francisco International Airport 
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SGF Springfield-Branson National Airport (Springfield, MO) 
SGU St. George Municipal Airport (St. George, UT) 
SHV Shreveport Regional Airport 
SJC San Jose International Airport 
SJT San Angelo Regional Airport (San Angelo, TX) 
SJU Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport (San Juan, Puerto Rico) 
SLC Salt Lake City International Airport 
SMF Sacramento International Airport 
SMX Santa Maria Public Airport (Santa Maria, CA) 
SNA John Wayne Airport (Orange County, CA) 
SPS Wichita Falls Municipal Airport (Wichita Falls, TX) 
SRQ Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport (Sarasota, FL) 
STL Lambert-St. Louis International Airport 
SUN Friedman Memorial Airport (Hailey, ID) 
SWF Stewart International Airport (Poughkeepsie, NY) 
SYR Syracuse Hancock International Airport 
TLH Tallahassee Regional Airport 
TOL Toledo Express Airport 
TPA Tampa International Airport 
TRI Tri-Cities Regional Airport (Tri-Cities, TN) 
TUL Tulsa International Airport 
TUP Tupelo Regional Airport (Tupelo, MS) 
TUS Tucson International Airport 
TVC Cherry Capital Airport (Traverse City, MI) 
TXK Texarkana Regional Airport (Texarkana, AK) 
TYR Tyler Pounds Regional Airport (Tyler, TX) 
TYS McGhee Tyson Airport (Knoxville, TN) 
VLD Valdosta Regional Airport (Valdosta, GA) 
VPS Northwest Florida Regional Airport (Destin, FL) 
XNA Northwest Arkansas Regional Airport (Fayetteville, AR) 






AFFILIATE AIRLINES IN EACH CASE STUDY 
 
 
The following tables list the affiliate airline exception processing inputs for each case 
study during the depeaking time period (peaked quarter, depeaking quarter, depeaked 
quarter). For the combinations that have two ticketing carriers for the same operating 
carrier for all or some of the spokes (or a specific spoke is if there is only one conflict), 
the bolded combination for the given bolded spokes is discarded. For that combination, 
the bolded ticketing carrier listed in these tables is not attributed the flights for the 
respective operating carrier. 
 
Case: American at ORD 






AA MQ AZO, BMI, BTR, CHA, CID, CLE, CLT, CMH, CMI, CVG, 
DAY, DBQ, DLH, DSM, EVV, FWA, GRB, GRR, GSP, 
HSV, IND, LSE, MDT, MEM, MKE, MQT, MSN, OMA, 
ORF, ORH, PIA, PIT, PWM, RIC, SDF, TOL, TVC, TYS, 
XNA 
 






AA MQ AZO, BMI, BTR, BTV, CHA, CID, CLE, CLT, CMH, CMI, 
CVG, DAY, DBQ, DLH, DSM, EVV, FWA, GRB, GRR, 
GSP, HSV, IND, LSE, MDT, MEM, MKE, MQT, MSN, 
OMA, ORF, ORH, PIA, PIT, PWM, RIC, ROC, SDF, TOL, 




Case: American at DFW 






AA MQ ABI, ABQ, ACT, AMA, BOI, BTR, CID, CLL, CMH, CRP, 
DAY, DRO, FSM, FWA, GGG, GRR, GSP, HOU, ICT, 
ILE, JAN, LAW, LBB, LIT, LRD, MAF, MEM, MKE, 
MSN, OKC, SAV, SGF, SHV, SJT, SPS, TUL, TXK, TYR, 
TYS, XNA 
YX MQ MKE 
 






AA MQ ABI, ACT, AMA, BOI, BTR, CID, CLL, CMH, CRP, CVG, 
DAY, FSM, FWA, GGG, GRR, GSO, GSP, HOU, ICT, ILE, 
JAN, LAW, LBB, LIT, LRD, MAF, MEM, MKE, MTJ, 
OKC, SAV, SGF, SHV, SJT, SPS, TUL, TXK, TYR, TYS, 
XNA 
AS MQ BOI 
YX MQ MKE 
 






AA MQ ABI, ACT, AMA, BOI, BTR, CID, CLL, CLT, CMH, CRP, 
CVG, DAY, FSM, FWA, GGG, GRR, GSO, GSP, HOU, 
HSV, ICT, ILE, JAN, LAW, LBB, LIT, LRD, MAF, MEM, 
MKE, MTJ, OKC, SDF, SGF, SHV, SJT, SPS, TUL, TXK, 
TYR, TYS, XNA 






Case: Delta at ATL 






AA AX STL 
US AX PIT 
DL EV ABE, ABY, AEX, AGS, APF, ATW, AUS, AVL, AVP, 
BNA, BQK, BTR, BUF, BWI, CAE, CAK, CHA, CHO, 
CHS, CLE, CLT, CRP, CRW, CSG, CVG, DAB, DCA, 
DFW, DHN, DSM, EVV, EYW, FAY, FLO, FNT, FWA, 
GNV, GPT, GRR, GSO, GSP, GTR, HOU, HPN, HSV, 
IAD, IAH, ICT, ILM, IND, ISP, JAN, JAX, LEX, LFT, LIT, 
LWB, LYH, MCN, MDT, MEI, MGM, MHT, MKE, MLB, 
MLU, MOB, MSY, MYR, OMA, ORF, PFN, PHF, PIA, 
PIT, PNS, ROA, ROC, SAT, SAV, SBN, SHV, SRQ, TLH, 
TOL, TRI, TYS, VLD, VPS, XNA 
DL OH ABE, ATW, AVP, BUF, BWI, CAK, CHS, CLE, CVG, 
DAB, DAY, DCA, DSM, EVV, FNT, GRR, GSP, HSV, 
IAH, ICT, JFK, LEX, MDT, MLB, PIT, ROA, ROC, SAV, 
SDF, SHV, STL, SYR, TLH, TOL, TYS, XNA 
CO RU CLE, IAH 
DL RU CLE 
UA YV IAD, ORD 

















AA AX STL 
UA AX PIT 
US AX PIT 
DL EV ABE, ABY, AEX, AGS, APF, ATW, AUS, AVL, AVP, 
BNA, BPT, BQK, BTR, BUF, CAE, CAK, CHA, CHO, 
CHS, CLE, CLT, CRP, CRW, CSG, DAB, DAY, DCA, 
DFW, DHN, DSM, DTW, EVV, EYW, FAY, FLO, FNT, 
FWA, GNV, GPT, GRR, GSO, GSP, GTR, HOU, HPN, 
HSV, IAD, IAH, ICT, ILM, IND, ISP, JAN, JFK, LEX, 
LFT, LIT, LYH, MCN, MDT, MEI, MEM, MGM, MHT, 
MKE, MLB, MLU, MOB, MSP, MSY, MYR, OMA, ORF, 
PFN, PHF, PIA, PIT, PNS, PWM, RIC, ROA, ROC, SAT, 
SAV, SBN, SHV, SRQ, STL, TLH, TOL, TRI, TUL, TYS, 
VLD, VPS, XNA 
NW EV GRR, MSP 
DL OH ABE, AVP, BUF, BWI, CAE, CAK, CHA, CLT, CRW, 
CVG, DAB, DAY, DSM, EVV, GSP, HSV, IAD, JFK, 
LEX, MKE, OMA, PIT, RDU, ROC, SDF, STL, SYR, TRI, 
XNA 
CO RU CLE, IAH 
DL RU CLE 
UA YV IAD, ORD 
















AA AX STL 
UA AX PIT 
US AX PIT 
DL EV ABE, ABY, AEX, AGS, APF, ATW, AUS, AVL, AVP, 
BNA, BPT, BQK, BTR, BUF, CAE, CAK, CHA, CHO, 
CHS, CLE, CLT, CRP, CRW, CSG, DAB, DAY, DCA, 
DHN, DSM, DTW, EVV, EYW, FAY, FLO, FNT, FWA, 
GNV, GPT, GRR, GSO, GSP, GTR, HKY, HOU, HPN, 
HSV, IAD, IAH, ICT, ILM, IND, ISO, ISP, JAN, JFK, LEX, 
LFT, LIT, LWB, LYH, MCI, MCN, MDT, MEI, MEM, 
MGM, MHT, MLB, MLU, MOB, MSP, MYR, OKC, OMA, 
PFN, PHF, PIA, PIT, PNS, PWM, RIC, ROA, ROC, SAT, 
SBN, SDF, SHV, STL, TLH, TOL, TRI, TUL, TUP, TYS, 
VLD, VPS, XNA 
NW EV GRR, MSP 
DL OH ABE, BUF, BWI, CAE, CAK, CHA, CRW, CVG, EVV, 
HSV, IAD, JFK, LEX, MKE, RDU, ROC, STL, TRI, XNA 
CO RU CLE, IAH 
DL RU CLE 
UA YV DEN, IAD, ORD 











Case: US Airways at PHL 






UA 16 DAY 
US 16 ABE, ALB, ATL, AVP, BGM, BGR, BHM, BNA, BTV, 
BWI, CAK, CHO, CLE, CMH, CVG, DAY, DCA, DTW, 
ERI, GSO, GSP, ITH, LGA, MDT, MHT, ORF, PHF, PWM, 
RIC, ROC, SCE, SDF, STL, SYR, TYS 
UA 17 ISP, LGA, PHF, ROA 
US 17 ABE, AVP, BGM, BUF, BWI, CHO, ELM, HPN, HVN, 
IPT, ISP, ITH, LGA, MDT, ORF, PHF, RIC, ROA, ROC, 
SBY, SCE, SWF, SYR 
AA RP STL 
US RP BGM, BTV, BUF, BWI, CLE, CMH, CVG, GSO, IND, 
LGA, ORF, RDU, ROC, SAV, SDF, STL, SYR 
UA YV CLE, IAD, STL 
US YV ABE, ALB, ATL, AVP, BDL, BGM, BGR, BHM, BNA, 
BOS, BTV, BWI, CAE, CHS, CLE, CLT, CMH, CRW, 
CVG, DCA, DTW, ELM, ERI, EWR, GRR, GSP, IAD, ITH, 


















UA 16 DAY 
US 16 ALB, ATL, AVP, BTV, BWI, CAK, CHS, CLE, CRW, 
DAY, DCA, DTW, EWR, GSO, IAD, ILM, IND, ITH, 
LGA, MSP, PHF, PWM, RIC, ROC, SDF, SYR, TYS 
UA 17 ISP, ROA 
US 17 ABE, AVP, BGM, BTV, BUF, BWI, CHO, ELM, HPN, 
HVN, IPT, ISP, ITH, LGA, MDT, ORF, PHF, ROA, ROC, 
SBY, SCE, SWF, SYR 
AA RP STL 
US RP ABE, AVP, BGM, BOS, BUF, BWI, CHS, CLE, CMH, 
DCA, DTW, ERI, GSO, GSP, IND, LGA, PHF, RDU, ROC, 
SCE, SDF, STL, SYR 
UA YV BNA, BTV, CLE, IAD 
US YV ABE, ALB, ATL, AVP, BGM, BGR, BHM, BNA, BTV, 
BWI, CAE, CHS, CLE, CLT, CMH, CRW, CVG, DCA, 
DTW, ELM, ERI, GRR, GSO, GSP, IAD, IND, MCI, MKE, 
MSP, ORF, PHF, PWM, RIC, ROC, SAV, SCE, SDF, STL, 
SYR 
 






UA 16 DAY 
US 16 ABE, ALB, BNA, BTV, CAK, CHS, CLE, CRW, DAY, 
DCA, DTW, GSO, HPN, IAD, ILM, IND, ITH, LGA, MSP, 
MYR, ORF, PHF, PVD, PWM, RDU, RIC, ROC, SDF, TYS 
UA 17 ISP, ITH, ROA 
US 17 ABE, AVP, BGM, BTV, BUF, BWI, CHO, ELM, EWN, 
HPN, HVN, IPT, ISP, ITH, LGA, MDT, ORF, PHF, RIC, 
ROA, ROC, SBY, SCE, SWF, SYR 
AA RP STL 
UA RP BUF 
US RP ABE, BUF, CHS, CMH, DCA, DTW, ERI, EWR, GSO, 
GSP, ILM, IND, LGA, ORF, PHF, RDU, SDF, SYR 
UA YV BNA, CLE, IAD, STL 
US YV ABE, ALB, ATL, AVP, BGM, BGR, BHM, BNA, BTV, 
BWI, CAE, CLE, CVG, DTW, ELM, ERI, GRR, GSO, 
GSP, IAD, ILM, IND, MCI, MHT, MKE, MSP, MYR, ORF, 




Case: United at LAX 






AA MQ FAT, MRY, PSP, SAN, SBA, SBP, SFO, SJC, XNA 
AS MQ FAT, PSP, SAN, SBP 
CO MQ PSP, SAN 
DL MQ FAT, MRY, PSP, SAN, SBA, SBP, SJC 
NW MQ FAT, PSP, SAN, SBA, SBP 
DL OO SLC 
UA OO BFL, CLD, COS, FAT, IPL, IYK, MRY, OAK, ONT, OXR, 
PHX, PSP, RNO, SAN, SBA, SBP, SGU, SJC, SLC, SMF, 
SMX, SNA, TUS, YUM 
AA QX BOI, MFR 
AS QX BOI, EUG, MFR, RNO, SUN 
F9 QX DEN 
UA ZW ASE 
 






AA MQ FAT, MRY, SAN, SBA, SBP, SFO, SJC, XNA 
AS MQ FAT, SAN, SBA, SBP 
CO MQ SAN 
DL MQ FAT, MRY, SAN, SBA, SBP, SJC 
NW MQ FAT, SAN, SBA, SBP 
DL OO SLC 
UA OO BFL, CLD, COS, FAT, IPL, IYK, MRY, OAK, ONT, OXR, 
PDX, PHX, PSP, RNO, SAN, SAT, SBA, SBP, SGU, SJC, 
SLC, SMF, SMX, SNA, TUS, YUM 
AA QX BOI, MFR 
AS QX BOI, EUG, MFR, RNO, SUN 












AA MQ FAT, MRY, SAN, SBA, SBP, SFO, SJC, XNA 
AS MQ SAN, SBA, SBP 
CO MQ SAN, SBA 
DL MQ FAT, MRY, SAN, SBA, SBP, SJC 
NW MQ FAT, SAN, SBA, SBP 
DL OO SLC 
UA OO BFL, CLD, COS, FAT, IYK, MRY, OAK, ONT, OXR, 
PDX, PHX, PSP, RNO, SAN, SAT, SBA, SBP, SGU, SJC, 
SLC, SMF, SMX, SNA, TUS, YUM 
AA QX BOI, MFR, RNO, SUN 
AS QX ACV, BOI, EUG, MFR, RDD, RNO, SUN 
F9 QX DEN 
 
Case: United at SFO 






DL OO SLC 
UA OO ABQ, ACV, BFL, BOI, BUR, CEC, CIC, COS, EUG, FAT, 
MFR, MOD, MRY, PDX, RDD, RDM, RNO, SAT, SBA, 
SBP, SLC, SMF, SNA, TUS 
AA QX PDX 
AS QX PDX 
NW QX PDX 
 






DL OO SLC 
UA OO ABQ, ACV, BFL, BOI, BUR, CEC, CIC, COS, EUG, FAT, 
MFR, MOD, MRY, ONT, PDX, PSP, RDD, RDM, RNO, 
SAT, SBA, SBP, SLC, SMF, SNA, TUS 
AA QX PDX 
AS QX PDX 
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